CC SR 20220118 05 - White Paper-Staff ReportCITY COUNCIL MEETING DATE: 01/18/2022
AGENDA REPORT AGENDA HEADING: Regular Business
AGENDA TITLE:
Consideration and possible action to adopt a Peninsula Utility Interdependency White
Paper.
RECOMMENDED COUNCIL ACTION:
(1)Adopt Resolution No. 2022-__, A RESOLUTION OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE
CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES, CALIFORNIA, ADOPTING A PENINSULA
UTILITY INTERDEPENDENCY WHITE PAPER FOR THE CITY OF RANCHO
PALOS VERDES.
FISCAL IMPACT: None
Amount Budgeted: N/A
Additional Appropriation: N/A
Account Number(s): N/A
ORIGINATED BY: Jesse Villalpando, Senior Administrative Analyst
REVIEWED BY: Karina Bañales, Deputy City Manager
APPROVED BY: Ara Mihranian, AICP, City Manager
ATTACHED SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS:
A.Draft Resolution No. 2022-__, adopting a Utility Interdependency White Paper
for the Cities of Rancho Palos Verdes, Palos Verdes Estates, Rolling Hills and
Rolling Hills Estates (page A-1)
B.Peninsula Utility Interdependency White Paper (page B-1)
C.Redline version of amendments to the Peninsula-wide Incident Communication
Protocol (page C-1)
D.Los Angeles County Sanitation Districts’ Emergency Response Contingency
Plans (page D-1)
E.SCE's 2021 Wildfire Mitigation Plan
F.SCE's Public Safety Power Shut-off Plans
BACKGROUND:
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CITYOF RANCHO PALOS VERDES
The four cities of the Palos Verdes Peninsula share similar geography, development
patterns, and exposure to similar types of natural hazards. Recognizing that greater
efficiencies are possible when emergency preparedness occurs in a regionally
coordinated manner, in 2019, the Peninsula cities formed a Regional Emergency
Preparedness Committee (REPC). The REPC is now known as the Peninsula Public
Safety Committee (PPSC) is comprised of two city council members from each Peninsula
city and meets quarterly to discuss collaborative efforts on ensuring Peninsula-wide
emergency preparedness. The objective of the PPSC is to enhance emergency
preparedness on the Peninsula by addressing joint preparedness efforts and responses
to widespread disasters affecting the greater Peninsula region.
Following presentations on resilience efforts by various utility companies serving the
Palos Verdes Peninsula to the PPSC in late 2019 and early 2020, the PPSC expressed
concern about the risks associated with a potential power outage affecting critical
infrastructure serving the Palos Verdes Peninsula. To address this concern, the PPSC
requested a white paper (Attachment B) be written that examines the potential
consequences of cascading failures of critical utility systems serving the Palos Verdes
Peninsula due to their interdependence vulnerabilities.
In response, the PPSC requested that the City of Rancho Palos Verdes and its
Emergency Services Coordinator take the lead in preparing the white paper, which is to
examine the vulnerabilities of power, water, sewer, and communication utilities as a result
of their interconnected nature and the potential consequences of a failure in one sector
affecting the other critical infrastructure sectors providing services to the Palos Verdes
Peninsula community.
The current draft of the white paper was authored by the City’s Emergency Services
Coordinator and highlights the historically identified interdependence vulnerabilities within
the critical infrastructure sector and further evaluates the potential consequences of one
utility sector failing and significantly impacting the other sectors on which it relies on or
provides services to function properly. Existing research and lessons learned about best
practices for responding to utility failures significantly aided in the infrastructure analysis
presented in this white paper.
The white paper analyzes the following critical infrastructure sectors servicing the Palos
Verdes Peninsula:
• Electricity (energy sector)
• Natural gas (energy sector)
• Telecommunication and information systems (communication sector)
• Water systems (water sector)
• Wastewater systems (wastewater sector)
At its November 18, 2021 meeting, the PPSC received and approved the final draft of the
white paper included in this report (Attachment B). Following this approval by the PPSC,
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the Peninsula cities were asked to share this report with their respective city councils for
review and adoption. This white paper serves as a working document for the Peninsula
cities and may be updated or modified as the result of further Peninsula city staff
collaboration and coordination.
DISCUSSION:
Due to the complexity and highly interdependent nature of the infrastructure sectors
providing essential services to the Peninsula community, disruption of one section by
natural or manmade disasters can severely impact the security and quality of life for the
community. Understanding the interdependencies among critical infrastructure systems
is vital in ensuring the resilience of a local community due to the important role critical
infrastructures play in society and the ability for their failure to cause severe disruption to
societal stability.
The attached white paper serves to establish a framework for identifying interdependence
vulnerabilities in the analysis of critical infrastructures serving the Peninsula community,
with the goal of equipping emergency planners with a fundamental understanding of
infrastructure interdependence in order to inform future emergency operation protocols.
The current draft aims to accomplish the following objectives, which were established at
the project's inception:
• Identification of critical infrastructure facilities and primary contact information for
utility stakeholders servicing the Peninsula community.
• Assessment of historically identified utility vulnerabilities due to their
interrelationship and reliability among one another.
• Development of a crisis communications protocol.
• Providing emergency planners with a basic understanding of infrastructure
interdependence and serving as a guide for future emergency operation response
efforts and protocols amongst the Peninsula cities.
Analysis of Infrastructure Interdependencies
The Peninsula community’s comfort and security rests upon a myriad of highly
interdependent critical infrastructure sectors that currently provide essential everyday
services. Critical infrastructure consists of a large number of sectors, including the electric
power grid, natural gas production, water, and water waste systems, as well as
telecommunications and information systems. These infrastructure systems depend upon
extensive interconnections and are part of a “system of systems” that ensures the quality
of life for the entire Peninsula community.
The analysis of infrastructure interdependence is complex and dynamic, and its number
and complexity continue to grow. There are numerous approaches to identifying
interdependencies. To manage these complexities, the current draft of this white paper
takes a top-down approach by outlining and establishing the following:
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(1) Providing an overview of how each critical infrastructure system functions in
general;
(2) Identifying how infrastructure sectors located within the Peninsula community
currently operate to serve the community;
(3) Identifying known historical vulnerabilities between critical infrastructure
systems as a result of their interconnectedness and dependability wit h one
another; and
(4) Modeling the potential consequences of a failure in one sector on other critical
infrastructure sectors that provide services to the Peninsula community.
Crisis Communications Protocol
The white paper is the result of the efforts of the four Peninsula cities of Rancho Palos
Verdes, Palos Verdes Estates, Rolling Hills, and Rolling Hills Estates to maintain a
constant state of readiness to provide uninterrupted services to their respective
communities prior to, during, and after an emergency incident. In support of this effort,
the City of Rancho Palos Verdes Emergency Services Coordinator reviewed and modified
previously established incident communications protocols among the Peninsula cities,
which were established by the Regional Law Committee in response to the homicide at
the Promenade on the Peninsula on May 3, 2018.
The revised communication protocols incorporate the following updates, which are
included in the final draft of this white paper. Attachment C contains a copy of the following
redline changes to the existing Peninsula Wide Communication protocol.
− Addition of Protocol Number 6: During a regional emergency declared by the
county, state, or federal government, the Peninsula Cities will coordinate with the
County Office of Emergency Management to ensure unified messaging about the
incident.
− Addition of Protocol Number 7: To ensure unified messaging, the Peninsula
Cities will only post incident emergency information that has been approved by the
agency that has jurisdiction over the incident. Individual Peninsula Cities may still
post emergency and incident information that is directly under their City’s purview.
− Addition of Protocol Number 8: In the event of a power outage and/or a loss of
cell service impacting the entire Palos Verdes Peninsula , the Peninsula Cities will
work cooperatively (to the best extent possible) to implement the following
strategies for information distribution:
o Regional emergency phone hotline
o Deployment of Information Stations (large wooden sandwich boards) to
post information when other means of communication are impaired at key
locations (dependent on the situation and where it is needed.)
o Printed materials to distribute to Emergency Information Stations
o Flyers for in-person distribution
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o Loudspeakers in vehicles
The PPSC reviewed various draft versions of the White Paper and directed City Staff to
include items pertaining to communication systems, cyber security, water reservoirs, and
septic wastewater sectors during these meetings. As a result, the white paper has been
revised to incorporate these changes.
The final draft of this white paper concludes a multi-year process that began in November
2019 with the PPSC and involved the identification of critical infrastructure utilities serving
the Palos Verdes Peninsula, conducting an exhaustive review of existing emergency
policies and developing new emergency protocols, as well as ongoing collaboration and
dialogue between utility companies and the Peninsula cities.
Rancho Palos Verdes is the first Peninsula city to bring the white paper to its city council
for consideration and adoption. The other three cities of Palos Verdes Estates, Rolling
Hills, and Rolling Hills Estates will bring the same white paper to their c ity councils for
consideration in the coming weeks. If substantive revisions are desired by any of the city
councils, they can be brought to PPSC at a later date for consideration as needed.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
Coordination with Utility Companies
As part of this white paper preparation, City Staff initiated discussions with the various
utility companies serving the Palos Verdes Peninsula, including Southern California
Edison (SCE), California Water Service (Cal Water), the Los Angeles County Sanitation
Districts, Cox Communications, and the Southern California Gas Company (SoCalGas),
regarding the report's identified interdependent vulnerabilities. Staff received numerous
comments and input from utility representatives throughout the report's development,
including receiving and reviewing the Los Angeles County Sanitation Districts’ Emergency
Response Contingency Plans (Attachment D), Southern California Edison's wildfire
mitigation and public safety power shut-off plans (Attachments E and F), and meeting
with various representatives to discuss the possibility of a ripple effect from a single
infrastructure sector failure.
It should be noted that due to the high complexity of analyses of critical infrastructure
interdependence, additional coordination is required to gain a better understanding of the
infrastructure sectors’ processes and interoperability with other infrastructures. The
analysis of the infrastructure sector contained in this white paper provides a high-level
summary of interoperations affecting infrastructure serving the Palos Verdes Peninsula
based on existing research. This document is intended to provide emergency planners
with a foundational understanding of infrastructure interdependencies and how they can
be used to inform future emergency operation protocols and serve as a starting point for
recognizing interdependencies in critical infrastructure analysis.
CONCLUSION:
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The white paper is intended to ensure the continuity of critical government services during
utility outages. Thus, Staff recommends the City Council adopt the attached resolution
(Attachment A), thereby adopting the Peninsula Cities' Utility Interdependence White
Paper for the City of Rancho Palos Verdes.
ALTERNATIVES:
In addition to the Staff recommendation, the following alternative actions are available for
the City Council’s consideration:
1. Do not adopt the draft resolution, thereby not adopting the Peninsula Cities' Utility
Interdependence White Paper
2. Take other action, as deemed appropriate.
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Resolution No. 2022-_
Page 1 of 2
RESOLUTION NO. 2022-__
A RESOLUTION OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY
OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES, CALIFORNIA, ADOPTING
A PENINSULA UTILITY INTERDEPENDENCY WHITE
PAPER FOR THE CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES.
