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20121016 Late CorrespondenceJUNELAGMAY City Clerk HOllY l.WOLCOTT Executive Officer When making inquiries relative to this matter,please refer to the Council File No.11-1813,51 CITY OF LOS ANGELES CALIFORNIA ANTONIO R.VilLARAIG05A MAYOR Office ofthe CITY CLERK Council and Public Services Room 395,City Hall Los Angeles,CA 90012 Generallnfonnation -(213)978-1133 Fax:(213)978-1040 SHANNON HOPPES Council and Public Services Division WINW.citvclerk.lacitv.org July 31,2012 Dear Mr.Miller:.it At its special meeting held June 27,2012,the Public Safety Committee considered Motions (Buscaino -Perry -Englander)and (Perry -Krekorian)relative to permitting and safety requirements for liquid bulk storage facilities located in San Ped~o.At that time,Committee instructed youJQ: :,~.0:f.'" 1.Convene meetings with the Fire Department,BUilding and Safety,Harbor Department, City Attorney,Planning,Emergency Management,Bureau of Sanitation,and any other City departments as needed,and to report to the Public Safety Committee with recommendations to improve safety and hazard mitigation measures ofIiqLligpylk. ..facUitles,:R.ecommendations can include,but should not be limited to:.::N.·..'. .::~::::~~:~:~:::::::::::::::::::?:?:::::::::::.:.:...,.",' a.Enlisting the assistan~.9t~l.liQg~p~ndent consultant to examine the risks associated withfiqtftd:6Ulksforage facilities in the Harbor area. b.Recommendations for anYn~W9m~m:tm~nt§to local,state or federal r~9yir~rTlent~Jt1at pertain to Iiquf(f1ml('-'Sf6f.!ige'faeUfties. 2.Develop a comprehensiv~J!§t9n.QlpLma,PQL9U§l,lctlf~iijties in Harbor area,includingthoseonPortproperly..·············N . ·z-;":·.·.·.··' ';.:-:.';.:-:-:.;.;.:.;... Please submit your report to the Public Safety Committee,in care of the City Cler.k's Office,City Hall,Room 395. Sincerely, An Equal Employment Opportunity -Affirmative Action Employer RECEIVED FROM-'lW.5;;;1.......I'Lo~=-~--.1 AND MADE A PART OF THE RE~'RD AT THE COUNCIL MEETING OF ();;t _!~/, OFFICE OF THE CITY CL RK CARLA MORREALE,CITY CLERK11-1813 rpt_psJ-24-2012 John A.White,Legislative Assistant Public Safety Committee 213-978-1072 MOTION RE:CIlY COUNCIL PUBLIC SAFElY COMMITTEE STORAGE OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS IN HARBOR AREA WHEREAS,the City Council Public Safety Committee recently held a meeting in San Pedro,chaired by Councilman Buscaino,to address liquid bulk storage of hazardous materials in the Harbor area;and WHEREAS,City departments reported on inspections of the liquid bulk storage facilities currently operated by Rancho LPG Holdings,LLC;and WHEREAS,City of Los Angeles Ordinance No.166272,4ateci).990"amended the zoning map for and imposed limitations on the usesf.ofthep~tc¢fOfland east of Gaffey Street zoned [Q]M3-IVL,on which the Ranc.ho LPG Hoiaf#gsbulk storage facilities are presently sited (see map attached);ant:l\,~>f'",",'. WHEREAS,no requirement was made in ordinance~~~\~;~t1272th~~!~aY-~~~l:ation or study be reqUired for earthquake (seismic)potential6t,~~~ty for land use or facilities located on [Q]M3-IVL;and "'>' WHEREAS,the parcel of land zoned [Q]M3"'1~~i;~~W!l to th~}g~~e of California Geological Survey to be a seismic hazard i~ne in.~iliidj}ih~Wisa potential of liquefaction (California Division ofTylii1(;!s Jnd G~Ology,9peh-FileReport98-26); NOW THEREFOR,BE IT RESOINIi~t~:t the NJ~~Wk~;t.sanPedro Neighborhood Council urges th~¢i'ty of LosArig~l~~DepartmentS of Building and Safety and Emergency Ma:riag~m~ll.t to undettil~¢.astudy of the seismic potential and consequences of seisihi~~(;tivityat th~p~(;:el [Q]M3-IVL. BE IT FURTHERR~~~~~~~1i~il~the fiJdi~~s of the report be communicated to the Northwest San 1?~4ro Neighbdtl1:9R(lCouncil. RECEIVED FROM~~~~~-=:::::'I AND MADE A PART OF T~~~COR~THE COUNCIL MEETING OF~lkf 10l: ,.",OFFiCE OF THE CITY CLEAK CARLA MORREALE,CITY CLERK .~. ,. RESOLUTION RE:CITY COUNCil PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE TRANSPORT OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS IN HARBOR AREA WHEREAS,Councilman Buscaino recently chaired a meeting of the City Council Public Safety Committee in San Pedro to take public comment on hazardous material transport in the harbor area;and WHEREAS,at the conclusion of the hearing,the Committee moved to ask the legislative Analyst to provide further information to the Council so that it might consider further action regarding the safety of hazardous material transport in the harbor area;and f' WHEREAS,much of the movement of hazardous materials in the harbor area is associated with Port activity,and consists of rail tank car transport,truck tank car transport,and pipeline transport;and . WHEREAS,far more accidents occur in the transport of hazardous product by truck,rail and pipeline than occur at fixed facilities;and WHEREAS,the Harbor Department has developed a risk analysis approach that evaluates tQe blast,toxicity,and fire hazard potential of fixed facilities and could evaluate those potentials for tank car and pipeline transport also;. NOW THEREFOR,BE IT RESOLVED that the Northwest San Pedro suggests ar:Jd requests that the City Council consider performing,either through Council-controlled departments or by the Harbor Department,risk analyses of movement of hazardous materials by rail tank car,truck tank car,and pipeline in and around the Harbor area. BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED,that the risk analyses include the product being transported,the location of storage of tank cars and pipelines,and the routing of trucks and rail cars. Agenda Page 22 of 31 SAN RAMON FINANCING Fiscal Year Gen Fnd Res*TOT**Cum GF +TOT Cum San Ramon Cost***Net Res. 12/13 $8,619,652 $8,619,652 -$1,000,000 $7,619,652 13/14 $2,500,000 $11,119,652 -$5,500,000 $5,619,652 14/15 $2,500,000 $13,619,652 -$10,000,000 $3,619,652 15/16 $2,500,000 $16,119,652 -$10,000,000 $6,119,652 16/17 $2,500,000 $18,619,652 -$10,000,000 $8,619,652 17/18 $2,500,000 $21,119,652 -$10,000,000 $11,119,652 ; *Includes FY 12/13 TOT.***FY 12/13 $2.9 M ***City Share ~ssumptions 1 Council honors city pledge to use TOT for infrastucture only. 2 Conservative TOT income of $2.5 M per year 3 TOT is only income contributing to reserve 4 Annual costs are split between City and Grant. 5 Project completed in FY 14/15 RECEIVED FROM ~\,Vt¥05w.::.v>-;.::;...--' AND MADE A PARTOFT~ORD AT TH~E' .COUNCIL MEETING OF tJ:;t fle I d.-f)/_} OFFiCE OF THE CITY CLERK CARLA MORREALE,CITY CLERK :Efem~ Propane and butane are gases at room temperature and pressure. LPG FACT SHEET RECEIVED FROM THE AND MADE A PART OF :~fJ:lO~R4J ( COUNCIL MEETING OF~I.J/._'+'~-I OFFiCE OF THE CITY CL RK CARLA MORREALE,CITY CLERK They are converted to liquids by pressure and/or chilling.Propane is kept at pressures about 10 times atmospheric pressure at Rancho LPG Terminal. (Propane is in the long tanks.There are five of them,each can hold 60,000 gallons.)' Butane is stored in the large cylindrical tanks,of 12,600,000 gallons capacity.Butane is stored at 28°F,3°below its boiling point of 31°F. It's also at 7%pressure higher than atmospheric.2 When they are released to the atmosphere,both liquids.would quickly become gases,forming a vapor cloud.3 Butane and propane would greatly increase in volume,more than 200 times their original volume.(As they do this,they would compress the air to form a destructive pressure wave.t The contents of one butane tank would overflow the impound basin as it vaporizes;the basin will hold less than 1 %of the tank's contents,as the liquid vaporizes.The rest of the vapor will flow onto Gaffey Street.5 But both gases are heavier than air,and would tend to roll out like cold syrup,flowing invisibly along the ground,rather than rise.They would gradually mix with air at their edges.6 As they mix with air,they would become very flammable.(Fire needs oxygen from the air to support burning.)If they are ignited,possibly by a passing car,they will bum rapidly,and warm the rest of the gas which may still be in the liquid state,which will increase the fire.7 If water is sprayed on the burning gas,the gas and the liquid LPG will float on the water.Even as a liquid,LPG is lighter than water.The water would actually warm the liquid LPG,causing it to evaporate faster,and spread the fire.Butane bums hotter than 3600 oP,hot enough to melt steel!8 Th~~utane st?red at Rancho has enough energy to equal 53 atomic bombs! ThIS mformatIOn was acknowledged by Rancho's own consultants,Quest.9 I At 70°F propane has a vapor pressure of 145 psi (pounds per square inch)absolute; atmospheric pressure is 14.7 psi.Data according to NFPA (National Fire Protection Association)58,"Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code"2008. 2 Storage temperature is from Rancho documents.Butane's boiling point is 31 0 F, according to the API's (American Petroleum Institute)"Fire Protection Considerations for the Design and Operation of Liquified (LPG)Gas Facilities."It's stored at about 1 psi above atmospheric pressure,according to Rancho documents. 3 The 'vapor cloud'would be propane or butane,and not mix readily with air except at its edges.As gases,both propane and butane are odorless and colorless.They would be cold on their release,because of'self-refrigeration,'that is,after the pressure under which they were stored is relieved,and they are allowed to vaporize,they would expand greatly.When they expand,these gases cool down,in the same way that a refrigerant works in a refrigerator.If there was enough moisture in the air,the moisture might condense on the vapor surface and make it somewhat visible:.F f 4 Propane increases 270 times its volume;butane increases 230 times its volume, according to the API document cited above. 5 The impound basin was sized to hold the entire contents of one tanle (According to Google maps and a depth of 17 feet,given in Rancho documents,the impound basin volume is slightly smaller than 12,600,000 gallons,though.)So 12,600,000 gallons would expand 230 times to 2,898,000,000 gallons as a vapor.Only about 0.4% (12,600,000/2,898,000,000)of the vapor could be contained in the impound basin. 6 As the vapor flows out of the impound basin,it would flow into the adjacent stonn drain,then into the harbor near Channel Street.More vapor would likely flow onto Gaffey Street.Propane is 1.5 times as heavy as air;butane is 2.01 times as heavy.They would behave similarly to dry ice vapors that are used in spooky shows,hugging the ground.The weights of both gases are from the NFPA 58 document cited above. 7 The lower flammability limit (LFL)for propane is 2.15 %in the vapor air mixture;for butane it is 1.55 %.From the NFPA 58 document.Sources of ignition could be the engine of a passing car or a truck on site,or the heater,flare,or three compressors on site, or a static charge,or cigarette. 8 Although the gases are heavier than air,they are lighter than water when they are liquids (and,of course,when they are gases).Propane is 0.504 times the weight of water and butane is 0.582 times,according to the NFPA 58 document.Propane burns at a temperature of3595°F;butane at 3615°F.Information from NFPA 58 document.Steel melts at 2550 to 2790°F.The tanks containing the propane and butane are steel. Information on steel from Perry's Chemical Engineer's Handbook,6th Edition. 9 From Rancho's documents,letter titled,"Responses to Portions of Anthony Patchett's Letter by Quest Consulting,"p.4. Analysis of Potential Damage from a Spill from one Rancho Butane Tank The EPA specifies that for a 'worst case analysis'a company has to assume that its largest tank releases all its contents.After that specification EPA essentially allows any method for calculating the risk -we (the anti-tanks group)have calculated the worst-case to have a radius of 3 miles,using a formula which EPA did require,before they softened the requirements in 1999,relating the explosiveness of the spill in comparison to TNT. Rancho's consultant calculated just ~mile radius,which they were allowed to do under the EPA's weakened rule.But,if we start with Rancho's estimate ofa release from one tank of 57,000,000 Ibs,as reported in their Risk Management Plan,these calculations can be deduced: 57,000,000 lbs x gal/4.8 lb =11,875,000 gal. The spill will initially flow into the impound basin,which is sized to hold 12,600,000 gal.,where it will pick up heat and evaporate (it's boiling point is 31 0 F).When it evaporates,it will expand 230 times its volume as a liquid.SQ,the 11,875,000 gal.of liquid butane will become: 11,875,000 gal x 230 =2,731,250,000 gal.of butane gas. Since butane is heavier than air,some will stay in the basin,but most will be released. 