WHEREAS, the City of Rancho Palos Verdes is vulnerable to natural hazards
which may result in loss of life and property, economic hardship, and threats to public
health and safety; and
WHEREAS, The California’s Standardized Emergency Management System
(SEMS) and the Federal National Incident Management System (NIMS) legislation
require the creation, maintenance, training, and exercising of emergency response
protocols by every local government; and
WHEREAS, the City Council approved and adopted the 2020 City of Rancho
Palos Verdes and Rolling Hills Estates Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan on
November 17, 2021, and subsequently the plan was approved by FEMA on November
24, 2020; and
WHEREAS, the City of Rancho Palos Verdes is committed to maintaining and
enhancing a high quality of life and safety for all residents; and
WHEREAS, the Peninsula Public Safety Committee (PPSC) is comprised of
elected officials from the cities of Palos Verdes Estates, Rolling Hills, Rolling Hills
Estates, and Rancho Palos Verdes who meet quarterly to discuss collaborative efforts
aimed at ensuring Peninsula-wide emergency preparedness; and
WHEREAS, the City of Rancho Palos Verdes' Emergency Services Coordinator
has authored a white paper that examines the interrelationship vulnerabilities of the
Palos Verdes Peninsula’s power, water, gas, and sewer utilities, as well as the potential
consequences of escalating utility failures; and
WHEREAS, on November 18, 2021, this white paper was submitted to the PPSC
as a final draft for distribution to the Peninsula cities' respective city councils for
adoption; and
WHEREAS, this white paper shall serve as a regional working document that
may be updated or modified with the collaboration and coordination of Peninsula staff.
NOW, THEREFORE, the City Council of the City of Rancho Palos Verdes does
hereby resolve as follows:
Section 1: The foregoing recitals are true and correct and are incorporated
herein by reference.
A-1
Resolution No. 2022-_
Page 2 of 2
Section 2. The City Council hereby approves and adopts the Peninsula Utility
Interdependency White Paper for the City of Rancho Palos Verdes.
Section 3. The City Clerk shall certify to the passage, approval, and adoption
of this resolution, and shall cause this resolution and its certification to be entered
in the Book of Resolutions of the City Council of the City.
PASSED, APPROVED and ADOPTED this 18th day of January 2022
___________________
David Bradley, Mayor
Attest:
____________________
Teresa Takaoka, City Clerk
State of California )
County of Los Angeles ) ss
City of Rancho Palos Verdes )
I, Teresa Takaoka, City Clerk of the City of Rancho Palos Verdes, hereby certify
that the above Resolution No. 2022-_ was duly and regularly passed and adopted by
the said City Council at a regular meeting thereof held on January 18, 2022
____________________
Teresa Takaoka, City Clerk
A-2
INFRASTRUCTURE INTERDEPENDENCY
VULNERABILITIES ASSESSMENT
PALOS VERDES PENINSULA
WHITE PAPER JANUARY 2022
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THIS PAGE WAS LEFT BLANK INTENTIONALLY
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary: ………………………………………………………………………….......…………… Page 4
Introduction: ………………………………………………………………………………………………….……Page 7
Methodology:………………...……...………………….….............................................................................Page 8
Community Profile: ……………………………………………………………………...…...….....…………... Page 11
Cyber Security Vulnerability Considerations: …………….…...………………………….....…....……..... Page 17
Electricity General Overview: …....................................…….…....................................….……........…... Page 18
Electricity Background Palos Verdes Peninsula: …..............….…………....…….…....……….........… Page 19
Electricity Interdependencies: …….…....……….…....……….…………........…….….…....……………….Page 21
Natural Gas I General Overview: …...…....……….…....…….…....………...………….......……..................Page 24
Natural Gas Background: Palos Verdes Peninsula: .…...….………………………...…………………….Page 25
Natural Gas Interdependencies: …….…....……….…....……….…....……….…...................…..................Page 27
Communications Systems General Overview: …….….......…….…....…………….………..……………..Page 29
Communications Systems Background: Palos Verdes Peninsula: …...….……….………..………......Page 30
Communications Systems Interdependencies: …...….…….………...………..……………..……...…....Page 30
Water General Overview: …….…......…….…....……….……................….…....………….…......................Page 33
Water Background: Palos Verdes Peninsula: …….…....……….…………..………………….……..........Page 34
Water Interdependencies: …….…....……….…....……….…………....….…....………………….…....…….Page 36
Wastewater General Overview: …….…...……....…....……………...…………………………..….…...........Page 38
Wastewater Background: Palos Verdes Peninsula: ……...…....……………………………...……...……Page 38
Wastewater Interdependencies: …...…….…....……….……...….…........……….…………….….…..........Page 39
Conclusion: ………...….….…….……...….…....……….….…......….........…….…....………….….….....…...Page 41
Communication Protocols...….……...….…....……….….….............…...…….…...…………...….…...…....Page 42
References: ………..…...……….……...….…....……….….….............…...…….…...……………....…...…....Page 44
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This white paper was developed as a result of the four Peninsula cities of Palos Verdes Estates,
Rancho Palos Verdes, Rolling Hills, and Rolling Hills Estates’ efforts to ensure a constant state of
readiness to provide uninterrupted services to their respective communities, before, during
and after an emergency incident. The City of Rancho Palos Verdes led the development of this
white paper as a result of the Palos Verdes Peninsula Public Safety Committee’s (PPSC) direction in
exploring the potential effects of cascading failures of critical utility systems servicing the Palos
Verdes Peninsula due to their interdependencies’ vulnerabilities.
WHAT IS CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE?
The Palos Verdes Peninsula communities’ comfort and security rests upon myriad highly
interdependent critical infrastructure sectors that provide essential everyday services. Critical
infrastructure consists of a large number of sectors, including the electric power grid, natural gas
production, water and water waste systems, as well as telecommunications and information
systems. These infrastructure systems depend upon extensive interconnections and are part of a
“system of systems”1 that ensures the quality of life for the entire Palos Verdes Peninsula
community.
In the United States, the Patriot Act of 2001 defines critical infrastructure as those “systems and
assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or
destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national
economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.”
Generally, critical infrastructure can be defined as the electricity that powers our homes, the
water we drink, the transportation that gets us around, the stores where we shop, and the
Internet and communications that enable us to stay in touch with friends, family, and coworkers.
The energy infrastructure sector is of most importance as the sector needs to be operating
properly in order for all other sections of critical infrastructure, such as natural gas
production, water, and wastewater systems, and telecommunications and information
systems, to perform as needed. These other critical infrastructures are dependent on the
energy sector to maintain functionality, and vice versa—that is, they are interdependent.
The importance of critical infrastructure protection and interconnectedness was highlighted
in 1998 when the Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection2 recognized
that the security, economic prosperity, and social well-being of the nation depend on the
reliable functioning of our increasingly complex and interdependent infrastructures.
These include water supply and wastewater systems, energy system s (electric power, oil, and
gas), communications, transportation (road, rail, air, and water), banking and finance, and
emergency and government services.
WHAT ARE THE THREATS AND HAZARDS TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE?
Both natural and manmade (intentional or unintentional) events have the potential to harm,
damage, disable, or destroy critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure has long been exposed
to physical threats and natural disasters and is now becoming increasingly vulnerable to cyber
threats. These risks arise as a result of the increasing integration of information and
communications technologies with critical infrastructure and adversaries intent on exploiting B-4
potential cyber vulnerabilities. As physical infrastructure becomes increasingly reliant on
complex cyber systems to operate, critical infrastructure may become more vulnerable to specific
cyber threats.3
Due to the interconnections and interdependence of infrastructure elements and sectors,
damage, disruption, or destruction to one infrastructure element can have cascading effects,
affecting the continued operation of another. Identifying and comprehending the
interdependence (two-way) or dependency (one-way) between infrastructure elements and
sectors is critical for assessing risks and vulnerabilities and determining the best course of
action for increasing security and resilience. For instance, the electric grid operates with
the assistance of integrated information and communication systems from other
critical infrastructure sectors.3
Consequences resulting from one infrastructure sector failing can generate cascading failures
across the entire infrastructure system. The location of critical infrastructure lifelines is
typically not shared among different utility operators, thus resulting in a majority of these
infrastructure placements being unknown.5 The colocation of multiple lifelines also increases
the likelihood that failure in one system can damage and interrupt others. Severe disruption of
one section of the critical infrastructures sector caused by natural or manmade disasters can
cause undue damage to the security and sustainable living of a community. Because of the
essential role the infrastructure sector plays and the ability for its failure to cause severe
disruption to a society’s stability, the understanding of interdependencies among these critical
infrastructure systems is essential in ensuring the resilience of a local community.
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SUMMARY OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE INTERDEPENDENCIES
ELECTRICITY NATURAL GAS WATER COMMUNICATIONS WASTEWATER
ELECTRICITY
Highly connected and
interdependent
infrastructure
Power needed for
pumping stations,
storage, control
systems, and facilities
Power for control
system monitoring,
pumps and facilities
temperature control
(e.g., cooling of
equipment), fire
suppression, potable
water
Power needed for control
facilities, communication
towers, and remote
monitoring capabilities
Power needed for
control systems,
sewage pumping and
treatment, and for
facilities
NATURAL GAS
Fuel for heat,
generators, and
facilities
Highly connected and
interdependent
infrastructure
Fuel for treatment,
heat, pumps and lift
stations, and facilities
Fuel for heat, generators,
and facilities
Fuel for treatment,
heat, pumps and lift
stations, and facilities
WATER
Temperature control
(e.g., cooling of
equipment), fire
suppression, potable
water
Water for production,
cooling, and emissions
control
Highly connected and
interdependent
infrastructure
Temperature control
(e.g., cooling of
equipment), fire
suppression, potable
water
Wastewater removal
service, raw water
supply for
hydroelectric
generation
WASTEWATER
Sewage wastewater
services for facilities
Sewage wastewater
services for facilities
Sewage wastewater
services for facilities
Sewage wastewater
services for facilities
Sewage wastewater
services for facilities
COMMUNICATIONS
Telecommunication
for daily operations
and supervisory
control and data
acquisition (SCADA)
systems
SCADA
communication, and
customer service and
crew repair
communication
Control system,
SCADA
communication, and
customer service and
crew repair
communication
Highly connected and
interdependent
infrastructure
SCADA
communication, and
customer service and
crew repair
communication
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I -0'-, ' -..
0
INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
The four cities of the Palos Verdes Peninsula share similar geography, development patterns,
and exposure to similar types of natural hazards. Recognizing that greater efficiencies are
possible when emergency preparedness occurs in a regionally coordinated manner, in 2019 ,
the Peninsula cities formed a Regional Emergency Preparedness Committee (REPC). The
Regional Emergency Preparedness Committee (REPC) (now known as the Palos Verdes Peninsula
Public Safety Committee) consists of two city council members from each of the Peninsula cities
and meets on a quarterly basis to discuss collaborative efforts on ensuring Peninsula-wide
emergency preparedness. The objective of the Palos Verdes Peninsula Public Safety Committee
(PPSC) is to enhance emergency preparedness on the Peninsula by addressing joint preparedness
efforts and responses to widespread disasters affecting the greater Peninsula region.
Following presentations from utility companies servicing the Peninsula, the PPSC expressed
concern regarding the risks associated with the possible loss of power to critical infrastructure
utilities servicing the Peninsula community. In response to this concern, the Committee
motioned for the City of Rancho Palos Verdes’ Emergency Services Coordinator to take the lead
in creating a white paper that examines the interrelationship vulnerabilities of utilities servicing
the Peninsula community.