2,731,250,000 gal-12,600,000 gal capacity of basin =2 ..718,650,000 gal of butane gas flows off-site. This volume of butane gas weighs 2,718,650,000 gal x 1/230 (expansion)x 4.8 lb/gal =56,737,000 lb Using the EPA's Guidance,to correlate this weight to the explosive power of TNT,the following calculation applies: 0.0081 (conversion factor)x (0.1 x 56,737,000 Ib x 45719 Kjoule/Kg [butane]/4680 Kjoule/Kg [TNT]yI/3 =3.1 miles Although the EPA calls this a 'worst case,'it would be much worse than that,since the explosion and fire would surely destroy the rest of the Terminal. Done by Connie Rutter,Registered Env.Assessor in CA. Michigan Technological University Ms.JanetR.Gunter P.O.Box 642 San Pedro,CA 90733 Dear Ms.Gunter: October 11,2011 Vice President for Governmental Relations SecremryofffieBoMdofCooum 507 Administration Building 1400 Townsend Drive Houghton,Michigan 49931-1295 906-487-2318 <>Fax 906-487-2935 .~ This letter is in response to your correspondence of October 3 regarding an analysis that was performed by Dr.Daniel Crowl,who is a faculty member at Michigan Tech. I have looked into the situation,and Dr.Crowl was hired directly,as an individual,by the EPA as a professional consultant for this project.He was not representing Michigan Tech nor speaking on behalf of the University in his capacity as a consultant for the EPA.The University has no contract for the services you question.Therefore,if you have any questions regarding Dr. Crowl's credentials or the work that he performed you will need to contact the EPA as they are his employer for this project. Sincerely, Dale R.Tahtinen Vice President for Governmental Relations and Secretary of the Board of Control RECEIVED FROM''S;:;o,I,.v.u:~~..;;;;..l''''''''__1 AND MADE A PART OF T E RECORD AT THE COUNCIL MEETING OF~::::I'~1 ~~r...K::'f OFFICE OF THE CITY CLERK CARLA MORREALE.CITY CLERK www.mtu.edu We prepare students to create the future. Michigan Technological University is an equal opportunity educational institution/equal opportunity employer. Printed on recycled paper ---c;;T"--......-W_...__.............W__---....-----...."....----0---_....-T'••---._-.........._J._-_...._..-__..._....._..._.._"_..wg_w O MW_--....--_••_. Engineer R.ebert B'ea a studeDt of disaster San Francisco Chronicle http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/amcle.cgi?f=/c/a/2010/o6/o6/MNH61DQ275.DTL [http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2010/06/06/MNH61DQ275.DTL] Jun06,2010 UC Berkeley engineering professor Robert Bea,73,a former Shell Oil executive,is a student of disaster. He has spent decades investigating catastrophic engineering failures,from the New Orleans levee breaches in Hurricane Katrina to the space shuttle Columbia's fiery end.Now he has assembled a team of researchers to delve into the Apri120 explosions that destroyed the Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling rig and caused the worst oil spill in U.S.history. ooen v ..!:Sea I L!VlI ana .bI1VIrOnmental bngtneenng nttp:IIWWW.ce.oerKeley.eawpeople/IaCUlty/oealoesunauon=peoplelIacu. Civil and Environmental Engineering University of California,Berkeley Search Home AboulCEE Programs People Faculty By Program Phone List Staff Advisory Council Visiting Scholars Graduate Undergraduate Research Alumni Department Resources Summary Biography CV Publications Awards Research Teaching Students Robert G.Sea Professor Emeritus bea@ce.berkeley.edu (510)642-0967 (510)643-8919 fax 212 McLaughlin Hall Program: Civil Systems Engineering and Project Management Research Summary: Risk Assessment and Management;Reliability,Human and Organizational Factors,Quality Assurance & QLJality Control,Design,Construction,Maintenance,Operations,Decommissioning,Ocean engineered systems (platforms,pipelines,ships). ©2011 UC Regents I UC Berkeley I College of Engineering I Contact From:Robert G Bea <bea@ce.berkeley.edu> To:Janet Gunter <arriane5@ao1.com> Subject:Re:Link to article in City Watch LA today re:LPG situation Date:Fri,Aug 3,20122:46 pm -----------------"-_._~_.._-------- very good summary Janet. status report from DC Berkeley three members of group are 'totally engaged'in the San Bruno disaster litigation (since BP trial was suspended end February).trial date October 10th.all Rancho work put on hold until trial is completed. i had a 'mild stroke'July 22nd.major effect was loss ofleft eye vision.still undergoing tests to,determine short and long term prognosis.no signs the circulation system 'trash' reached my brain. perhaps the San Bruno trial will provide opportunities to raise the flags about Rancho and about the prices of ignoring infrastructure risk assessment and management...industry and government.we will stay alert for the opportunities...San Bruno is a perfect analog for a future Rancho disaster....1ack of any realistic assessment ofthe SYSTEM RISKS ...denial by industry....more denial by government.....public not informed....you know the rest. bob bea On 8/3/12 11:13 AM,Janet Gunter wrote: http://citywatchla.com/component/content/article/317-8box- rig ht/3555-where-theres-smoke-theres-fire-and-possi bly-a- catastrophe?utm source=General+CityWatch+List&utm campaign =f17bf8d350-CW10628 2 2012&utm medium=email Professor Emeritus Robert Bea,PhD,PE Department of Civil &Environmental Engineering University of California Berkeley Email:bea@ce.berkeley.edu Home Office Risk Assessment &Management Services 60 Shuey Drive Moraga,California 94556 Telephone 925-631-1587 Cell 925-699-3503 Email:BeaRAMS@gmail.com From:Robert Bea <bearams@gmail.com> To:Janet Gunter <arriane5@aol.com> Subject:Re:Rancho LPG-"Derated"Tanks-"Ultra hazardous Activity" Date:Thu,Jun 30,2011 6:37 am Hi Janet, thank you for the update i would like to hear that proper attention was being paid to this obvious threat to the public and environment. i am having similar experiences with the Deepwater Horizon and the San Bruno disasters big pubic outcry when these disasters happened now,i think i hear the sounds of silence. much of this seems to be ingrained in our culture ...a culture ofTefictiveness .......we only get going when a disaster has happened....not very good at proactive action. on the Deepwater Horizon,i have decided the only way to develop reforms is through the courts ...legal processes.perhaps,this is the only way for you to be able to develop the necessary reforms ......fh:st principle ofcivil law:it is not lawful to expose people to risks they have not understood and acknowledged to accept. best regards, bob bea Hi Janet, i reviewed the report -and several of the appendices. the report provides some useful information. the·report does not provide a comprehensive analysis of all ofthe associated hazardous facilities.given the close proximities of the various types of hazardous facilities,there is high potential for 'domino system failure effects'-failure of one facility leads to failure of another facility .....etc. the report does not provide quantitative analyses of the major 'd~mands'(e.g. earthquakes)or of the facility 'capacities'to withstand those demands without failure (e.g. storage tank:performance during intense earthquakes). the report provides useful information on the consequences of tank:ruptures in terms of 'losses in containment'effects.these effects are not propagated to determine economic or life impacts given the losses in containment effects. risk is expressed by the combination ofthe likelihood of failure (Pt)and the consequences of failure (Ct).based on the results provided in this report,i am not able to determine in any definitive way either of these two elements that express risks.until the Pfs and Cfs are determined in reasonable ways,i am not able to tell ifthe risks are 'acceptable'to the affected public and industrial enterprises. an example will help express this requirement.if one were to focus on earthquakes and 'high hazard'facilities (like schools),California's 'structure'performance based codes and guidelines for such facilities would indicate that these facilities must be able to survive without failure (would sustain extensive damage,but not collapse)earthquakes that have average return periods in excess of 10,000 years.the performance based standards define both the likelihood of failure (Pf=10E-4 or lower per year)and the consequences of failure (loss of lives,injuries,property associated with the specified facilities).ifi determine that the combination of Pf and Cf exceed what California laws have specified, then i must take corrective action or be in potential violation ofthe law. i hope this helps. bob bea - CONTRA COSTA COUNTY CODE ~:~:::f~~:~::~~~:!:~::~iji;:ii'~Ii_I]Jt:.:..:{ Sections: ]O(Qj)V cZ~~ t=ium:NdG<...(A,6~v 450-8.002 -Background and findings. 450-8.004 -Purpose and goals. 450-8.006 -Authority. 450-8.008 -Administration. 450-8.0.1 0 -Applicability. 450-8.012 -Inspection. 450-8.014 -Definitions. 450-8.030 -Annual performance review and evaluation. {:0 "·~~{~0 ~f\JA1P{4 (]F r1t:& J:::::........--,--::::::-:::;;;;z- ...::::\..\:..M N~.- "-:;"~ ~Bt p~~oo CBr W-r<J db LA ~-e.--::::::::: 450-8.026 -Fees. 450-8.032 -Construction. 450-8.016 -Stationary source safety requirements. 450-8.018 -Review,audit and inspection. 450-8.020 -Trade secret. 450-8.028 -Penalties. ...:::dfW45(j~·8·.022···_···Hii~;dous··~~t6ti~i'~:~~~b~d~;~i;:o:n·:··:%;1'::;;.·· ....:;:;:~:"' :45(jL8.024=P~bii~""~f~rt11~ti~~bank.······ 450-8.002 -Background and findings. The board of supervisors of Contra Costa County fmds as follows: (a)Recent incidents in Contra Costa County at industrial chemical,petrochemical,and oil industry facilities have prompted the consideration of reviews,inspections,and audits that supplement existing federal and state safety programs and the imposition of additional safety measures to protect public health and safety from accidental releases. (b)Section 112(r)(7)ofthe Clean Air Act (42 V.S.C.A.Section 7412(4))required the ....Jr-2 Federal Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")to promulgate the rule known as the :;:ff!!fJ1-rr.::::> "Risk Management Program,"which is intended to prevent ...1 -'.'V~Nfli';Ii lPK5 f:lECEIVEO FROM AND MADE A PART OFTOlEl~$ COUNCIL MEETING OF # OFFICE OF THE CITY CL RK CARLA MORREALE,CITY CLERK regulated substances,as defined in the federal program,and reduce the severity of those releases that do occur.All facilities subject to this federal regulation must prepare a risk management plan (RMP)based on a risk management program established at the facility, that includes a hazard assessment of the facility,an accidental release prevention program,and an emergency response program (40 CFR Section 68).The facility must submit the Federal RMP to the EPA by June 21,1999 (40 CFR Section 68-150-68.185). The federal RMP will be available to state and local government and the public. (c)The California Health and Safety Code Article 2 (Section 25531 et seq.)of Chapter 6.95 was amended effective January 1,1997 to implement the federal EPA's risk management program rule with certain state-specific amendments.The state's risk management program is known as the California Accidental Release Prevention (CalARP)Program. (d)The county recognizes that regulatory requirements alone will not guarantee public health and safe!V,and that the public is a key stakeholder in chemical accident prevention.preparedness.and response at the local level.Prevenl'ing accidental releases ofregulated substances is the shared responsibility ofindustry.government and the public.The first steps toward accident prevention are identifying the hazards and assessing the risks.Once infOrmation about chemical hazqrds in the community is openlv shared.industry,government,and the communitr can work together towards reducing the risk to public health and safetr. (e)The success ofa safety program is dependent upon the cooperation ofindustrial chemical and oil refining facilities within Contra Costa County.The public must be assured that measures necessary to prevent incidents are being implemented,including changes or actions required by the department or the stationary source that are necessary to comply with this chapter. (Ord.98-48 §2). 