This white paper highlights historically known interdependencies of the critical infrastructure
sector and evaluates the potential effects of the failure of these utilities. Utilizing potential
cascading and escalating effects established by existing research and lessons learned on best
practices in responding to utility failures, this study will recommend areas of improvement in
the integration of analysis findings into emergency planning considerations for the Palos Verdes
Peninsula community.
This paper first discusses a general overview of how utilities currently provide services, then
covers background on the physical infrastructure sectors located in the community, and the
interdependencies between each sector and other critical infrastructure systems, and the
potential consequences that could result from cascading and escalating failures. This project aims
to support long-term emergency planning for the Peninsula cities through an infrastructure
interdependency vulnerability assessment, contributing to the resiliency of the Palos Verdes
Peninsula community.
PROJECT OBJECTIVES
The following objectives were established at the outset of the white paper project:
− Identification of critical infrastructure facilities and primary contact information for
utility stakeholders servicing the Palos Verdes community
− Assessment of historically identified utility vulnerabilities due to their interrelationship
B-7
and reliability among one another
− Development of a crisis communications protocol
− Providing emergency planners with a basic understanding of infrastructure
interdependence and serving as a guide for future emergency operation response efforts
and protocols among the Peninsula cities
METHODOLOGY
Due to the complexity and highly interdependent nature of the critical infrastructure sectors
providing essential services to the Peninsula community, disruption of one section by natural or
manmade disasters can severely impact the community’s security and quality of life.
Understanding the interdependencies among critical infrastructure systems is key to ensuring
the resilience of a local community because of the roles those critical infrastructures play in
society and the ability of their failure to cause severe disruption to societal stability.
DEFINING KEY TERMS:
• DEPENDENCY: A dependency is a “linkage or connection between two infrastructures, by
which the state of one infrastructure influences or is reliant upon the state of the other.”
A dependency is a unidirectional relationship between two assets where the operations
of one asset affect the operations of the other. For example, a water treatment plant
depends on communications services that support the supervisory control and data
systems required to control plant operations.8
• INTERDEPENDENCY: An interdependency is a “bidirectional relationship between two
infrastructures in which the state of each infrastructure influences or is reliant upon the
state of the other.” An interdependency can be defined as a two-way relationship
between two assets where the operations of both assets affect each other. 8
T B
ASSET A
ASSET A BIDIRECTIONAL RELATIONSHIP ASSET B
B-8
INTERDEPENDENCY
CATEGORIES OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEPENDENCIES
Critical infrastructure is in constant interaction with its environment, using and transforming
inputs from the environment to provide outputs to the same environment. Th ese interactions
between critical infrastructure and its environment can be characterized into three categories:
Category of
Dependencies Definition
Upstream
− The products or services provided to one infrastructure by
another external infrastructure that are necessary to support
its operations and functions.
Internal
− The interactions among internal operations, functions, and
missions of the infrastructure. Internal dependencies are the
internal links among the assets constituting a critical
infrastructure (e.g., an electric generating plant that depends on
cooling water from its own onsite water well).
Downstream
− The consequences to a critical infrastructure’s consumers or
recipients from the degradation of the resources provided by a
critical infrastructure.
CLASSES OF DEPENDENCIES
Infrastructure interdependencies vary in scale and complexity, ranging from local connections
(municipal water supply and emergency services) to regional connections (electric power
coordinating councils), national connections (interstate natural gas and transportation systems),
and international connections (telecommunications and banking and finance systems).
Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly (2001) classified infrastructure interdependencies as one of four
types: physical, cyber, geographic, or logical. Physical interdependencies involve disruptions that
physically impact one or more other infrastructures. The risk of failure from normal operating
conditions in one infrastructure will be a function of risk in another infrastructure. The four
categories of infrastructure interdependencies are described in the table below:
Dependency and Interdependency Classes
Class Description
Physical
Interdependence
− Physical interdependencies involve disruptions that physically
impact one or more other infrastructures.
Cyber
Interdependence
− Cyber interdependencies occur when the operation of one
infrastructure is dependent upon another infrastructure via
information or communication links.
Geographic
Interdependence
− Geospatial interdependencies involve the physical proximity
of one infrastructure to another.
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Logical
Interdependence
− Logical interdependencies occur when the state of one
infrastructure is dependent upon another due to some
economic or political decision.
Source: “Analyzing Cross- Sector Interdependencies,”40th Annual Hawaii International Conference onSystem
Sciences (HICSS’07), James P. Peerenboom, Ronald E. Fisher, 2015,
https://publications.anl.gov/anlpubs/2015/06/111906.pdf
APPROACHES TO CHARACTERIZING DEPENDENCIES
TOP-DOWN APPROACH:
Each dependency has its own characteristics; therefore, analyzing dependencies requires
different approaches to successfully consider their category, class, and dimension(s). These
approaches can generally be described as either top-down or bottom-up. Top-down
approaches consist of analyzing a system in its entirety and then focusing on its component
parts. Bottom-up approaches consist of analyzing the component parts of a system and
building on this analysis to describe the system as a whole.
Infrastructure interdependencies are complex
and dynamic and continue to grow in
number and complexity, resulting in systems
that are increasingly vulnerable to cascading
and escalating effects across infrastructure
sectors. There are numerous approaches to
identifying interdependencies. To manage
these complexities, this white paper uses a
top-down approach of defining how the
overall critical infrastructure system
functions in general; current infrastructure
functions in a particular geographical region
context; the interdependencies between
that sector and other critical infrastructure
systems; and the potential consequences that
could result from a disruption of services.
The following critical infrastructure sectors servicing the Palos Verdes Peninsula are analyzed
in this white paper:
• Electricity (energy sector)
• Natural gas (energy sector)
• Telecommunication and information systems (communication sector)
• Water systems (water sector)
• Wastewater systems (wastewater sector)
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HOIJV 11H E OVERALL CRITICAi!. [N FRASTRUCT\J RE SYSTEM
FUNCT1IONS UN GEINcRAL • HO\lll CURIRENT JNFRASTRUCTU 1RE HJNCTIONS IN A
PAHTtCULA'RGEOGRAPHICA'L.A:REA
[NTE'ROE!'ENCJENCIES a:erw:em OTHER CRITT'JCAL
l1NF RAS'IRUC:T\JRE SYSTEMS
• POTEJNTllAL OONSEQUEINCES THATOOULD IRIESUL.T FROM A
10CSRUPTION OF S,ERVJCES
PALOS VERDES PENINSULA PROFILE
The Palos Verdes Peninsula has a unique physiography, formed over millions of years of
submerging and lifting from the Pacific Ocean. Once an island, the Peninsula is nine miles wide
by four miles deep, now rises above the Los Angeles Basin, with the highest elevation at
1,480 feet. The terrain of much of the planning area is rolling hills, steep slopes, canyons,
and coastal bluffs. Several active park sites and an extensive amount of preserved natural
open space and passive parkland, particularly along the Peninsula’s coastline, provide the
majority of recreational resources for residents. The Palos Verdes Peninsula is made up of
four cities: Rolling Hills, Rolling Hills Estates, Rancho Palos Verdes, and Palos Verdes Estates,
as well as the unincorporated community of Westfield/Academy Hill. The Palos Verdes
Peninsula is bounded on the north by Torrance, on the south and west by the Pacific Ocean,
and on the east by Lomita and San Pedro (Los Angeles).
The Palos Verdes Peninsula has one of the most ideal climates in the world. Its average maximum
and minimum temperatures range approximately between 67-68°F and 50-54°F, and the
average annual precipitation is approximately 13 inches. The predominant wind, the sea breeze,
is a primary factor in creating this climate and typically flows from the west-southwest in a day-
night cycle with speeds generally ranging from 5 to 15 mph. The sea breeze maintains the cool
temperatures and clean air circulation and generally prevents warmer inland temperatures and air
pollution from permeating into the Peninsula, except under certain seasonal conditions
such as the offshore Santa Ana winds.
The Palos Verdes Peninsula
has a total population of
about 67,067 (PVE 13,434,
RPV 42,030, RH 1,513, RHE
8,169, and the
unincorporated areas of
the Peninsula 1,921). The
Palos Verdes Peninsula
includes an area of
approximately 17.78 square
miles (PVE 4.77 sq mi RPV
13.6 sq mi, RH 2.99 sq mi,
and RHE 4.18 sq mi).4
MAP OF THE FOUR PENINSULA CITIES
B-11
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THREATS AND HAZARDS
The Peninsula cities’ hazard mitigation plans identify the following hazards posing a
significant threat against the Palos Verdes Peninsula area:
Earthquake
Wildfire
Earth movement
Tsunami
Hazardous materials
Human-caused events
Utility-related events
As an example of risks faced by the Peninsula cities can be found in the City of Rancho Palos
Verdes Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan’s Calculated Priority Risk Index ranking table
for the city, as depicted below. This table indicates a generalized perspective of the
community’s vulnerability of the various hazards according to extent (or degree), location, and
probability, with four (4) as the highest probability and one (1) as the lowest probability. For
example, the probability of a wildfire in Rancho Palos Verdes is the highest probability with
the probability of a three (3).
Source: City of Rancho Palos Verdes Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan
WILDFIRE VULNERABILITY
The Palos Verdes Peninsula has always been vulnerable to wildfire hazards due to its
numerous steep canyons and open scrub brush-covered hillsides. The Palos Verdes Peninsula
is surrounded by dense brush and other vegetation that, if ignited, could pose a threat to
B-12
■
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Hazard
Earthquake -Palos Verdes M7 .3
Earthquake -San Andreas M7.8
Earthquake-Newport-Inglewood M7.2
Wildfire
Utility-Related Events
Earth Movement
Hazardous Materials
Human-Caused Events
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residential areas via wind-borne embers and direct ignition from uncontrolled fires. The most
recent significant fire igniting on the Peninsula was on August 27-28, 2009, when a wildfire
burned through approximately 230 acres. The fire is believed to have originated from wildlife
interference and was exacerbated by the wind in the Portuguese Bend Nature Reserve, located in
the city, where 165 acres were charred. The remaining 65 acres burned in the neighboring
Peninsula city of Rolling Hills. Dozens of homes were threatened, and approximately 1,200
residents were forced to evacuate. 5
State law requires that all local jurisdictions identify very high fire hazard severity zones (VHFSZ)
within their areas of responsibility. California Government Code section 51178 requires the
California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (Cal Fire) to identify VHFHSZs using
consistent statewide criteria. Fire hazard is established using a number of applicable criteria.
Inclusion within these zones is based on vegetation density, slope severity, and other relevant
factors that contribute to fire severity. Based on this criteria, the four Peninsula cities are
generally classified as VHFHSZs, as illustrated in the maps below.
.
B-13
PALOS VERDES ESTATES RANCHO PALOS VERDES
R.1ncho P.110, \ t.•u.h_•..,
~-
ROLLING HILLS ROLLING HILLS ESTATES
Rolling H11I .. Rollm g Ifill-., 1 ... 1.11t.•-.
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IDENTIFICATION OF PRIMARY CONTACTS AND STAKEHOLDERS
The following primary contacts for utilities servicing the Peninsula:
UTILITY TYPE VENDOR NAME
Water California Water Service Company
Natural Gas Southern California Gas Company
Electricity Southern California Edison (SCE)
Communications/Internet Cox Communications
Communications/Internet DirectTV
Communications/Internet Frontier Communications (FiOS)
Waste removal (PVE) Athens
Sanitation LA County Sanitation District
Waste Removal (RPV) EDCO
Waste Removal (RH) Republic Services
Waste Removal (RHE) Waste Management
***Due to the sensitivity of the information in the identification of primary contacts, these are
redacted from public view.
CRITICAL FACILITIES
Critical facilities are essential to the health and welfare of the whole population and are
especially important following hazardous events. The most critical municipal facilities for the
Palos Verdes Peninsula are those that support public administration and emergency operat ions,
police, fire, and emergency medical and emergency communications.
Critical facilities are places that provide emergency services or serve people who would be
impacted by an emergency. Examples include hospitals, fire stations, police stations, emergency
services facilities, utility facilities, and communication facilities. Critical facilities can also include
the transportation system and schools. Due to the size and composition of the Palos Verdes
Peninsula, many of the critical facilities that serve the city are located outside of Peninsula.
CITY HALL LOCATIONS FOR THE PENINSULA CITIES
PENINSULA CITY CITY HALL LOCATIONS PHONE
NUMBER
Palos Verdes Estates
City Hall
340 Palos Verdes Drive West
Palos Verdes Estates, CA 90274 310-378-0383
Rancho Palos Verdes
City Hall
30940 Hawthorne Blvd.
Rancho Palos Verdes, CA 90275 310-544-5200
B-14
Rolling Hills City Hall 2 Portuguese Bend Rd.
Rolling Hills, CA 90274 310-377-1521
Rolling Hills Estates
City Hall
4045 Palos Verdes Drive North
Rolling Hills Estates, CA 90274 310-377-1577
EMERGENCY SERVICES
Law Enforcement Services:
The cities of Rolling Hills, Rolling Hills Estates, and Rancho Palos Verdes jointly contract
with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department for law enforcement services. The
Lomita Sheriff’s Station provides police protection to these cities. The City of Palos Verdes
Estates has its own police department. Officers are assigned to different divisions such as
traffic, patrol, and detectives. The city also has its own dispatch center and jail.4
Fire Protection Services:
Currently, the four Peninsula cities contract with the Los Angeles County Fire Department for
fire suppression, enforcement of the Fire Code, and paramedic services. Concurrently, Los
Angeles County Fire also provides emergency ambulance service. 4
FIRE AND POLICE STATIONS SERVICING THE PALOS VERDES PENINSULA
Type of
Asset Name Address Phone
Number
Police (PVE) Palos Verdes Estates
Police Department
340 Palos Verdes Drive West
Palos Verdes Estates, CA 90274 310-378-4211
Police (RPV,
RH, RHE)
LA County Sheriff’s
Department - Lomita
Station
26123 Narbonne Ave.
Lomita, CA 90717
310-539-1661
Fire LA County Fire Dept.
Station 2
340 Palos Verdes Drive West
Palos Verdes Estates, CA 90274 310-373-6539
Fire LA County Fire Dept.
Station 6
25517 S. Narbonne Ave.
Lomita, CA 90717 310-326-2461
Fire LA County Fire Dept.
Station 53
6124 Palos Verdes Drive South
Rancho Palos Verdes, CA, 90275 310-377-3333
Fire LA County Fire Dept.
Station 56
12 Crest Rd. West
Rolling Hills, CA 90274 310-377-1584
Fire LA County Fire Dept.
Station 83
83 Miraleste Plaza
Rancho Palos Verdes, CA 90275 310-831-4624
Fire LA County Fire Dept.
Station 106
27413 Indian Peak Rd.
Rolling Hills Estates, CA 90275 310-377-9523
B-15
AREA HOSPITALS:
The the following acute care hospitals in Torrance and San Pedro are located approximately 15
minutes away from the Palos Verdes Peninsula.
AREA HOSPITALS
Name Address Phone Number
Del Amo Hospital Torrance 23700 Camino Del Sol
Torrance, CA 90505 (310) 530-1151
Harbor - UCLA Medical Center 1000 W. Carson St.
Torrance, CA 90502 (424) 306-4000
Providence Little Company of
Mary Medical Center - Torrance
4101 Torrance Blvd.
Torrance, CA 90503
(310) 540-7676
Providence Little Company of
Mary Medical Center -San Pedro
1300 W. 7th St.
San Pedro, CA 90732
(310) 832-3311
Torrance Memorial Medical
Center
3330 Lomita Blvd.
Torrance, CA 90505 (310) 325-9110
B-16
CYBER SECURITY VULNERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS
Cyber security refers to the protection of everything related to the internet, from networks,
to the information stored in computer databases and other applications, to devices that
control equipment operations via network connections. Without launching a physical attack,
attackers can cause damage to physical infrastructure by infiltrating the digital systems that
control physical processes, damaging specialized equipment, and disrupting vital services.
While often dismissed as an issue only for information technology departments, cyber
security is an area of increasing concern for infrastructure resiliency.
Almost every aspect of a critical infrastructure sector is vulnerable to a cyberattack. For example,
the transmission and distribution system that transports power from the generator to the users
is vulnerable to cyberattacks. Power misrouting, spoofed reports of power outages, and other
malicious attacks could result in power outages even when the system was functioning
normally. In the worst-case scenario, such an event could cause a cascading failure, in
which one outage causes a power surge, which causes another outage. While their effects
are not as immediate as those of direct threats, additional cyber security threats include
data breaches, in which unauthorized users obtain personal or other confidential information,
such as billing and account information or even meter data. Keeping all of these kinds of data is
critical for retaining customer trust in the power distribution system. 6
MITIGATING CYBER SECURITY THREATS
There are a variety of protocols and techniques for mitigating cyber security threats that may
be appropriate to incorporate and address in emergency planning efforts, many of which are
already widely used in the information technology industry. The first step is to understand
the vulnerabilities. Once threats are identified, some common methods of mitigating them
include:
− Instituting access control policies: Restricting access to key terminals, files, and
networks to individuals who have the training and the need to work with those
resources.
− Adopting security protocols: In some cases, failure to use industry-standard antivirus
software and failure to install security patches and upgrades have resulted in severe
consequences.
− Monitoring systems: Constant monitoring of system usage and assessing abnormal
usage patterns on systems can help identify vulnerabilities and attacks before
major problems occur.
− Training: Individuals responsible for ensuring the reliability of the system need to
be trained to recognize and respond to security threats, as even the most advanced
security technology can be undermined by a lack of awareness.
− Testing: Security protocols and procedures need to be tested, and it may make sense
for the planning process to include regular exercises (some of which simulate
cyberattacks and responses), as well as penetration tests/ security evaluations by third
parties to identify potential vulnerabilities.
B-17
ELECTRICITY GENERAL OVERVIEW
In the United States, the electricity infrastructure system is currently comprised of a complex
network of power plants, transmission and distribution lines, and end users. The majority of
Americans now get their electricity from centralized power plants t hat generate electricity
through a variety of energy sources, including coal, natural gas, nuclear energy, and renewable
energy sources such as water, wind, and solar energy. Often referred to as the electric power
grid, this intricate system consists of e lectricity being generated at power plant stations,
transmitted to substations via high voltage lines, and then distributed to end -users via the
distribution system at lower voltages. 7
All sectors of the critical infrastructure systems network rely on el ectricity to function, the failure
of this sector has the potential for widespread impact and failures across all critical
infrastructure sectors currently serving the Peninsula community.7
How Electricity Gets To Your Home
(1) Electricity generation: Electricity is generated in a power plant using fossil fuels or
renewable energy sources ranging from coal and natural gas to hydroelectric and wind
energy. The forces of gas, steam, wind, water, solar, biomass, geothermal, and even
nuclear fission are typically used to power large spinning turbines. These power plant
stations generate electricity through the use of these spinning turbines, which are then
connected to the transmission system.
(2) Transformers: Once generated, the electrical current is then sent through
transformers, which increase the voltage so the power can be pushed over long
distances.
B-18
power plan t
generates electrioty n:;:.
transm iss ion hnes carry
elec ci ty long di stances
distribution lines carry
electncity to houses
transfonner steps
up voltage or
transmiss ion
neighborhood
trans former steps
down voltage
Source : pied from abooal En gy E~cabon Dev lopmen t Projcet (publi c d0mi111 )
transformers on po les
step n electnoty
be fore 11 enters houses
(3)Transmission lines: The electrical charge is then transported over long distances from the
generating facility to various locations via transmission lines that span across the United States.
(4)Substations: At the other end of a transmission line is a substation that uses
transformers to lower the voltage so the electricity can be distributed to customers at a
usable voltage.
(5)Distribution lines: The electricity is then sent through distribution lines to neighborhoods.
Smaller transformers reduce the voltage again to make the power safe to use in homes.
These smaller transformers may be mounted on power poles or sitting on the ground
(they’re the big green boxes, called pad mount transformers).
(6)Your home: The electricity then connects to consumers’ homes, where it passes through
a meter that measures the amount of electricity used. Finally, electricity travels through
wires inside the walls to the outlets and switches in consumers’ homes.
Electricity Background - Palos Verdes
Southern California Edison (SCE) provides the supply of electrical power to municipal,
commercial, and residential customers on the Palos Verdes Peninsula. SCE operates the Harbor
Generating Station, a 474-megawatt natural gas facility located south of Wilmington, which
supplies a majority of electrical power to the Palos Verdes Peninsula.
The electric infrastructure is made up of resource facilities and a distribution network. The power
distribution network consists of major source lines (66 K.V.), which run from power generating
resource facilities to local substations and the lesser transmission lines, which in turn deliver
power to customers in a usable state. The electrical power distribution infrastructure in Rancho
Palos Verdes is designed as an integrated grid system, principally for ease of maintenance and
uniform current flow.7
SCE operates two different types of overhead facilities on the Peninsula, namely transmission
and distribution lines. The transmission line system provides high voltage service to a larger
regional area. At the present time, the Peninsula’s electrical power needs are being reliably met
by SCE. A potential problem of electricity reliability for the Peninsula is that facilities in the area
are susceptible to damage from earth movements, such as earthquakes and landslides.
Additionally, overhead transmission lines, transformers, and associated poles potential do pose
significant adverse safety hazards. Overhead wires and associated hardware are vulnerable to
damage caused by natural conditions, such as high winds, lightning, and tree growth, and man -
caused conditions, such as automobile accidents, thereby creating power outages and, in some
cases, safety hazards if severed or broken.
SCE Peninsula Network of Transmission and Distribution Lines
B-19
(Source Southern California Edison Power Site Search Tool)
B-20
D i:Stri t i on
Su btr an::imis:::io n /Tran 5;m jggio n
Tra 1n smissio n C i rouits
Legend ::o.
Substations * D istribution
0 Subtransmission / Transmission
ICA-Circuit Segments
Circuit Capacity
-->2 -32
> 1.5 -2
> 1 -1.5
> 0.1 -1
---4.6-0.1
Transm ission Circuits
--Subtransmission
--Transmission
ELECTRICITY SYSTEM INTERDEPENDENCIES
UPSTREAM
DEPENDENCIES ELECTRICITY DOWNSTREAM
DEPENDENCIES
NATURAL GAS
NATURAL GAS
WATER WATER
WASTEWATER WASTEWATER
COMMUNICATIONS COMMUNICATIONS
Electricity infrastructure is heavily interdependent with other infrastructure sectors. The diagram
above depicts critical infrastructure sectors that are interdependent with the electricity
subsector. The left side depicts which infrastructure sectors the electricity sector rely heavily on
(upstream dependencies), while the right side depicts critical infrastructure sectors that rely on
electricity (downstream dependencies).