450-8.004 -Purpose and goals. (a)The purpose of this chapter is to impose regulations which improve industrial safety by:. (1)Requiring the conduct of process hazard analyses for covered processes handling hazardous materials not covered by the federal or state accidental release prevention programs; (2)Requiring the review of action items resulting from process hazard analyses and requiring completion of those action items selected by the stationary source for implementation within a reasonable time frame; (3)Requiring the review of accidental release prevention efforts of stationary sources and providing for the conduct of investigations and analyses for the determination of the root cause for certain incidents; (4)Providing review,inspection,auditing and safety requirements that are more stringent than those required in existing law and reglliations; (5)Providing for public input into the safety plan and safety program and public review of any inspection and audit results; (6)Facilitating cooperation between industry,the county,and the public in the prevention and reduction of incidents at stationary sources; (7)Expanding the application of certain provisions of the federal and state accidental release prevention programs to processes not covered by the federal or state accidental release prevention programs; (8)Verifying that an approved security and vulnerability study is performed,and that the recommendations are addressed within a reasonable time frame; (9)Requiring the development and implementation of a written human factors program; and # (l0)Preventing and reducing the number,frequency,and severity of accidental releases in the county. (Ords.2006-22 §2,98-48 §2). 450-8.006 -Authority. The ordinance codified in this chapter is adopted by the county pursuant to its police power (or the purposes ofprotecting public health and safety by prevention of accidentall'eleases ofhazardous materials and to assure protection ofthe environment. (Ord.98-48 §2). 450-8.008 -Administration. The department is charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing this chapter. (Ord.98-48 §2). 450-8.010 -Applicability. (a)This chapter shall apply to stationary sources except that: (b)The following are exempt from the provisions of this chapter except Sections 450- 8.016(c)and (e),and 450-8.018(f)and (g): (1)Storage tanks containing a nonreglliated substance,except for storage tanks that contain a material that has a flashpoint above one hundred forty-one degrees Fahrenheit and below two hundred degrees Fahrenheit in accordance with the defInition of combustible liquid in 49 CFR 173.120(b); (2)Drum storage of:(A)a nonregulated substance;(B)less than ten thousand pounds of a hazard category B material located such that the drums could reasonably be expected to be involved in a single release;and (C)a hazard category A material,located such that the drums could reasonably be expected to be involved in a single release,at less than the quantity specified as the threshold planning quantity on the extremely hazardous substances list (Appendix A to 40 CFR Chapter I,Subchapter J,Part 355,as amended from time to time)or five hundred pounds,whichever is less; (3)Activities in process plant laboratories or laboratories that are under the supervision of a technically qualified individual as defined in Section 720.3(ee)of 40 CFR.This exemption does not apply to specialty chemical production;manufacture,processing or use of substances in pilot plant scale operations;and activities conducted outside the laboratory; (4)Utilities,except for fuel gas and natural gas systems to the battery limits of a process unit;and (5)Any waste tanks, containers or other devices subject to the federal and state hazardous waste laws,including the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),40 CFR Chapter I,Subchapter I,commencing with Part 260,the California Hazardous Waste Control Law,California Health and Safety Code,commencing With Section 25100 and the California Code of Regulations,Title 22 Division 4.5 Environmental Health Standards for the Management of Hazardous Waste. (Ords.2006-22 §3,98-48 §2). 450-8.012 -Inspection. The department shall be allowed reasonable access to any part of the stationary source subject to the requirements of this chapter,Sections 450-8.016 and 450-8.018 and to supporting documentation retained by the source for the purpose of determining compliance with this chapter. (Ord.98-48 §2). 450-8.014 -Definitions. For purposes of this chapter,the definitions set forth in this section shall apply.Words used in this chapter not defined in this section shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Clean Air Act Regulations (40 CFR Section 68.3)and in California Health and Safety Code Article 2 (Section 25531 et seq.)of Chapter 6.95,unless the context indicates otherwise. (a)"Covered process"means any process at a stationary source. (b)"Department"means the Contra Costa County health services director and anr.. director authorized deputies. (c)"Feasible"means capable of being accomplished in a successful manner within a reasonable period of time,taking into account economic,environmental,legal,social,and technological factors. (d)"Hazard category A materials"are substances which meet the hazard category A material definition as set forth in Section 84-63.1016 of this code. (e)"Hazard category B materials"are substances which meet the hazard category B material definition as set forth in Section 84-63.1016 of this code. (f)"Industry codes,standards,and guidelines"means the edition of the codes,standards, and guidelines in effect at the time of original design or construction for the design, construction,alteration,maintenance or repair of process units,industrial equipment,or other industrial facilities,structures or buildings published by,but not limited to,the American Petroleum Institute (API),the American Chemistry Council (ACC),the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)or the American National Standards Institute (ANSI),and meets recognized and generally accepted gpoo engineering practices (RAGAGEP). (g)"Inherently safer systems"means "inherently safer design strategies"as discussed in the latest edition of the Center for Chemical Process Safety Publication "Inherently Safer Chemical Processes,"and means feasible alternative equipment,processes,materials,lay- outs,and procedures meant to eliminate,minimize,or reduce the risk of a major chemical accident or release by modifying a process rather than adding external layers of protection.Examples include,but are not limited to,substitution of materials with lower vapor pressure,lower flammability,or lower toxicity;isolation of hazardous processes; and use of processes which operate at lower temperatures and/or pressures. (h)"Major chemical accident 01'release"means an incident that meets the definition ora level 3 or"level 2 incident in the communitl?warning system incident level classification system defined in the hazardous materials incident notification policr.as determined by the department;01'results in the release ofa regulated substance and meets one or more oUhe following criteria: (1)Results in one or more fatalities; (2)Results in greater than twenty-four hours of hospital treatment ofthree or more persons; (3)Causes 011.-and/or off-site propertl?damage (including clean-up and restoration activities)initially estimated at five hundred thousand dollars or more.On-site estimates shall be performed by the stationary source.Off-site estimates shall be performed by appropriate agencies and compiled by the department; (4)Results in a vapor cloud of flammables and/or combustibles that is more than five thousand pounds. (i)"Regulated substance"means (1)any chemical substance which satisfies the provisions of California Health and Safety Code Section 25532(g),as amended from time to time,or (2)a substance which satisfies the provisions of hazard categories A or Bin Section 84-63.1016 of this code.Mixtures containing less than one percent of a regulated substance shall not be considered in the determination of the presence of a regulated material. (j)"§i§.lsm~fHt&xmxHtJ?:FR~wpnmeans the documentation,development, impIemerifatic)ll,andihlegfiition ofmanagement systems by the facility to comply with the regulations set forth in 40 CFR,Part 68 and the California Health and Safety Code, Article 2,commencing with Section 25531. (k)"RMP"means the risk management plan required to be submitted pursuant to the requirements of the 40 CFR Section 68.150-68.185 and the California Health and Safety Code Article 2 (Section 25531 et seq.)of Chapter 6.95. (1)"Root cause"means prime reasons,such as failures of some management systems,that allow faUlty design,inadequate training,or improper changes,whichJead to an unsafe act or condition,and result in an incident.If root causes were removed;the particular incident would not have occurred. (m)"Safety plan"means the safety plan required to be submitted to the department pursuant to the requirements of Section 450-8.016 of this chapter. (n)"Safety program"means the documentation, development,implementation,and integration of management systems by the stationary source to comply with the safety requirements set forth in Section 450-8.016 of this chapter. (0)"Stationary source"or "source"means a facilitp which includes at least one process as defined in 40 CFR 68.10 that is subject to federal risk management program level 3 requirements and whose primary North American Industry Classification System code fNAlCS)is 324 (Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing)or 325 (Chemical Manufacturing}. (P)"California accidental release prevention program"means the documentation, development,implementation,and integration of management systems by a facility to comply with the regulations set forth in California Code of Regulations,Title 19, Division 2,Chapter 4.5. (q)"Catastrophic release"means a major uncontrolled emission.fire.or explosion. involving one or more highly hazardous chemicals.that presents serious danger to employees in the workplace and/or the public.As used in this section,"highly hazardous chemical"has the meaning ascribed to it in 29 CFR 1910.119(b)as of May 21,2003. (r)"Human factors"means a discipline concerned with designing machines,operations, and work environments so that they match human capabilities,limitations,and needs. "Human factors"can be further referred to as environmental,organizational,and job factors,and human and individual characteristics that influence behavior at work in a way that can affect health and safety. (s)"Human systems"means the systems.such as written and unwritten policies. procedures.and practices.in effect to minimize the existence/persistence oriatent conditions at the stationary source.It also includes the broad area of safety culture of a stationary source to the extent that it influences the actions of individuals or groups of individuals. (Ords.2006-22 §4,98-48 §2). 450-8.016 -Stationary source safety requirements. The stationary source shall submitasafetypiatltothe department within one year ofthe effective date ofthe ordinance cb:aifi~din this ~h;pter or within three years of the date a facility becomes a stationary source,that complies with the provisions of this section and that includes the safety elements listed in subsection (a)of this section.In addition,the stationary source shall comply with the safety requirements set forth in subsections (a) through '(e)of this section and shall include a description of the ma.n.D:er of compliance with these subsections in the safety plan.A new covered process,at~an existing stationary source shall comply with subsections (a)through (e)ofthis section prior to initial startup. (a)Sa(etv Program Elements.All covered processes shall be subject to the sa(etv program elements listed below.The safety plan shall include a description of the manner in which these safety program elements listed below shall be applied to the covered process.These safety program elements shall be implemented in conformance with the California accidental release prevention program and the safety plan shall follow Chapters 5,7,~and-.2 of the Contra Costa County health services department CalARP program guidance document. (1)Process Sa(etv Information. (A)The stationary source shall complete a compilation o(written process sa(etv information before conducting any process hazard analysis as required by this chapter. The compilation of written process safety information is to enable the stationary source and the employees involved in operating the covered process to identify and understand the hazards posed by the covered process.This process safety information shall include information pertaining to the hazards of the regulated substances used or produced by the process,information pertaining to the technology of the process,information pertaining to the equipment in the process,and information pertaining to the hazards of the regulated substances in the process. (i)This information shall consist of at least the following:toxicity information; permissible exposure limits;physical data;reactivity data;corrosivity data;thermal and chemical stability data;and hazardous effects of inadvertent mixing of different materials that could foreseeably occur. (ii)Material safety data sheets meeting the requirements of Section 5189,Title 8 of California Code of Regulations may be used to comply with this requirement to the extent they contain the information required by this subsection. (iii)Information pertaining to the technology oOhe process shall include at least the following:a block flow diagram or simplified process flow diagram;process chemistry; maximum intended inventory;safe upper and lower limits for such items as temperatures.pressures,flows or compositions;and.an evaluation oOhe consequences ofdeviations.Where the original technical information no longer exists. such information may be developed in conjunction with the process hazard analysis in sufflcient detail to support the analysis. (iv)Information pertaining to the equipment in the process shall include:materials of construction;piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's);electrical classification;relief system <,lesign and design basis;ventilation system design;design codes and standards employed;material and energy balances for processes built after the compliance date of the ordinance codified in this chapter;and safety systems (e.g.,interlocks,detection or suppression systems). (B)The stationary source shall document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices.. (C)For existing equipment designed and constructed in accordance with codes, standards,or practices that are no longer in general use,the stationary source shall determine and document that the equipment is designed,maintained,inspected,tested, and operating in a safe manner. (2)Operating Procedures. (A)The stationary source shall develop and implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process consistent with the process safety information and shall address at least the following elements: (i)Steps for each operating phase:initial startup;normal operations;temporary operations;emergency shutdown,including the conditions under which emergency shutdown is required,and the assignment of shutdown responsibility to qualified operators to ensure that emergency shutdown is executed in a safe and timely manner; emergency operations;normal shutdown;and,startup following a turnaround,or after an emergency shutdown. (ii)Operating limits:consequences of deviation;and steps required to correct or avoid deviation. (B)Safety and Health Considerations.Properties of,and hazards presented by,the chemicals used in the process;precautions necessary to prevent exposure,including engineering controls,administrative controls,and personal protective equipment;control measures to be taken if physical contact or airborne exposure occurs;quality control for raw materials and control ofhazardous chemical inventory levels;and.any special or unique hazards. (C)Safety systems and their functions. (D)Operating procedures shall be readily accessible to employees who work in or maintain a process. (E)The operating procedures shall be reviewed as often as necessary to assure that they reflect current operating practice,including changes that result from changes in process chemicals,technology,and equipment,and changes to stationary sources.The stationary source shall certify annually that these operating procedures are current and accurate. (F)The stationary source shall develop and implement safe work practices to provide (or the control o{hazards during operations such as lockout/tagout;confined space entry;0pening process equipment or piping;and control over entrance into a stationary source by maintenance,contractor,laboratory,or other support pelsonnel.These safe work practices shall apply to employees and contractor employees. (3)Employee Participation. (A)The stationary source shall develop a written plan ofaction regarding the implementation ofthe emplovee participation required by this chapter. (B)The stationary source shall consult with employees and their representatives on the conduct and development of process hazards analyses and on the development of the other elements ofthe safety program in this chapter. (C)The stationary source shall provide to employees and their representatives access to process hazard analyses and to all other information required to be developed under this chapter. (4)Training.For each emplovee in such covered process: (A)Initial Training.Each employee presently involved in operating a covered process, and each employee before being involved in operating a newly assigned covered process, shall be trained in an overview of the process and in the operating procedures as specified in subsection (a)(2)(A)ofthis section.The training shall include emphasis on the specific safety and health hazards,emergency operations including shutdown,and safe work practices applicable to the employee's job tasks.In lieu of initial training for those employees already involved in operating a process,an owner or operator may certify in writing that the employee has the required knowledge,skills,and abilities to safely carry out the duties and responsibilities as specified in the operating procedures. (B)Refresher Training.Refresher training shall be provided at least every three veal'S, and more often if necessary,to each employee involved in operating a covered process to assure that the employee understands and adheres to the current operating procedures of the covered process.The stationary source,in consultation with the employees involved in operating the process,shall determine the appropriate frequency of refresher training. (C)Training Documentation.The stationary source shall ascertain that each employee involved in operating a process has received and understood the training required by this section.The stationary source shall prepare a record which contains the identity of the employee,the date of training,and the means used to verify that the employee understood the training. (5)Mechanical Integritv.Including the Use ofIndustry Codes.Standards.and Guidelines. (A)Application.Subsections (a){5)(B)through (a)(5)(F)of/his section apply to the following process equipment:pressure vessels and storage tanks;piping subsystems (including piping components such as valves);relief and vent systems and devices; emergency shutdown systems;controls (including monitoring devices and sensors, alarms,and interlocks)and pumps. (B)Written Procedures.The stationary source shall establish and implement written procedures to maintain the on-going integrity of process equipment. (C)Training for Process Maintenance Activities.The stationary source shall train each employee involved in maintaining the on-going integrity of process equipment in an overview of that process and its hazards and in the procedures applicable to the employee's job tasks to assure that the employee can perform the job tasks in a safe manner. (D)Inspection and Testing. (1)Inspections and tests shall be performed on process equipment.Inspection and testing procedures shall follow recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices.The frequency of inspections and tests of process equipment shall be consistent with applicable manufacturers'recommendations and good engineering practices,and more frequently if determined to be necessary by prior operating experience.The stationary source shall document each inspection and test that has been performed on process equipment.The documentation shall identify the date ofthe inspection or test,the name of the person who performed the inspection or test,the serial number or other identifier of the equipment on which the inspection or test was performed,a description of the inspection or test performed,and the results of the inspection or test. (E)Equipment Deficiencies.The stationary source shall correct deficiencies in equipment that are outside acceptable limits (defined by the process safety information in subsection (a)(1)ofthis section)before further use or in a safe and timely manner when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation. (F)Quality Assurance.In the construction of new plants and equipment,the stationary source shall assure that equipment as it is fabricated is suitable for the process application for which they will be used.Appropriate checks and inspections shall be performed to assure that equipment is installed properly and consistent with design specifications and the manufacturer's instructions.The stationary source shall assure that maintenance materials,spare parts and equipment are suitable for the process application for which they will be used. (6)Management ofChange. (A)The stationary source shall establish and implement written procedures to manage changes (except for "replacements in kind")to process chemicals.technology. equipment.and procedures;and changes to stationary sources that affect a covered process. (B)The procedures shall assure that the following considerations are addressed prior to any change:the technical basis for the proposed change;impact of change on safety and health;modifications to operating procedures;necessary time period for the change;and authorization requirements for the proposed change. (C)Employees involved in operating a process and maintenance and contract employees whose job tasks will be affected by a change in the process shall be informed of,and trained ~,the change prior to startup of the process or affected part of the process. (D)If a change covered by this section results in a change in theprfJcess safety information required by subsection (a)(l)of this section,such information shall be updated accordingly. (E)If a change covered by this section results in a change in the 'Operating procedures or practices required by subsection (a)(2)ofthis section,such procedures or practices shall be updated accordingly. (7)Pre-Startup Reviews. (A)The stationary source shall perform a pre-startup safety review for new stationary sources and for modified stationary sources when the modification is significant enough to require a change in the process safety information. (B)The pre-startup safety review shall confirm that prior to the introduction of regulated substances to a covered process:construction and equipment is in accordance with design specifications;safety,operating,maintenance,and emergency procedures are in place and are adequate;for new covered processes,a process hazard analysis has been performed and recommendations have been resolved or implemented before startup;and modified covered processes meet the requirements contained in management of change, subsection (a)(6)of this section;and training of each employee involved in operating a process has been completed. (8)Compliance Audits. (A)The stationary source shall certify that they have evaluated compliance with the provisions ofthis section at least every three years to verify that the procedures and practices developed under this chapter are adequate and are being followed. (B)The compliance audit shall be conducted by at least one person knowledgeable in the process. (C)A report of the fmdings of the audit shall be developed. (D)The stationary source shall promptly determine and document an appropriate response to each of the findings of the compliance audit,and document that deficiencies have been corrected. (E)The stationary source shall retain the two most recent compliance audit reports. (9)Incident Investigation. (A)The stationary source shall investigate each incident which resulted in,or could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release of a regulated substance. (B)An incident investigation shall be initiated as promptly as possible,but not later than forty-eight hours following the incident. (C)An incident investigation team shall be established and consist of at least one person knowledgeable in the covered process involved,including a contractemployee if the incident involved work ofthe contractor,and other persons with apj>ropriate knowledge and experience to thoroughly investigate and analyze the incident. (D)A report shall be prepared at the conclusion of the investigation which includes at a minimum:date of incident;date investigation began;a descriptipn of the incident;the factors that contributed to the incident;and recommendations resulting from the investigation.The written summary shall indicate whether the cause of the incident and/or recommendations resulting from the investigation are specific only to the process or equipment involved in the incident,or are applicable to other processes or equipment at the stationary source.The incident investigation report shall be made available to the department upon request. (E)The stationary source shall establish a system to promptly address and resolve the incident report findings and recommendations.Resolutions and corrective actions shall be documented. (F)The report