ELECTRICITY UPSTREAM INTERDEPENDENCIES:
The electricity subsector depends heavily on other energy subsectors (i.e., natural gas, coal, and
petroleum) supplying fossil fuels for power generation. All classes (i.e., physical, cyber,
geographic, and logical) of interdependencies affect the operations of the electricity subsector.
The characteristics of these interdependencies vary according to the level of assessment. These
upstream dependencies can vary when considered at the asset level. The following table depicts
critical infrastructure sectors that electricity depends on to function properly.
SERVICES/RESOURCES NEEDED
NATURAL GAS Fuel for power generation
WATER Temperature control (e.g., cooling of equipment), fire suppression,
potable water
WASTEWATER Sewage wastewater services for facilities
COMMUNICATIONS Telecommunication for daily operations; and SCADA systems B-21
ELECTRICITY DOWNSTREAM DEPENDENCIES:
The Electricity Subsector has downstream dependencies with all critical infrastructure sectors,
making it a fundamental need and community-wide requirement. Water treatment facilities,
pumping stations, and communication systems rely heavily on electricity supply. Electricity is
particularly important for heating, control systems, lighting, mechanical and electrical equipment,
and security and safety. Additionally, electricity is required for the operation of petroleum
refineries and distribution terminals.
SERVICES/RESOURCES PROVIDED
NATURAL GAS Power needed for pumping stations, storage, control systems
and facilities.
WATER
Power is needed to energize control system monitoring and
controls at remote sites, including IT and Communications
equipment.
WASTEWATER Power needed for control systems, sewage pumping and
treatment, and for facilities
COMMUNICATIONS Power is needed for SCADA communication, and customer
service and crew repair communication
POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF ENERGY DISRUPTIONS ON ESSENTIAL INFRASTRUCTURE:
The Energy Sector is exposed to a diverse range of risks that are constantly evolving and may be
difficult to assess or quantify due to the high degree of uncertainty surrounding the frequency or
severity of the event. Cyber and physical security threats, space weather events, aging
infrastructure, and an aging workforce, as well as climate change are just a few of these risks.
Energy infrastructure’s ability to adapt to these threats is critical, even more so during disaster
recovery, because many critical infrastructures and essential functions, such as hospitals, water,
and wastewater systems, transportation, and telecommunications, rely on the reliable supply
and delivery of electricity and other fuels to operate. According to the United States Department
of Energy (DOE), interruptions in electric service have a significant impact on the reliability of
other sectors of the energy sector. These losses are particularly concerning beca use outages
caused by energy grid disruptions can be widespread and affect large geographic areas
simultaneously, according to the DOE.
Electrical equipment failures (e.g., power lines, pumps) can result in the shutdown of steam
boilers, cooling towers, pumps, and electrically operated safety control mechanisms in oil and B-22
gas refineries, pumping stations, terminals, and other facilities. Apart from the revenue los s and
other costs associated with equipment damage in these sectors, disruptions in fuel deliveries can
exacerbate the effects of power outages on consumers.
A disruption to local or regional infrastructure has the potential to have a significant impact on
the severity of a power outage and the restoration efforts required to restore normal operation
to the system. The interdependencies of the Electrical infrastructure sector servicing the Palos
Verdes Peninsula combined with impacts of natural disasters can lead to a ripple effect of
disruptions of Critical Infrastructures serving the Palos Verdes Residents. Further understanding
of the Electricity infrastructure sector interdependencies and critical failure points is therefore
vital to achieving long-term resilience planning for the Palos Verdes Peninsula.
The following table illustrates the effects of electricity disruptions on critical services.
ELECTRICITY POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF DISRUPTIONS
NATURAL GAS
− Curtailed Natural Gas Production leading to failure of fuel for
power generators and lubricants for facilities.
− Loss of heating and cooking abilities.
WATER
− Lack of potable water as a result of a reduction in supply from
water mains, with the risk of contamination from various
sources.
− Water may not be able to be boiled, resulting in a scarcity of
drinking water.
WASTEWATER
− Challenges in hygiene: reduced pressure in the water mains,
toilets not flushing, difficult to maintain the sewer systems
operarional.
COMMUNICATIONS
− Failure of communication facilities and towers, Loss of
electronic transactions and ability to obtain data. Customer
service and repair crew communications failure.
B-23
NATURAL GAS GENERAL OVERVIEW
Natural gas accounts for a significant percentage of the primary energy consumed in the United
States. Natural gas consumption in the United States is highly seasonal, with a higher demand
in winter for heating and lower demand in summer. The natural gas section of the critical
infrastructure sectors includes the production, processing, transportation, distribution, and
storage of natural gas; and gas control systems. 8
There are three main parts of the national gas system: the gathering of the gas from multiple
small wells, the transmission of the gas by long-distance pipelines, and the distribution of the
gas to local customers.
− Natural Gas Production – A majority of natural gas comes from natural gas
production fields in New Mexico, west Texas, and Oklahoma, as well as in the Rocky
Mountains and Canada. The remaining natural gas supply percentage is produced
locally in Central and Southern California from onshore and offshore fields.
− Natural Gas Processing – Natural gas processing consists of separating all of the various
hydrocarbons and fluids from the pure natural gas to produce pipeline-quality dry natural
gas.
B-24
Natural gas production and delivery
oil and
gas well
oil
water
gas
processing
plant
products removed
nonhydrocarbon
gases removed
returned to field
vented and flared
J • ~~n natural gas .U. sales company
underground
storage
reservo ir
LNG
storage
consumers
-------product ion --------transmission -----distribution --1
~ ela Source : U.S. Energy Information Administration
−Natural Gas Transmission- The interstate natural gas pipeline network transports
natural gas from processing plants in producing regions to areas with high natural
gas demands, particularly large urban areas. Compression stations along the
pipeline transmission route keep the gas moving at the desired pressure.
−Natural Gas Storage – Gas is typically stored underground and under pressure as an
efficient way to balance discrepancies between supply input and market demand.
Three types of facilities are used for underground gas storage: depleted reservoirs in oil
and/or gas fields, aquifers, and salt caverns.
−Natural Gas Distribution – Local distribution companies typically transport natural gas
from interstate pipeline delivery points to end-users through thousands of miles of
distribution pipe. Delivery points for local distribution companies are often termed city
gates, especially for large municipal areas, and are important market centers for the
pricing of natural gas.
NATURAL GAS BACKGROUND- PALOS VERDES PENINSULA
Southern California Gas Company (SoCalGas) provides natural gas to the Palos Verdes Southern
California Gas Company (SoCalGas) provides natural gas to the Palos Verdes Peninsula through a
network of transmission lines, high-pressure distribution supply lines and medium pressure
distribution pipelines. Although part of the larger SoCalGas system, the Peninsula is also included
in SoCalGas distribution sections, which function principally as sub-administrative districts and
are responsible for all lines and service systems that feed from transmission lines to the point of
delivery8 .
However, unlike the others, the Palos Verdes Peninsula lacks resource facilities. The processing
and transmission of natural gas are all located outside of the Palos Verdes Peninsula. On the other
hand, natural gas networks are quite similar to other types of networks in terms of configuration
and, in many cases, even parallel to the water and electric networks. The gas distribution network
is comprised of distribution lines (supply, headers, and mains), regulatory stations, isolation
valves, and extremity gauges.
Southern California Gas Company utilizes an integrated grid system to ensure a consistent flow
and efficient service capabilities during scheduled maintenance or an emergency. Natural gas is
pumped under high pressure from the resource facility to the Palos Verdes Peninsula distribution
network via transmission lines (there are none on the Palos Verdes Peninsula). Natural gas users’
primary concern is the dwindling supply of natural gas and the economic realities that accompany
it. As gas reserves diminish, the cost of locating and processing new sources rises, increasing the
cost to gas custome
B-25
NATURAL GAS TRANSMISSION AND HIGH-PRESSURE DISTRIBUTION LINES: INFORMATION
GATHERED FROM SOCALGAS NATURAL GAS PIPELINE MAP
B-26
NATURAL GAS INTERDEPENDENCIES
NATURAL GAS UPSTREAM DEPENDENCIES:
Significant Interdependencies exist between Natural Gas infrastructure and the Communications,
Transportation, Water, and Wastewater Systems Sectors. Natural gas is used for generating
electric power, while electric power is used for core operations in each fuels subsector (e.g., for
pumping stations, storage, control systems). The table below depicts critical infrastructure
sectors Natural Gas depends on to function properly.
SERVICES/RESOURCES NEEDED
ELECTRICITY Power needed for pumping stations, storage, control systems and
facilities.
WATER Temperature control (e.g., cooling of equipment), fire suppression,
potable water.
WASTEWATER Wastewater removal service, raw water supply for hydroelectric
generation.
COMMUNICATIONS Telecommunication for daily operations; and supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA) systems.
NATURAL GAS DOWNSTREAM DEPENDENCIES:
Historically, natural gas was primarily used for heating. However, natural gas has been
increasingly used to generate electricity since the late 1990s. Natural gas-fired generation was
also increased by the advent of combined-cycle generation capacity additions. Additionally, the
natural gas sector has downstream dependencies with all of the critical infrastructure sectors as
natural gas provides all sectors with heating, steam generation, and cooking abilities. Table 7
depicts critical infrastructure sectors electricity depends on to function properly.
SERVICES/RESOURCES PROVIDED
ELECTRICITY Natural gas is needed for fuel for heat, power generatoration, and
lubricants for electric facilities.
WATER Natural gas is needed for heating, pumps and lift stations, and
facilities.
WASTEWATER Natural gas is needed for fuel for generators and facilities.
COMMUNICATIONS Natural gas is needed for fuel for heat, generators, and facilities. B-27
POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF NATURAL GAS DISRUPTIONS ON ESSENTIAL INFRASTRUCTURE:
An interruption or pressure loss in natural gas pipeline systems may result in the loss of multiple
natural gas-fired power generators, significantly reducing available power and jeopardizing the
reliability of the energy sector. Although underground natural gas storage facilities can provide a
backup for the natural gas supply to certain power sources, natural gas pipeline disruptions would
cause significant reductions in electric power services. The following table gives an example of
the potential effects of natural gas disruptions on essential services.
NATURAL GAS POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF DISRUPTIONS
ELECTRICITY − Significant impact to power generation
− Impact on fuel for heating, generators and for facilities
WATER
− Lack of potable water as a result of a reduction in supply
from water mains, with the risk of contamination from
various sources
− Water may not be able to be boiled, resulting in a scarcity
of drinking water.
WASTEWATER
− Challenges in hygiene: reduced pressure in the water
mains, toilets not flushing, difficult to maintain the sewer
system is working.
COMMUNICATIONS
− Impact to facility lighting, telecommunications, electronic
data. Impact on fuel for heating, generators, and for
facilities.