shall be reviewed with all affected personnel whose job tasks are relevant to the incident fmdings including contract employees where applicable. (0)Incident investigation reports shall be retained for five years. (l0)Hot Work. (A)The stationary source shall issue a hot work permit for hot work operations conducted on or near a covered process. (B)The permit shall document that the fire prevention and protection requirements in Section 5189 of Title 8 of California Code Regulations have been implemented prior to beginning the hot work operations;it shall indicate the date(s)authorized for hot work; and identify the object on which hot work is to be performed.The permit shall be kept on file until completion of the hot work operations. (11)Contractors. (A)Application.This section applies to contractors performing maintenance 01'repair. turnaround.major renovation.or specialty work on 01'adjacent to a covered process.It does not apply to contractors providing incidental services which do not influence process safety,such as janitorial work,food and drink services,laundry,delivery or other supply services. (B)Stationary Source Responsibilities. (i)The stationary source.when selecting a contractor.shall obtain and evaluate information regarding the contract owner or operator's safety performance and programs. (ii)The stationary source shall inform contract owner or operator of the known potential fIre,explosion,or toxic release hazards related to the contractor's work and the process. (iii)The stationary source shall explain to the contract owner or operator the applicable provisions of the emergency response program subsection (a)(l2)zC)fthis section. (iv)The stationary source shall develop and implement safe work practices consistent with subsection (a)(2)of this section to control the entrance,presence,and exit of the contract owner or operator and contract employees in covered process areas. (v)The stationary source shall periodically evaluate the performance ofthe contract owner or operator in fulfIlling their obligations as specifIed in subsection (a)(ll)(C)of this section. (C)Contract Owner or Operator Responsibilities. (i)The contract owner or operator shall assure that each contract employee is trained in the work practices necessary to safely perform his/her job. (ii)The contract owner or operator shall assure that each contract employee is instructed in the known potential fIre,explosion,or toxic release hazards related to hislher job and the process,and the applicable provisions of the emergency action plan. (iii)The contract owner or operator shall document that each contract employee has received and understood the training required by this section.The contract owner or operator shall prepare a record which contains the identity of the contract employee,the date of training,and the means used to verify that the employee understood the training. (iv)The contract owner or operator shall assure that each contract employee follows the safety rules of the stationary source including the safe work practices required by subsection (a)(2)of this section. (v)The contract owner or operator shall advise the stationary source of any unique hazards presented by the contract owner or operator's work,or of any hazards found by the contract owner or operator's work. (12)Emergency Response Program. (A)The stationary source shall develop and implement an emergency response program (or the purpose ofprotecting public health and the environment.Such program shall include the following elements: (i)An emergency response plan,which shall be maintained at the stationary source and contain at least the following elements:procedures for informing the public and local emergency response agencies about accidental releases,emergency planning,and emergency response;documentation of proper first-aid and emergency medical treatment necessary to treat accidental human exposures;and procedures and measures for emergency response after an accidental release of a regulated substance; (ii)Procedures for the use of emergency response equipment and for its inspection, testing,and maintenance,including documentation of inspection,testing,and maintenance; (iii)Training for all employees in relevant procedures and the incident command system; and ,Co> (iv)Procedures to review and update,as appropriate,the emergency response plan to reflect changes at the stationary source and ensure that employees are informed of changes. (B)A written plan that complies with other federal contingency plan regulations or is consistent with the approach in the National Response Team's Integrated Contingency Plan Guidance ("One Plan")and that,among other matters,includes the elements provided in subsection (a)(l2)(A)of this section,shall satisfy the requirements ofthis section ifthe stationary source also complies with subsection (a)(l2)(C)of this section. (C)The emergency response plan developed under this section shall be coordinated with the community emergency response plan developed under 42 U.S.C.Section 11003. Upon request of the local emergency planning committee or emergency response officials,the stationary source shall promptly provide to the local emergency response officials information necessary for developing and implementing the community emergency response plan. (D)The stationary source whose employees will not respond to accidental releases of regulated substances need not comply with subsections (a)(l2)(A)through (a)(l2)(C)of this section provided that they meet the following: (i)For stationary sources with any regulated toxic substance held in a process above the threshold quantity,the stationary source is included in the community emergency response plan developed under Section 11003 of Title 42 of the United States Code (USC);or (ii)For stationary sources with only regulated flammable substances held in a process above the threshold quantity the stationary source has coordinated response actions with the local fIre department;and (iii)Appropriate mechanisms are in place to notify emergency responders when there is a need for a response. (13)Safety Program Management. (A)The owner or operator of a stationary source subject to this chapter shall develop a management system to oversee the implementation of the safety program elements. (B)The owner or operator shall assign a qualified person 01'position that has the overall responsibility (or the development.implementation.and integration ofthe safety program elements. (C)When responsibility for implementing individual requirements of this chapter is assigned to persons other than the person identified under subsection (a)(13)(B)of this section,the names or positions of these people shall be documented and the lines of authority defmed through an organization chart or similar document. (b)Human Factors Program. (1)Stationary sources shall develop a written human factors program that (ollows the human factors guidance document developed or adopted by the department.The program shall be developed within one year following the issuance of the Contra Costa County guidance documents,the effective date of the ordinance codified in this section, or as otherwise allowed by this chapter,whichever is later.The human factors program shall address: (A)The inclusion of human factors in the process hazards analysis process; (B)The consideration of human systems as causal factors in the incident investigation process for major chemical accidents or releases or for an incident that could reasonably have resulted in a major chemical accident or release; (C)The training of employees in the human factors program; (D)Operating procedures; (E)Maintenance safe work practice procedures and maintenance procedures for specialized equipment,piping,and instruments,no later than June 30,2011;and (F)The requirement to conduct a management of change prior to staffing changes for changes in permanent staffing levels/reorganization in operations,maintenance,health and safety,or emergency response.This requirement shall also apply to stationary sources using contractors in permanent positions in operations and maintenance.Prior to conducting the management of change,the stationary source shall ensure that the job function descriptions are current and accurate for the positions under consideration. Staffing changes that last longer than ninety days are considered permanent.Temporary changes associated with strike preparations shall also be subject to this requirement. Employees and their representatives shall be consulted in the management of change. (2)Employees and their representatives shall participate in the development of the written human factors program. (3)The program shall include,but not be limited to,issues such as staffing,shiftwork and overtime. (4)A description of the human factors program subsections (b)(l)through (b)(3)of this section shall be included in the safety plan prepared by the stationary source. (c)Root Cause Analysis and Incident Investigation. (l)Stationary sources shall conduct a root cause analysis for each major chemical accident or release which occurs after the effective date ofthe ordinance codified in this chapter.Stationary sources shall periodically update the departmeJ).t on facts related to the i' release or incident,and the status of a root cause analysis conducted pursuant to this section,at meetings scheduled by the department in cooperation with the stationary source.To the maximum extent feasible,the department and the stationary source shall coordinate these meetings with other agencies with jurisdiction (:)ver the stationary source.Within thirty days of completing a root cause analysis performed pursuant to this section,the stationary source shall submit to the department a final report containing that analysis,including recommendations to be implemented to mitigate against the release or incident reoccurring,if any,and a schedule for completion of resulting recommendations. The department may require the stationary source to submit written,periodic update reports at a frequency not to exceed every thirty days until the fmal report is submitted. The methodology of the root cause analysis shall be one of the methodologies recognized by the Center for Chemical Process Safety or shall be reviewed by the department to determine substantial equivalency. (2)The department may elect to do its own independent root cause analysis or incident investigation for a major chemical accident or release.If the department elects to conduct a root cause analysis or incident investigation the stationary source shall cooperate with the department by providing the following access and information in a manner consistent with the safety of department and stationary source personnel and without placing undue burdens on the operation of the stationary source: (i)Allow the department to investigate the accident site and directly related facilities such as control rooms,physical evidence and where practicable the external and internal inspection of equipment; (ii)Provide the department with pertinent documentation;and (iii)Allow the department to conduct independent interviews of stationary source employees,subject to all rights of the stationary source and employees to be represented by legal counsel and/or management and union representatives during such interviews.If in the course of the department's root cause analysis or incident investigation access is required to areas of the stationary source which in the judgment of the stationary source requires personnel entering the area to use protective equipment and/or have specialized training the department shall provide its personnel with such equipment and training.To the maximum extent feasible,the department shall coordinate any root cause analysis or incident investigation it conducts with investigations conducted by other agencies with jurisdiction over the stationary source to minimize the adverse impacts on the stationary source and/or its employees. (3)No part of the conclusions,[mdings or recommendations ofthe root cause analysis conducted by the department or stationary source,or incident investigation conducted by the department,relating to any major chemical accident or release or the investigation thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used in any action or suit for damages arising out of any matter mentioned in such report. (d)Process Hazard Analvsis/Action Items. (l )Process hazard analyses will be conducted for each ofthe coverfld processes according to one ofthe following methods:What-If.Checklist!What-If/Checklist. Hazard and Operabilitv Study (HAZOP).Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEAi2 fault tree analysis 01'an appropriate equivalent methodology approved by the department prior to conducting the process hazard analysis.The process hazard analysis shall be appropriate to the complexity ofthe covered process and shall identify, evaluate,and control the hazards involved in the covered process.The process hazard analysis shall address:the hazards of the process;the identification of any previous incident which had a likely potential for catastrophic consequences;engineering and administrative control applicable to the hazards and their interrelationships such as appropriate application of detection methodologies to provide early warning of releases (acceptable detection methods might include process monitoring and control instrumentation with alarms,and detection hardware such as hydrocarbon sensors); consequences of failure of engineering and administrative controls;covered process and stationary source siting;human factors;and a qualitative evaluation of a range of the possible safety and health effects of failure of controls.PHAs should also include consideration of external events except for seismic analyses,which are only required when criteria listed in subsection (d)(2)of this section are satisfied.All process hazard analyses shall be performed by a team with expertise in engineering and process operations,and the team shall include at least one employee who has experience and knowledge specific to the process being evaluated.Also,one member of the team must be knowledgeable in the specific process hazard analysis methodology being used. (2)The process hazard analyses shall be conducted within one year of the effective date of the ordinance codified in this chapter and no later than the submittal date of the safety plan.Previously completed process hazard analyses that comply with the California Code of Regulations,Title 8,Section 5189,and/or the California Code of Regulations,Title 19, Section 2760.2 are acceptable for the purposes of this chapter.Process hazard analyses shall be updated and revalidated at least once every five years after completion of the initial process hazard analysis.Updated and revalidated process hazard analyses completed to comply with the California Code of Regulations,Title 8,Section 5189, and/or the California Code of Regulations,Title 19,Section 2760 are acceptable for meeting the update and revalidation requirement.Seismic events shall be considered for processes containing a substance defined in the California Code of Regulations,Title 19, Chapter 4.51,Section 2770.5,if the distance to the nearest public receptor for a worst case release scenario specified by the California Code of Regulations,Title 19,Chapter 4.5,Section 2750.3 is within the distance to a toxic or flammable endpoint as defmed in California Code of Regulations,Title 19,Chapter 4.5,Section 2750.2(a). (3)For all covered processes,the stationary source shall consider the use of inherently safer systems in the development and analysis of mitigation items resulting from a process hazard analysis and in the design and review of new processes and facilities.The stationary source shall select and implement inherently safer systems to the greatest extent feasible.If a stationary source concludes that an inherently safer system is not feasible,the basis for this conclusion shall be documented in meaningful detaiL (4)For all covered processes,the stationary source shall document the decision made to implem~mt or not implement all process hazard analysis recommended action items and the results of recommendations for additional study.The stationary s0urce shall complete recommended actions from the initial PHA's and from PHA revalidations,identified by the process hazard analysis and selected for implementation by the stationary source as follows:all actions not requiring a process shutdown shall be completed within one year after submittal of the safety plan;all actions requiring a process shutdown shall be completed during the first regularly scheduled turnaround of the applicable process subsequent to one year after submittal ofthe safety plan unless the stationary source demonstrates to the satisfaction of the department that such a schedule is infeasible.For recommended actions not selected for implementation,the stationary source shall include the justification for not implementing the recommended action.For all covered processes, the stationary source shall retain documentation of closure,and any associated justifications,of actions identified by the process hazard analysis.The stationary source shall communicate the actions to operating,maintenance,and other employees whose work assignments are in the process and who may be affected by the recommendations or actions. (e)Accident History. (1)The stationary source shall include an accident history in the safety plan of all major chemical accidents or releases from June 1,1992,through the date of safety plan submittal to the department.For each major chemical accident or release the stationary source shall report the following information,to the extent known: Date,time and approximate duration of the release; Chemicals released; Estimated quantity released in pounds; Type of release event and its source; Weather conditions at the time of the release; On-site impacts; Known off-site impacts; Initiating event and contributing factors; Root cause(s); Whether off-site responders were notified;and Operational or process changes that resulted from the investigation of the release. (2)The stationary source shall annually submit a report ofthe accident history to the department.The first report shall be due two years after the effective date of the ordinance codified in this chapter,and subsequent reports shall be due by June 30th of each year. (t)Certification.The owner or operator shall submit in the safetv plan a single certification that.to the best ofthe signer's knowledge.information,and belief formed after reasonable inquiry,the information submitted is true.aceulate,and complete. (g)Security and Vulnerability Assessment.Each stationary source shall perform and document a security and vulnerability assessment as defined in the Contra Costa County CalARP program guidance document,by June 30,2007,and at feast once every five years after the initial assessment,or as prescribed by federal regulation.The stationary source shall document its process for assuring that recommendations are addressed. (h)Safety Culture Assessment.The stationary source shall conduct a safety culture assessment.The assessment shall be based upon a method listed in the Contra Costa County CalARP program guidance document or shall be reviewed by the department to determine substantial equivalency.The initial assessment shall be performed by one year following the revisions to the Industrial Safety Ordinance guidance document that addresses the safety culture assessment,and at least once every five years thereafter.The safety culture assessment will be reviewed during the audit and inspection of the stationary source.The department may perform its own safety culture assessment after a major chemical accident or release or the occurrence of any incident that could reasonably have led to a major chemical accident or release,or based on department audit results of the stationary source. (Ords.2006-22 §5,2000-20 §1,98-48 §2). 450-8.018 -Review,audit and inspection. (a)Upon submission ofa safeW plan by the stationary source.the department shall review the sa(eW plan to determine ffall the elements required by Section 450-8.016 of this chapter are included and complete.The department shall provide to the stationary source a written notice of deficiencies,if any.The stationary source shall have sixty calendar days from receipt of the notice of deficiencies to make any corrections.The stationary source may request,in writing,a one-time thirty-day calendar day extension to correct deficiencies.By the end of the sixty calendar days or any extension period,the stationary source shall resubmit the revised safety plan to the department.After the department determines that the safety plan is complete,the department shall schedule a public meeting on the stationary source's safety plan to explain its contents to the public and take public comments.Public comments on the safety plan shall be taken by the department for a period of forty-five days after the safety plan is made available to the public.The department shall schedule a public meeting on the stationary source's safety plan during the forty-five day comment period.The public meetings shall be held in the affected community on evenings or weekends.The department shall respond in writing to all written comments received during the forty-five day comment period and to all oral comments received and not addressed at the public meeting.The department shall make portions of the safety plan,which are not protected trade secret information,available to the public for the public meeting. (b)(l)The department shall.within one year ofthe submission ofthe stationary source'9 safety plan.conduct an initial audit and inspection ofthe stationary source's safety program to determine compliance with this chapter.Basedppon the department's review of the safety plan and the audit and inspection of the stationary source,the department may require modifications or additions to the safety plan submitted by the stationary source,or safety program to bring the safety plan or safety program into compliance with the requirements ofthis chapter.Any determination that modifications or additions to the safety plan or safety program are required shall be in writing, collectively referred to as the "preliminary determination."The preliminary determination shall explain the basis for the modifications or additions required to bring the safety plan or safety program into compliance with the requirements of this chapter and provide a timetable for resolution of the recommendations.The preliminary determination shall be mailed to the stationary source. (2)The stationary source shall respond in writing to the preliminary determination issued by the department.The response shall state that the stationary source will incorporate into the safety plan or safetv program the revisions contained in the preliminary determination or shall state that the stationary source rejects the revisions;in whole or in part.For each rejected revision,the stationary source shall explain the basis for rejecting such revision.Such explanation may include substitute revisions. (3)The stationary source's written response to the department's preliminary determination shall be received by the department within ninety days of the issuance of the preliminary determination or such shorter time as the department specifies in the preliminary determination as being necessary to protect public health and safety.Prior to the written response being due and upon written request from the stationary source,the department may provide,in writing,additional time for the response to be received. (4)After receiving the written response from the stationary source,the department shall issue a public notice pursuant to the department's public participation policy and make portions of the safety plan,the preliminary determination and the stationary source's responses,which are not protected trade secret information,available for public review. Public comments on the safety plan shall be taken by the department for a period of forty- five days after the safety plan,the preliminary determination and the stationary source's responses are made available to the public.The department shall schedule a public meeting on the stationary source's safety plan during the forty-five day comment period. The public meetings shall be held in the affected community on evenings or weekends. The department shall respond in writing to all written comments received during the forty-five day comment period and to all oral comments received and not addressed at the public meeting. (c)Based upon the department's preliminary determination,review of the stationary source's responses and review of public comments on the safety plan,the preliminary determination and the stationary source's responses,the department may require modifications or additions to the safety plan submitted by the stationary source or safety program to bring the safety plan or safety program into compliance with the requirements of this chapter.Any determination that modifications or additions to the safety plan or safety program are required,and any determination that no modifications or additions to the safety plan or safety program are required shall be in writing (collectively referred to as "final determination"),shall be mailed to the stationary source and