B-28
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS GENERAL OVERVIEW
The communications sector provides products and services that enable the efficient operation of
our global information-based society. Communication networks enable people from all over the
world to communicate with one another, instantly access information, and communicate from
remote locations. This entails establishing a connection between a sender (including voice
signals) and one or more recipients through the use of technology (e.g., a telephone system
or the internet) in order to transfer data from one location to another. Communication
networks comprise both physical infrastructure (structures, switches, towers, and antennas) and
cyber infrastructure (routing and switching software, operational support systems, and user
applications), posing significant interdependencies on all sectors of critical infrastructure.
The communications sector includes the following five component areas that have similar
functions and operations.
Broadcasting Systems:
− Broadcasting systems are composed of free and subscription-based over-the-air radio
and television (TV) stations that provide analog and digital audio, video, and data
programming.
− Broadcasting systems operate on three different frequency bands: medium frequency
(MF (AM radio)), very high frequency (VHF (FM radio and television)), and ultra-high
frequency (UHF (TV).
Cable:
− The cable industry provides bidirectional signal paths to customers via a combination of
fiber and coaxial cable.
− This hybrid fiber/coaxial (HFC) network effectively benefits business and residential
customers because it improves signal performance, expands available bandwidth, and
increases overall network reliability.
Satellite:
− Satellites are launched into orbit to relay voice, video, or data signals as part of a
telecommunications network. Earth station antennas transmit signals to the satellite,
which are amplified and sent back to Earth for reception by other earth station antennas.
− Antennas stationed on Earth transmit signals to the satellite, which are amplified and
received via other ground stations antennas. Satellites perform a variety of functions
through the use of a combination of terrestrial and space-based components, including
t h e bidirectional transmission of voice, video, and data services; data collection; event
detection and timing; and navigation.
Wireless:
− Wireless refers to telecommunication in which electromagnetic waves rather than wire
carry a signal over a portion of or the entire communication path. B-29
− Wireless technologies consist of cellular phones, wireless hot spots (WiFi), personal
communication services, high-frequency radio, and commercial and private radio
services to provide communication services.
COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR BACKGROUND: PALOS VERDES PENINSULA
Communication systems are critical for disseminating news and information, relaying personal
and business messages, providing audio and visual entertainment, and transmitting and
receiving emergency messages. The communication component of the Palos Verdes Peninsula
infrastructure system is a multifaceted and highly complex system of resource facilities and
networks that contribute to the economic and social well-being of the Peninsula4.
Telephone systems on the Peninsula consist of a network of transceivers (telephones),
transmission lines, and switching centers. Residents can contract their cell phones and laptops
with any company of their choice.
Cable television on the Peninsula cable television is supplied by Frontier, AT&T, and Cox
Communications. All three companies use fiber-optic lines to provide instant access to numerous
television channels, high-speed Internet, and digital telephone for their customers. There is
also satellite TV provided by companies such as DirectTV and DishNetwork, which can
provide similar access to television channels. The difference is that with satellite TV, a satellite
dish needs to be installed.
Broadcast communications are systems that have no wires or transmission lines but rather
transmit signals through the airwaves. Of the three primary broadcast systems, radio and
television are by far the most popular, while microwave remains a more specialized
communications medium. Radio and television communication systems are operated by
privately-owned companies that supply free audio and audio/visual communication to people
with appropriate receivers. These broadcast systems are used primarily for the dissemination of
news, information, and entertainment.
The County of Los Angeles currently owns and operates a microwave station near the
intersection of Highridge Road and Crestridge Road in the City of Rancho Palos Verdes. The facility
is a broadcast communication system designed to relay signals to and from the Palos Verdes
Peninsula area. The prime users of the facility are the Los Angeles County Fire and Sheriff’s
Departments and other county agencies.
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS INTERDEPENDENCIES
Many other sectors of critical infrastructure are highly dependent on the communications sector.
The communications sector is one of the few sectors that affect all other sectors. Each sector
relies on communications services to support its operations and associated daily communication
requirements for corporate and organizational networks and services (e.g., internet connectivity,
voice services, and video teleconferencing capabilities).
B-30
UPSTREAM DEPENDENCIES:
The communications sector’s primary upstream dependency is on electricity, which is
generated either commercially or on-site. Water can also be a limiting factor in the
operation of buildings that require heating, ventilation, and air conditioning or cooling (e.g.,
data centers). Additionally, upstream dependencies of the communications system sector are
depicted in the table below.
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS UPSTREAM DEPENDENCIES
SERVICES/RESOURCES NEEDED
ELECTRICITY Power is needed for control facilities, communication towers, and
remote monitoring capabilities.
WATER Water is needed for temperature control (e.g., cooling of equipment),
fire suppression, and potable water.
WASTEWATER Wastewater removal service, raw water supply for hydroelectric
generation.
NATURAL GAS Telecommunication for daily operations; and SCADA systems.
DOWNSTREAM DEPENDENCIES:
The communications sector has downstream dependencies with all critical infrastructure sectors.
All sectors rely on communications, making its reliability a fundamental need and requirement.
Communication is particularly important for telecommunication for daily operations and
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems monitoring. The following table
summarizes the extent to which other sectors rely on the communications sector.
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS UPSTREAM DEPENDENCIES
SERVICES/RESOURCES PROVIDED
ELECTRICITY Telecommunication for daily operations and SCADA systems
WATER Telecommunication for daily operations and SCADA systems
WASTEWATER Telecommunication for daily operations and SCADA systems
NATURAL GAS Telecommunication for daily operations and SCADA systems B-31
POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS DISRUPTIONS ON ESSENTIAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
Large regional impacts across all infrastructure sectors can occur when communication systems
are disrupted. California has seen an increasing number of large-scale disasters over the last
two decades as a result of climate change. Our communications systems, which are normally
extremely dependable, failed during recent disasters. These failures jeopardize situational
awareness, impact alerts, and warnings, obstruct critical communications between multiple
stakeholders, and can result in unnecessary deaths and other social harms.
During a community-wide crisis, efficient, rapid, and accurate information flow can save lives,
especially during complex, evolving events like a wildfire. Given the importance of
communication to the public in an emergency, it is critical to continue to examine the extent
to which the communications sector depends on and impacts essential critical infrastructure
servicing the Palos Verdes Peninsula. The following table summarizes the potential effects of
disruptions of the communications Sector.
POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF DISRUPTIONS
ELECTRICITY
− Failure of communication facilities and towers, loss of
electronic transactions and ability to obtain data. Customer
service and repair crew communications failure.
WATER − Loss of monitoring of pipeline status, loss of situational awareness.
WASTEWATER
− Monitoring equipment affected, restriction of sewage pumping
and treatment for stationary, scale systems. Challenges in
communicating with residents and business
− Potential impact to facility lighting, telecommunications;
electronic data
NATURAL GAS − Loss of monitoring of pipeline status, loss of situational awareness
B-32
WATER SYSTEMS GENERAL OVERVIEW
One of the most vital components in the infrastructure is the water distribution system.
Unlike other infrastructure components such as flood control systems, which are primarily
for convenience, water is a necessity of the most basic human settlement. In Rancho Palos
Verdes, as in other developed areas, water is used for varied purposes, which can be grouped
into four basic categories: safety requirements (fire); human consumption (drinking, food
preparation); grounds maintenance (landscaping); and urban a ctivities (sewage medium).
Water is drawn from a freshwater source, usually a lake, river, or stream, and treated before
it is pumped to our homes and businesses. Water from reservoirs, streams, and rivers often
contains a variety of organisms and dissolv ed chemicals or metals. This material must be
removed from the water to ensure that it is safe for drinking or other uses. Most systems will
include at least two to three filtration stages to remove harmful or dangerous particles such
as bacteria, viruses , and other debris.
After treatment, the system works by transferring quantities of water into the established
water distribution systems. Water d istribution system infrastructure is generally considered
to consist of pipes, pumps, valves, storage tanks, reservoirs, meters, fittings, and other
hydraulic appurtenances that connect treatment plants or well supplies to consumers’ taps.
Source: Environmental Protection Agency: https://www.epa.gov/dwsixyearreview/drinking -
water-distribution-systems \
B-33
Fundamentally, a water supply system consists of three basic components: the source of
supply, the processing or treatment of the water, and the distribution of water to the users.
− Water Sources – These include surface reservoirs, rivers, and ground water from
aquifers via wells. Utilities often use a combination of multiple water sources to
ensure an uninterrupted supply.
− Treatment – Drinking water in a public water system is treated to make su re it is safe
to drink before it enters all those pipes. Water treatment plants filter the water to
remove particles of dirt, minerals, microorganisms, and other contaminants. Chlorine is
a chemical commonly used to disinfect water supplies.
− Distribution and Collection – Public drinking water systems include a series of pipes,
storage tanks, pumps, valves, and gates. Flow rates are adjusted to ensure th at the
required pressure is available where it is needed.
WATER BACKGROUND - PALOS VERDES PENINSULA
The Palos Verdes Peninsula’s water needs are served by California Water Service Company (Cal
Water). Cal Water supplies the area with sufficient fire safety requirements and adequate
amounts of potable drinking water at a pressure consistent with accepted standards. Cal Water
is a private company that operates within the regulations and standards of the California Public
Utilities Commission. Cal Water purchases surface water imported by the Metropolitan Water
District of Southern California from the Colorado River and the State Water Project in Northern
California, which is then used to serve the entire Peninsula through the Palos Verdes water
system.
The Palos Verdes Reservoir in Rolling Hills Estates is categorized as a surface water reservoir.
Surface storage is a critical element of Southern California’s water resources strategy. Because
California experiences dramatic swings in weather and hydrology, surface storage is important
to regulate those swings and mitigate possible supply shortages. Surface storage provides a
means of storing water during normal and wet years for later use during dry years when imported
supplies are limited. According to the Metropolitan District of Southern California 2020 “Urban
Management Plan,” the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California has a comprehensive
Emergency Action Plan (EAP) for each of its dam and reservoir facilities.
B-34
The Palos Verdes water system distributes water through two systems commonly referred to as
the “D-500 System” and the “Ridge System.” The D-500 System serves the lower-elevation areas
of the Peninsula, about 13% of the total demand, and the Ridge System serves the upper -
elevation areas, comprising the remaining 87% of demand. The average daily demand and
maximum daily demand of the D-500 and Ridge Systems combined are 12,500 gallons per minute
(gpm) and 20,600 gpm, respectively. All of the supply to the Palos Verdes system is delivered
through four connections located at the northeastern edge of the Peninsu la4.
Recently, Cal Water completed the Palos Verdes Peninsula Water Reliability Project, which
enhances the reliability of the drinking water infrastructure on the Palos Verdes Peninsula and
will help ensure that all Peninsula residents continue to have safe, reliable water service. Prior to
the project’s completion, 90% of the Palos Verdes
Peninsula was served by one 60-year-old drinking
water pipeline and a single pump station.
The project replaced a portion of the existing
water pipeline and added a second pipeline to
deliver drinking water to homes and businesses.
In total, crews installed about seven miles of a
new pipeline. Additionally, the project added a
second pump station on a separate electrical grid B-35
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that will help guard against the risk of prolonged water service outages caused by disruptions
such as natural disasters.
CALIFORNIA WATER SERVICE (CAL WATER) FACILITIES SERVICING THE PENINSULA
WATER SYSTEMS INTERDEPENDENCIES
UPSTREAM DEPENDENCIES:
The water sector is critical to all sectors and is dependent on several key sectors. Upstream
dependencies of the water system sector are depicted in the following table.