shall be made available to the public.The department may not include in a final ~etermination any requirements to a safety plan or safety program that would cause ~violation of,or conflict with,any state or federal law or regulation or a violation of any permit or order issued by any state or federal agency. (d)Within thirty days ofthe department's final determination,the stationary source and/or any person may appeal the final determination to the board of supervisors pursuant to Chapter 14-4 of this code by a verified written notice of appeal filed with the clerk of the board of supervisors and payment of the applicable appeal fee.The appeal must be limited to issues raised during the public comment period.The notice shall state the grounds for any such appeal,including (i)the reasoning that the appeal is necessary because the stationary source is in compliance with this chapter,or (ii)the reasoning that the appeal is necessary to bring the stationary source into compliance with this chapter.In acting on the appeal,the board shall have the same authority over the final determination as the department.The board may require modifications or additions to the safety plan or safety program to bring the safety plan or safety program into compliance with the requirements of this chapter.The board may not include in its decision on the final determination any requirements to a safety plan or safety program that would cause a violation of,or conflict with,any state or federal law or regulation or a violation of any permit or order issued by any state or federal agency.The decision of the board of supervisors shall be fmal with respect to the final determination. (e)The safety plan shall be valid for a period oUhree years from the date ofreceipt by the department and shall be reviewed and updated by the stationary source every three years pursuant to the requirements oUhis chapter.Any revisions to the safety plan as a result oUhe review and update shall be submitted to the department and shall be subject to the provisions oUhis section. (t)The department may,within thirty days of a major chemical accident or release, initiate a safety inspection to review and audit the stationary source's compliance with the provisions of Section 450-8.016 of this chapter.The department shall review and audit the stationary source's compliance with the provisions of Section 450-8.016 of this chapter at least once every three years.The department may audit the stationary source based upon any of the following criteria:accident history of the stationary source, accident history of other stationary sources in the same industry,quantity of regulated substances present at the stationary source,location ofthe stationary source and its proximity to the public and environmental receptors,the presence of specific regulated substances,the hazards identified in the safety plan,a plan for providing neutral and random oversight,or a complaint from the stationary source's employee(s)or their representative.The stationary source shall allow the department to conduct these inspections and audits.The department.at its option.may select an outside consultant to assist in conducting such inspection. (g)Within thirty days of a major chemical accident or release the department may commence an incident safety inspection with respect to the process involved in the incident pursuant to the provisions of Section 450-8.016(c)of this chapter. (h)(1)Based upon the department's audit.safetv inspection or an incident inspection. the department may require modifications or additions to the satjtr plan submitted by the stationary source or safetv program to bring the safetv plan or safety program into compliance with the requirements oUhis chapter.Any determination by the department shall be in writing and shall be mailed to the stationary source (referred to as the "notice offindings").The stationary source shall have sixty calendar days from receipt of the notice of findings to make any corrections.The stationary source may request,in writing, a one-time thirty-day calendar day extension to make corrections.The department may not include in its notice of findings requirements to a safety plan or safety program that would cause a violation of,or conflict with,any state or federal law or regulation or a violation of any permit or order issued by any state or federal agency.The notice of fmdings made by the department will be available to the public. (2)Within thirty days of the department's notice offmdings,the stationary source and/or any person may appeal the notice of fmdings to the board of supervisors pursuant to Chapter 14-4 ofthis code by a verified written notice of appeal filed with the clerk ofthe board of supervisors and payment of the applicable appeal fee.The appeal must state the grounds for any such appeal,including (i)the reasoning that the appeal is necessary because the stationary source is in compliance with this chapter,or (ii)the reasoning that the appeal is necessary to bring the stationary source into compliance with this chapter.In acting on the appeal,the board shall have the same authority over the notice offindings as the department.The board may require modifications or additions to the safetv plan or safety program to bring the safety plan or safety program into compliance with the requirements oUhls chapter.The board may not include in its decision on the notice of fmdings any requirements to a safety plan or safety program that would cause a violation of,or conflict with,any state or federal law or regulation or a violation of any permit or order issued by any state or federal agency.The decision ofthe board of supervisors shall be final with respect to the notice of fmdings. (i)Nothing in this section shall preclude,limit,or interfere in any way with the authority of the county to exercise its enforcement,investigatory,and information gathering authorities under any other provision of law nor shall anything in the chapter effect or diminish the rights of the stationary source to claim legal privileges such as attorney client privilege and/or work product with respect to information and/or documents required to be submitted to or reviewed by the department. (Ords.2006-22 §6,98-48 §2). 450-8.020 -Trade secret. The disclosure of any trade secret information required by this chapter shall be governed by California Health and Safety Code Section 25538,as amended from time to time,or as otherwise protected or required by law. (Ord.98-48 §2). 450-8.022 -Hazardous materials ombudsperson. The department shall continue to employ an ombudsperson for hazardous materials programs.The ombudsperson will serve as a single point of contact f<>r people who live or work in Contra Costa County regarding environmental health-concerns,questions,and complaints about hazardous materials programs.The ombudsperson will be empowered to identify and solve problems and make recommendations to the department.The ombudsperson's role will be one ofinvestigating concerns and complaints.facilitating their resolution and assisting people in gathering information about programs. procedures,or issues.The ombudsperson may retain appropriate technical experts in order to fulfill technical assistance requests from members oUhe public.The cost of experts may be funded through programs established by the U.S.EPA or other appropriate entities. (Ords.2000-20 §2,98-48 §2). 450-8.024 -Public information bank. The department shall collect and provide ready access.including the use ofelectronic accessibility as reasonably available.to public documents which are relevant to the goals oUhis chapter.including at a minimum.business plan inventories and emergency response plans.risk management plans.safety plans.and department incident reports.This section shall not apply to trade secret information or other information protected from disclosure under federal or state law.The public information bank shall be completed by December 31.2000. (Ord.98-48 §2). 450-8.026 -Fees. The department may.upon a majority vote oUhe board ofsupervisors,adopt a schedule offees to be collected from each stationary source subject to the requirements oUhis chapter.Any review,inspection.audit fee schedule shall be set in an amount sufficient to pay only those costs reasonably necessary to carry out the requirements of this chapter.including costs ofsta"and/or consultant time or public hearings and administrative overhead.The fee schedule shall include the cost oOhe ombudsperson position. (Ord.98-48 §2). 450-8.028 -Penalties. Regardless ofthe availability ofother civil or administrative remedies and procedures for enforcing this chapter,every act or condition prohibited or declared unlawful by this chapter,and every knowing or wilful failure or omission to act as required herein, is a violation oOhis code and shall be punishable and/or subject to enforcement pursuant to the provisions ofChapter 14-67 oOhe County Ordinance Code specifically including but not limited to Article 14-6.4 (DubUc nuisance),and Article 14-8 (criminal enforcement),as misdemeanors or infractions. (Ord.98-48 §2). 450-8.030 -Annual performance review and evaluation~' (a)The department shall annually:(1)review its activities to implement this chapter,and (2)evaluate the effectiveness of this chapter in achieving its purpose and goals pursuant to Section 450-8.004 ofthis chapter. (b)An annual performance review and evaluation report shall be prepared by the department based upon the previous fiscal year's activities and shall be submitted to the board of supervisors on or before October 31,2000 and each year thereafter.The report shall contain: (1)A brief description of how the department is meeting the requirements of this chapter as follows:(i)effectiveness of the department's program to ensure stationary source compliance with this chapter;(ii)effectiveness of the procedures for records management;(iii)number and type of audits and inspections conducted by the department pursuant to this chapter;(iv)number of root cause analyses and/or incident investigations conducted by the department;(v)the department's process for public participation;(vi)effectiveness of the public information bank,including status of electronic accessibility;(vii)effectiveness of the hazardous materials ombudsperson; (viii)other required program elements necessary to implement and manage this chapter. (2)A listing of all stationary sources covered by this chapter,including for each:(i)the status of the stationary source's safety plan and program;(ii)a summary of all stationary source safety plan updates and a listing of where the safety plans are publicly available; (iii)the annual accident history report submitted by the stationary source pursuant to Section 450-8.0 16(e)(2)of this chapter;(iv)a summary,including the status,of any root cause analyses conducted or being conducted by the stationary source and required by this chapter,including the status of implementation of recommendations;(v)a summary, including the status,of any audits,inspections,root cause analyses and/or incident investigations conducted or being conducted by the department pursuant to this chapter, including the status of implementation of recommendations;(vi)description of inherently safer systems implemented by the stationary source;and (vii)legal enforcement actions " initiated by the department,including administrative,civil,and criminal actions pursuant to this chapter. (3)Total penalties assessed as a result of enforcement of this chapter. (4)Total fees,service charges,and other assessments collected specifically for the support of this chapter. (5)Total personnel and personnel years utilized by the jurisdiction to directly implement or administer this chapter. (6)Comments from interested parties regarding the effectiveness of the local program that raise public safety issues. (7)The impact of the chapter in improving industrial safety. (c)The department shall provide a copy of the annual performance audit submission required by Title 19 Chapter 4.5 Section 2780.5 ofthe California Code of Regulations to the board of supervisors on or before October 31 st of each year. (Ords.2006-22 §7,98-48 §2). 