WATER UPSTREAM DEPENDENCIES
SERVICES/RESOURCES NEEDED
ELECTRICITY Power is needed for pumping stations, storage, control systems, and
facilities.
COMMUNICATIONS Telecommunication for daily operations and SCADA systems
WASTEWATER Essential and highly dependent infrastructure for health and safety
NATURAL GAS Natural gas is needed for heating, pumps and lift stations, and facilities.
B-36
DOWNSTREAM DEPENDENCIES:
The water sector is considered one of the most critical lifeline sectors because its functions are
essential to core operations in nearly every other critical sector. When water services are lost for
relatively short periods (less than eight hours), the functioning of multiple sectors is significantly
degraded.
WATER DOWNSTREAM DEPENDENCIES
SERVICES/RESOURCES PROVIDED
ELECTRICITY Temperature control (e.g., cooling of equipment), fire suppression,
potable water
COMMUNICATIONS Water is needed for cooling and facilities.
WASTEWATER Wastewater removal service, raw water supply for hydroelectric
generation
NATURAL GAS Water is needed for production, cooling, emission reduction and
facilities.
POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF WATER DISRUPTIONS ON ESSENTIAL INFRASTRUCTURE:
When water services are lost, even for short periods, the consequences can be widespread and
dramatic. When these services are lost for an extended period of time, the results can be
catastrophic. Potential impacts that a disruption in water service could cause include the
following: loss of water for cooling, resulting in impacts to electrical and telecommunications
equipment; lack of water for consumption, cooking, bathing, flushing, fire suppression, etc.; loss
of water for commercial irrigation, food supply, and production to meet consumer needs; and a
decreased public confidence in water supply.
POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF DISRUPTIONS
ELECTRICITY
− Loss of water for cooling (disabling electrical and
telecommunications equipment)
− Lack of water for consumption, flushing, fire suppression
COMMUNICATIONS
− Loss of water for cooling (disabling electrical and
telecommunications equipment)
− Lack of water for consumption, flushing, fire suppression
WASTEWATER − Significant impact on wastewater treatment plants negatively
affecting public health and the environment
NATURAL GAS − Impact on cooling and emissions reduction
− Lack of water for consumption, flushing, fire suppression, etc. B-37
WASTEWATER SYSTEMS GENERAL OVERVIEW
Wastewater collection and treatment are critical for public health and safe drinking water.
Sewers collect and transport sewage and wastewater from residences, businesses, and industries
to wastewater treatment plants. Wastewater systems utilize a collection system to transport raw
wastewater from the producer to wastewater treatment plants. Physical, chemical, and
biological processes are used to remove hazardous materials from wastewater before it is safely
discharged into approved locations, which are typically reservoirs, streams, rivers, and the ocean.
Fundamentally, wastewater treatment’s primary function is to accelerate the natural processes
by which water is purified. Wastewater treatment consists of two basic stages. The primary and
secondary stages are described in detail here. Solids are allowed to settle and are removed from
wastewater in the primary stage. The secondary stage purifies wastewater further through
biological processes. Occasionally, these stages are merged into a single operation.
WASTEWATER BACKGROUND PALOS VERDES PENINSULA
The four Peninsula Cities are located in Los Angeles County Sanitation District #5. The South Bay
Cities Sanitation District is serviced by the Los Angeles County Sanitation District s, which owns B-38
and operates the wastewater collection system within the Peninsula cities.
Onsite wastewater treatment systems (OWTS), also known as septic systems, are used to treat
wastewater that is contaminated by human use from a home or business and then released into
the environment. OWTS are underground structures that treat and dispose of wastewater,
typically from homes and businesses in suburban and rural locations. Instead of the wastewater
being transported to a wastewater treatment plant, the wastewater is treated on-site. According
to the Los Angeles Regional Water Quality Control Board & CA State Water Resources Control
BoardThe Los Angeles County Department of Public Health (LACDPH) reviews and approves
OWTS under the provisions of the Local Area Management Program (LAMP) to residents of
unincorporated county areas and contracted cities.
The Los Angeles County Sanitation Districts operate 10 water reclamation plants, which treat an
estimated 510 million gallons per day. The Joint Water Pollution Control Plant located in Carson
is one of the largest wastewater treatment plants in the world and is the largest of the districts’
wastewater treatment plants.
This facility provides both primary and secondary treatment for approximately 300 mgd of
wastewater. This plant serves a population of approximately 3.5 million people throughout Los
Angeles County, including the Palos Verdes Peninsula. Prior to discharge, the treated wastewater
is disinfected with hypochlorite and sent to the Pacific Ocean through a network of outfalls. These
outfalls extend 2 miles off the Peninsula to a depth of 200 feet.
WASTEWATER INTERDEPENDENCIES
UPSTREAM DEPENDENCIES:
Wastewater systems for the Palos Verdes Peninsula depend on a variety of external
infrastructures to maintain normal operations. Electric power is one of the most important
services necessary for maintaining pumping and treatment operations. Upstream dependencies
of the wastewater system sector are depicted in the table below.
WASTEWATER UPSTREAM DEPENDENCIES
SERVICES/RESOURCES NEEDED
ELECTRICITY Power is needed for pumping stations, storage, control systems, and
facilities.
COMMUNICATIONS Telecommunication for daily operations and SCADA systems
WATER Essential and highly dependent infrastructure for health and safety
NATURAL GAS
Natural gas is needed for heating, pumps and lift stations, and facilities.
B-39
WASTEWATER DOWNSTREAM DEPENDENCIES:
A wide range of physical infrastructure in industries and other critical infrastructure relies heavily
on the proper functioning of wastewater systems. The following table demonstrates the
interdependencies between wastewater infrastructure and other critical infrastructure.
WASTEWATER DOWNSTREAM DEPENDENCIES
SERVICES/RESOURCES PROVIDED
ELECTRICITY Power needed for pumping stations, storage, control systems and
facilities.
COMMUNICATIONS Sewage wastewater services for facilities.
WATER Essential and highly dependent infrastructure for health and safety
NATURAL GAS Sewage wastewater services for facilities.
POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF WASTEWATER DISRUPTIONS ON ESSENTIAL INFRASTRUCTURE
The deterioration and subsequent failure of the wastewater sector impact the health of the
community, the environment and has significant consequences for additional utility sectors.
Wastewater system infrastructure is critical to a community’s economic and social viability.
Although these systems ensure the basic health and safety of residents, businesses, and industry,
they are frequently taken for granted due to the high level of service and reliability provided by
water and wastewater utilities. The critical nature of these systems is not appreciated until a
water main breaks, or another type of service interruption occurs.
The interdependence of the water sector serving the Palos Verdes Peninsula, combined with the
impact of natural disasters, can result in a ripple effect of critical infrastructure disruptions
serving Palos Verdes residents. Understanding the interdependence and critical failure points of
the water infrastructure sector is therefore critical for achieving long-term resilience planning for
the Palos Verdes Peninsula.
The following table demonstrates the interdependencies between wastewater infrastructure
and other critical infrastructure.
POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF DISRUPTIONS
ELECTRICITY − Lack of wastewater services, posing public health and sanitation
issues.
COMMUNICATIONS − Lack of wastewater services, posing public health and sanitation
issues.
WATER − Lack of wastewater services, posing public health and sanitation
issues.
B-40
CONCLUSION/NEXT STEPS
It is important to recognize that infrastructure sectors interoperate together in myriad ways to
form a “system of systems” that supports the quality of life, well -being, and overall security for
residents of the Palos Verdes Peninsula. Understanding these indep endencies is crucial to ensure
that the Peninsula cities are prepared to continue critical services to residents in times of
emergencies. As critical infrastructures become more complex, the probability increases that
infrastructure failures will cascade and escalate in multipart ways.
The Peninsula cities of Palos Verdes Estates, Rancho Palos Verdes, Rolling Hills, and Rolling Hills
Estates comprehend the importance of the analysis of infrastructure interdependencies
vulnerabilities in the belief that this analysis is a key in addressing the catastrophic challenges of
infrastructure failures during an emergency response. Failures of one critical infrastructure sector
can lead to the proliferation of cascading and escalating failures across all infrastructure sectors.
It is essential to integrate the characterization of interdependencies into emergency planning
methodologies.
This white paper serves as an initial framework for recognizing interdependencies in the analysis
of critical infrastructures and is intended to provide emergency planners with a foundational
understanding of infrastructure interdependencies and how they could inform future
emergency operation protocols. The infrastructure sector analysis in this white paper provides
a high-level summary of interoperations that affect infrastructure servicing the Palos Verdes
Peninsula. This white paper is intended to convey this central concept. Future emergency
planning efforts will address the specific interdependencies’ threats to the Palos Verdes
Peninsula. Additional research is needed to better understand infrastructure sectors’ processes
and interoperability with other infrastructures. It is essential to integrate the characterization
of interdependencies into emergency planning methodologies.
B-41
APPENDIX A: PENINSULA-WIDE INCIDENT
COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS
The existing protocol for communication from the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD)
to the cities of Rancho Palos Verdes, Rolling Hills and Rolling Hills Estates typically involves an
email and or text message from the Captain or Watch Commander to the City Managers.
Depending on the particulars of the incident, a phone call may be made as well. Similarly, the
Palos Verdes Estates Police Department (PVEPD) advises the City Manager in the most
immediate and appropriate manner available. The City Managers then disseminate the
information to their respective City Councils via email or phone depending on the situation.
Appropriate information is then disseminated to the public via applicable electronic platforms.
LASD and PVEPD typically advise each other of incidents that may result in involvement by
the other agency. This also occurs with other neighboring jurisdictions such as the Torrance
and Los Angeles police departments. LASD and PVEPD also advise adjacent schools when
warranted on a case-by-case basis.
ADDITIONAL STRATEGIES: IMPROVED FLOW OF COMMUNICATION
1) It would be appropriate to include the Superintendent of the Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified
School District (PVPUSD) in any communication going to the City Managers.
2) All communication with City Council Members or School Board Members should come
through their respective City Managers or Superintendent to relieve first responders from
excessive communication burdens.
3) The city in which an incident occurs will act as lead agency in dealing with the media as well as
posting and updating information as it becomes available.
4) As much as possible, the lead agency will communicate electronically with the other cities
and PVPUSD immediately prior to posting or updating information.
5) Each city and PVPUSD will determine the information it wishes to post and where to post it.
6) During a regional emergency declared by the county, state, or federal government, the
Peninsula cities will coordinate with the County Office of Emergency Management to ensure
unified messaging about t h e incident.
7) To ensure unified messaging, the Peninsula cities will only post incident emergency
information that has been approved by the agency that has jurisdiction over the incident.
Individual Peninsula cities may still pos -emergency and incident information that is directly
under the city’s purview.
B-42
8) In the event of a power outage and/or a loss of cell service impacting the entire Palos Verdes
Peninsula, the Peninsula cities will work cooperatively (to the best extent possible) to
implement the following strategies for information distribution:
• Regional emergency phone hotline
• Deployment of Information Stations (large wooden sandwich boards) to post information
when other means of communication are impaired at key locations (dependent on the
situation and where it is needed.)
• Printed materials to distribute to Emergency Information Stations
• Flyers for in-person distribution
• Loudspeakers in vehicles
9) During an emergency of any level, the Peninsula cities will communicate and coordinate
with one another, as well as with any other partner agency responding to or involved in the
incident, to issue uniform coordinated emergency alerts via all appropriate and available
notification platforms, including the individual cities’ disaster and emergency alert systems,
Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA), and social media.
10) Each city and PVPUSD will provide the other agencies with priority contact lists for
purposes of communicating during incidents of joint concern.
It is universally recognized that judgment is often required in determining when and whom to
notify in any given circumstance. There is concern about inundating each other and the public
with non-critical information. Generally speaking, the consensus would be to err on the side
of over-communicating.
An emergency contact list has been developed and will be distributed to key staff in each
agency to facilitate inter-agency communication. It is not meant to be publicly available. This
list will be dynamic, and each agency will provide updated contact information as changes occur.
The City of Rolling Hills Estates will act as the central point for receiving updates and then
disseminating the updated information to all.
B-43
APPENDIX B - REFERENCES
1.“Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan as input to the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (Redacted).” Department of Energy and Department Homeland
Security, 2007, energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/Energy_SSP_Public.pdf
2.Presidential Decision Directive 63, 1998, https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/pdd/pdd-63.htm
3.“Infrastructure Interdependency Assessment Puerto Rico.” U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 2018, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7415906/
4.General Plan, City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 2018, rpvca.gov/DocumentCenter/View/12625/2018-
General- Plan
5.2020 Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan, Cities of Rancho Palos Verdes and Rolling Hills
Estates, 2020, https://rpvca.gov/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/2935
6.“Oregon State Energy Assurance Plan.” State of Oregon, 2012,
https://www.oregon.gov/energy/safety-
resiliency/Documents/2012%20Oregon%20State%20Energy%20Assurance%20Plan.pdf
7.“National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security
and Resilience.” Department of Homeland Security, 2013
https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/national-infrastructure-protection-plan-
2013-508.pdf
8.“Analysis of Critical Infrastructure Dependencies and Interdependencies.” Argonne National
Labaratory, 2015 https://publications.anl.gov/anlpubs/2015/06/111906.pdf
9.“Communications Sector-Specific Plan Annex of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.”
Department of Energy and Department of Homeland Security, 2010,
https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-communications-2010-508.pdf
10.“Water and Wastewater Sector-Specific Plan Annex of the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan.” Department of Energy and Department of Homeland Security, 2010,
https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-water-2015-508.pdf
B-44
COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL: PENINSULA-WIDE INCIDENT
The existing protocol for communication from LASD to RPV, RH and RHE typically
involves an email and or text message from the Captain or Watch Commander to the
City Managers. Depending on the particulars of the incident, a phone call may be made
as well. Similarly, PVEPD advises the PVE City Manager in the most immediate and
appropriate manner available. The City Managers then disseminate the information to
their respective City Councils via email or phone depending on the situation.
Appropriate information is then disseminated to the public via applicable electronic
platforms.
LASD and PVEPD typically advise each other of incidents that may result in involvement
by the other agency. This also occurs with other neighboring jurisdictions such as
Torrance PD and LAPD. LASD and PVE also advise adjacent schools when warranted
on a case by case basis.
ADDITIONAL STRATEGIES: IMPROVED FLOW OF COMMUNICATION
1) It would be appropriate to include the Superintendent of PVPUSD in any
communication going to the City Managers;
2) All communication with City Council Members or School Board Members should
come through their respective City Managers or Superintendent so as to relieve first
responders from excessive communication burdens;
3) The City in which an incident occurs will act as lead agency in dealing with the media
as well as posting and updating information as it becomes available;
4) Inasmuch as it is possible, the lead agency will communicate electronically with the
other cities and PVPUSD immediately prior to posting or updating information;
5) Each City and PVPUSD will determine the information it wishes to post and where
to post it;
6)During a regional emergency declared by the county, state, or federal government,
the Peninsula Cities will coordinate with the County Office of Emergency Management
to ensure unified messaging about incident.
7) To ensure unified messaging, the Peninsula Cities will only post incident emergency
information that has been approved by the agency that has jurisdiction over the
incident. Individual Peninsula Cities may still post emergency and incident information
that is directly under the City’s purview.
8) In the event of a power outage and/or a loss of cell service impacting the entire Palos
Verdes Peninsula the Peninsula Cities will work cooperatively (to the best extent
possible) to implement the following strategies for information distribution:
•Regional emergency phone hotline
C-1
•Deployment of Information Stations (large wooden sandwich boards) to post
information when other means of communication are impaired at key locations
(dependent on the situation and where it is needed.)
•Printed materials to distribute to Emergency Information Stations
•Flyers for in-person distribution
•Loudspeakers in vehicles
9)During an emergency of any level, the Peninsula Cities will communicate and
coordinate with one another, as well as with any other partner agency responding to or
involved in the incident, to issue uniform coordinated emergency alerts via all
appropriate and available notification platforms, including the individual Cities' disaster
and emergency alert systems, Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA), and social media.
10) Each City and PVPUSD will provide the other agencies with priority contact lists for
purposes of communicating during incidents of joint concern.
It is universally recognized that many times judgment is required in determining when
and whom to notify in any given circumstance. There is concern about inundating each
other and the public with non-critical information. Generally speaking, though, the
consensus would be to err on the side of over-communicating.
An emergency contact list has been developed and will be distributed to key staff in each
agency to facilitate inter-agency communication. It is not meant to be publicly available.
This list will be dynamic, and each agency will provide updated contact information as
changes occur. RHE will act as the central point for receiving updates and then
disseminating the updated information to all.
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EMERGENCY ACTION / FIRE PREVENTION PLAN
FOR PALOS VERDES LANDFILL
County Sanitation Districts of Los Angeles County
I RESPONSIBLE PARTIES
CUPA (323)-890-4317
Mike Alarcon Solid Waste Maintenance Supervisor (626) 665-3560
Ethan Laden Senior Engineer (310) 373-9043
K.C. Irwin Landfill Supervising Engineer Tech I (310) 377-3514
Walter Ancheta Solid Waste Operations Coordinator I (310) 377-9043
Management and Supervisory Responsibility
1)Read, understand and be knowledgeable in all aspects of their site specific
Emergency Action Plan (EAP).
2)Review and update the site specific EAP annually.
3)Reinforce District policies and procedures of the site specific EAP to employees.
4)Ensure employee responsibilities/assignments are understood through practical
training.
5)Coordinate emergency evacuations including employee accountability when
required.
II PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE
To comply with state and federal statutes, the Districts have developed and implemented
EAPs. Site Specific EAPs are located at each facility and are available for employee
review. Site-specific EAPs have been prepared to comply with one or more of the
following regulatory requirements:
1. Business Plan, California Health and Safety Code (CHSC), Section 25500-25520
2.Emergency Action Plan, CCR Title 8, Section 3220
3.Fire Prevention Plan, CCR Title 8, and Section 3221
4. Contingency Plan and Emergency Procedures, CHSC, Section 66265.50-66265.56
5. Preparedness and Prevention Plan, Title 22, Section 66265.30
6.Hazardous Substances Release, Title 8, Section 5192
Contact Environmental Health and Safety (EH&S) personnel if assistance is needed in
complying with the above requirements.
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III EMERGENCY TYPES
The purpose of this Emergency Action/Fire Prevention Plan is to minimize injuries, loss
of life, or loss of property during emergencies. Some potential emergencies identified for
this site include:
•Earthquake
•Chemical Spills
•Underground Fire
•Brush Fire
•Methane Explosion
•Landfill Gas Leak
The person identifying the emergency shall contact the Supervisor or individual in
charge.
IV EVACUATION PROCEDURES
When an evacuation is necessary (e.g., when directed by the Supervisor or other
Responsible Parties listed above), the following procedures shall be followed:
1.Notification for evacuation will be made by Public Address (PA) system, radio
communication, and/or by phone.
2.Evacuation shall be by the nearest safe exit (site map posted at office).
3. Assist any disabled workers and those with known medical problems.
4.Notify any contractors or outside personnel on the site and evacuate them
accordingly. If possible, check the equestrian/walking trails for outside personnel.
5.Personnel shall assemble in the designated assembly area (see Attachment,
Map/Layout Plan, Evacuation Assembly Areas).
6.Accounting for personnel shall be conducted by the Supervisor or other
Responsible Parties listed above.
V CRITICAL OPERATIONS
The following critical operations must be maintained during an emergency:
•Landfill gas recovery/treatment system.
•Landfill liquids collection/treatment system.
- These systems should be restarted as soon as possible after any unscheduled
shutdown.
- If parts of the system are damaged, those parts should be isolated so as to prevent a
release of gas or liquid spill. Crews should be called out as soon as possible to
make necessary repairs.
- If there is a potential for odors or a significant gas release or liquid spill, notify the
local fire departments to apprise them of current conditions and activities.
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- Remember to remain calm and gather necessary information to assist Districts staff
and/or emergency professionals that respond to the emergency.
- Know the location of emergency equipment (refer to Sections V and VII).
VI MEDICAL / FIRST AID
Location of emergency medical provider:
Western Medical Group
21081 S. Western Avenue Ste. 150
Torrance, CA 90501
(310) 782-3333
(310) 212-6230
Kaiser Permanente Occupational
25965 Normandie Avenue
Harbor City, CA 90710
(310) 517-3739
Location of first aid supplies:
•Office Cabinets •Vehicles
If a serious injury or illness occurs while working in the field or on District’ premises,
immediately contact emergency services, dial 911. Do not move persons who are
unconscious or cannot move under their own power.
Designated personnel are qualified, trained and able to perform initial CPR/First Aid until
emergency services personnel arrive on site.
VII POTENTIAL FIRE HAZARDS
•Brush
•Paper Refuse
•Trash
•Landfill Gases
•Methane Gas
•Hazardous/Flammable Materials
Ignition sources might include the following:
•Hot Engines
•Welding
•Cigarettes/Lighters
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VIII FIRE PREVENTION AND CONTROL RESOURCES
The following equipment is available at this site for the prevention and control of fires:
Equipment Name Location
Portable Fire Extinguishers Office, trailers, and in vehicles
Smoke Alarms Office
Mobile Equipment Throughout site
Procedures for inspecting and maintaining equipment:
•Maintenance workers and Engineering Technicians check fire extinguishers around
the facility and in vehicles monthly. New/recharged extinguishers may be obtained
from JWPCP or Puente Hills warehouse.
•Fire alarms are serviced monthly by Electrical and Instrumentation Technicians.
•Mobile equipment is serviced regularly.
All Palos Verdes field employees are trained to respond to incipient stage fires.
DO NOT fight a fire, Call 911, in the following situations:
•The fire is spreading beyond the spot where it started.
•You cannot fight the fire with your back to an exit or escape route.
•The fire can block your only escape.
•You do not have adequate equipment.
•Any situation where the fire cannot be locally controlled, do not fight the fire
yourself, call 911.
IX PROCEDURES FOR PREVENTING FIRES
All Palos Verdes field personnel are responsible for controlling the accumulation of
combustible and flammable materials.
•Housekeeping – Keep site clean and organized.
•Storage – Keep incompatible chemicals separate.
•Permits – Hot work permits needed for specialty welding projects.
•Other – Grounds keepers cut back brush.
See Attachment, Map/Layout Plan, showing emergency routes.
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Map/Layout Plan, Evacuation Assembly Areas
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