450-8.032 -Construction. Notwithstanding any other provision of this code and for the purposes of this chapter wherever it provides that the department shall act,such direction in all instances shall be deemed and is directory,discretionary and permissive and not mandatory. ******************************************************** NOTE:County Ordinance Chapter 450-8 expands on the California Accidental Release Prevention (CaIARP)Program for facilities meeting the following: •The facility is within an unincorporated area of the County •The facility is either a petroleum refinery or chemical plant •The facility is required to submit a Risk Management Plan (RMP)to the U.S.EPA and Contra Costa County Health Service (CCHS) •The facility has at least one Program 3 process The ~facilities currently subject to the County's Industrial Safety Ordinance (ISO)iooude:Air Products (within the Shell Refinery),Air Products (within the Tesoro Refinery),ConocoPhillips Rodeo Refinery,Air Liquide-Rodeo Hydrogen Plant,General Chemical West:Bay Point Works,Shell Oil Martinez Refinery and Tesoro Golden Eagle Refinery.The City of Richmond has adopted an Industrial Safety Ordinance (Municipal Code Chapter 6.43.RISO)that is almost identical (except for the 2006 amendment)to the County's Industrial Safety Ordinance.The two facilities located in the City of Richmond that are subject to this ordinance include:Chevron Richmond Refinery and General Chemical West:Richmond Works. TO: FROM: DATE: SUBJECT: HONORABLE MAYOR &CITY COUNCIL MEMBERS CITY CLERK OCTOBER 16,2012 ADDITIONS/REVISIONS AND AMENDMENTS TO AGENDA** Attached are revisions/additions and/or amendments to the agenda material presented for tonight's meeting: Item No. C 3 Description of Material Email from Barry Hildebrand Emails from:Ronald Conrow;Ken Delong;April Sandell Respectfully submitted, Ck&~'LL~~.JA Carla Morreale **PLEASE NOTE:Materials attached after the color page(s)were submitted through Monday,October 15,2012**. W:\AGENDA\2012 Additions Revisions to agendaS20121 016 additions revisions to agenda.doc From:bjhilde@aol.com Sent:Tuesday,October 16,2012 12:56 PM To:CC;Carolyn Lehr;pw@rpv.com Subject:Item "C"on Consent Calendar Ladies and Gentlemen, The subject item on tonight's Consent Calendar caught my eye as an attempt to sole source an item of work for $389,000 of the taxpayers money without public discussion.Voting this way pulls down the shade on transparency that the public has a right to.Competetive bidding on public works projects produces less costly projects in the end,which should be a goal of all public servants.Will one of you please pull that item and have it aired out for the public to see why,who's who,etc? Barry Hildebrand 3560 VigilanceDrive RPV,CA 90275 310-37-0051 10/16/2012 c. Page 1 of2 From:Kit Fox Sent:Monday,October 15,2012 3:11 PM To:Carla Morreale Cc:Teresa Takaoka Subject:FW:Plains LPG-Rancho Rail Cars.pdf,DOT-111 Rail Car Design Flaw Importance:High Attachments:Plains LPG-Rancho Rail CArs.pdf;DOT-111 Rail Car Design Flaw.pdf Hi Carla: Late Correspondence for Item 3 tomorrow night. Kit Fox,AIcr Senior AdminishativeAnalt)st Citt)Manaaer's Office Citt)of Rancho Palos Verdes 30940 Iiawthorne Blvd Rancho Palos Verdes,CA 90275 T:(310)544~5226 P:(310)544~5291 E kit£@rpv.cOIl1 From:Ronald Conrow [mailto:Ronald.Conrow@plainsmidstream.com] Sent:Monday,October 15,2012 2:57 PM To:Kit Fox Cc:Doane Liu;elise.swanson@mail.house.gov;michael.aguilera@mail.house.gov;John Larson; niki.tennant@asm.ca.gov;Kamm,Robert;ricardo.hong@lacity.org;Kim,Rebekah;Houterman,Justin; john.sterritt@lausd.net Subject:Plains LPG-Rancho Rail CArs.pdf,DOT-Hl Rail Car Design Flaw Mr.Fox, Attached is an article sent to you from Ms.Diana Nave,President of the Northwest San Pedro Neighborhood Council (NWSPNC)which was included in the attachments for the upcoming he City of Rancho Palos Verdes (RPV)meeting on the Rancho Gaffey Street Facility in San Pedro.Ms.Nave's attachment concerns flaws in a specific rail car model (OOT-111)extensively used throughout the United States to transport Ethanol.Besides Ethanol,the 00T-111 rail cars are typically used to transport crude oil and refined products designed for this type of service throughout the Country,including the greater LA Harbor Area.Plains/Rancho share the concerns expressed by Ms.Nave about this particular model of rail car.However,this appears to be another misguided effort to link Rancho to an issue that is not germane to the Facility,similar to the gas explosion in San Bruno (we do not process/store methane gas)or the Buncefield,England fire (we do not handle gasoline,jet fuel,diesel or kerosene)as does the Bumcefield fuel depot. However,these same refined products and crude oil are stored throughout the greater LA Harbor Area in bulk liquid storage facilities and refineries.It is not our ambition to marginalize these tragic and unfortunate incidents,but to illustrate they are ill-informed comparisons to the Rancho Facility 10/15/2012 3 Page 2 of2 As you know from attending Rancho community meetings,the Rancho Facility on Gaffey Street only handles and stores LPG (butane and propane),products quite dissimilar to those transported in the flawed 00T-111 rail cars.Plains LPG has several thousand rail cars in their fleet in the Canada and the USA and none of the rail cars in our vast fleet are model OOT- 111.Additionally,the design of the 00T-111 railcars (even if not flawed)would not the support loading or transporting of LPG.If attempted,the pressure relief valve (PRV)on the 00T-111 tank would release product due to pressure design limitations required accommodate high pressure products such as LPG or worse the tank shell would could eventually fail during loading operations.Our Transportation Services/Marketing Department has confirmed that all rail cars in our LPG fleet are model DOT-112,except for 3 model OOT- 105.DOT -112 rail cars (per attachment)are specially designed to transport LPG and ammonia ...pressurized products.Over the years,DOT-112 rail cars have undergone several modifications to enhance safety features which will significantly reduce the occurrence of a release of contents in the event of an accident or derailment.Therefore,the implication about Rancho using the design flawed 00T-111 rail cars have no merit. Rancho is committed to being a strong business and social partner in the San Pedro community.Since Plains purchased this facility in November 2QOa,It has endeavored to maintain an open,honest,and productive dialogue with the community,elected officials, regulatory agencies,and legal authorities.We remain committed to operating the facility in a prudent and responsible manner which safeguards our workforce and the community. Moreover,we have an open invitation to Neighbor Council Board Members and elected public officials and their representatives to make an appointment to tour the Facility to see our operation for themselves,which better serves to facilitate making informed decisions about the Facility. In closing,this rail car issue is another example which supports Councilman Buscaino's efforts to ensure the safety of all Bulk Liquid Storage Facilities/Refineries in the Harbor Area ...not just Rancho as advocated by the more vocal opponents of the Facility!Please relay this information to the RPV Council Members and feel free to contact me should you require additional information concerning this issue or any others relating to the Rancho Gaffey Street Facility. Regards, Ron Conrow Western District Manager Plains/Rancho LPG 10/15/2012 Railroad tank cars used for transporting ambient temperature liquefied gases within the United States must 'be designed,constructed,and inspected in accordance with Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations,Part 179,(49 CFR 179)"Specifications fur Tank Cars,"with specjf\l emphasis on Subpart C, lISpecifications for Pressure Tank Car Tanks (Classes DOT-lOS,109,112;and 114)."The three classes of tank cars normally used for transporting liquefied gases at ambient temperature are DOT-lOS,112,and 114.They have cylindrical (or nearly cylindrical)tanks with ellipsoidal dished heads.The tanks are of all-welded construction.Most of the tanks are constructed of steel,but aluminwn is allowed for certain type.s of tanks.Steel tanks must be post-weld heat treated.The allowable steel and aluminum alloys,shell and head thicknesses,piping,valves,safety relief valves,etc.,are specified in 49 CFR 179,Subpart C. DOT-lOS tank cars are general purpose cars that can carry a wide variety of substances,including propane.The capacity of DOT-l OS cars ranges fi:om 11,000 gallons (for older cars)to 33,000 gallons (for newer ones).These tank cars can be constructed from steel or aluminum.They have external insulation, which is covered by a steel jacket.Older,smaller DOT-lOS tank cars have frames that are separate from the tanks.Newer,larger versions are typically frameless (i.e"the tank functions as the cargo container and the main structural member). DOT-l 14 tank cars are also general purpose cars.Most of them have a nominal capacity of 33,000 gallons.l;~tank cars also have nominal capacities of 33,000 gallons but they were developed specifically t1 Po and ammonia service.DOT-lIZ and 114 tank cars that are suitable for transporting propane are constructed of steel,and are typically of the frame1ess design.At one time,DOT-II2 and 114 tank cars had bare steel tanks.In the late 1970s and early 19808,three major changes were made to the federal requirements for DOT-I 12 and 114 tank cars used in ammonia or flammable liquefied gas service.One change required all new and existing DOT-Il2 and 114 tank cars to have their tanks covered with a thermal protection system.The intent of this system is to prevent the release oftlle tank's contents (except through the safety relief valve)when the tank is exposed to a fire. The second change required new and existing DOT-I 12 and 114 tank cars to he fitted with head puncture resistance systems (commonly referred to as head shields).These were intended to prevent the head of a tank car being punctured by the coupler of an adjacent car in case of a derailment or other serio liS accident.The third change involved the type of couplers used on DOT~l12 and 114 tank cars.The typical knuckle couplers used on American railroads had a tendency to uncouple during accidents,which could lead to a coupler causing major damage to the head of an adjacent tank car,New and existing DOT-II2 and 114 tank cars were l'equired be fitted with shelf~type knuckle couplers that resist vertical disengagement during accidents.Similar changes (head protection and shelf couplers)have been made to DOT-IDS tank cars in flammable liquefied gas service. Loading,unloading,tank gauging,sampling,and safety relief valve piping on 001'·105 and 112 tank cars exit the tank through a manway on top of the tank.The manway consists of large·diameter n07.zlcs welded to the tank;a thick manway cover bolted to the nozzle;a protective hOllsing holted to the cover; and a lid for the housing with a hole above the pressure relief valve.The variolls valves,gauging devices, loading and unloading piping,etc.,are all attached to the manway cover.No other tank penetrations are allowed.The interior pipes of loading/unloading lines,sampling lines,and gauging devices with flow paths greater than 0,060 inches in diameter are required to be titted with excess flow valves.Figure (·1 shows a typical DOT·112 tank car and the arrangemell1 of valves,etc"at the manway. Before being put into service,each tank car is hydrostatically tested.Once in service,the tank must be inspected at regular intervals.Pressure relief valves must be tested before being put into service and Blust be retested at regular intervals once in service. SAfETY VALlIE GAUGlNG OEV,(;( lHERMOME TEfl WELL LWD VAlWS (2) VAPOR VALVE SAMPLING LINE Figure 1-1 1)ldcalDOT-112 Railcar Showing Top View OfMilDway (Lower Left)And Side Views (Top And Lower Right) Page 1 of 1 Kit Fox---,--------_.__..__.._-------_.•.._-----_._---- From:diana nave [dlananave@gmail.com] Sent:Thursday.September 13,2012 11 :28 AM To:John Greenwood;katie marrie;pete burmelster;bob bryant;CYNTHIA Gonyea;Anise Goldfarb; Carolyn Grayson;Kristina Smith;John Greenwood;Scott Allman;Barbara schach;craig goldfarb;dan dixon;Ray Regalado;Laurie Jacobs;laureen vivian;george thompson;Gary Buss; joe@joebuscalno,com;Jacob haik;gordon teuber;Kevin Bingham; Assemblymember,Lowenthal@assembly,ca,gov;Linda alexander;june smith;Pat Nave;Kit Fox; Michael Aguilera;Elise Swanson SUbject:Tanker rail car has dangerous design flaw Begin forwarded message: From:dianan~ve@earthJjnk.Det Date:'September 13,201211:17:00 AM PDT To:diananave@gmall.com Subject:E-mail-A-Friend:Tanker rail car has dangerous design flaw Comment: Story: Tanker rail car has dangerous design flaw CHICAGO -For two decades,one ofthe most conunonly used type of rail tanker has been allowed to haul hazardous liquids from coast to coast even though transportation officials were aware of a dangerous design flaw that almost guarantees the car will tear open in an accident,potentially spilling cargo that could catch fire,explode or contaminate the environment. For more of this story,click on or type the URL below: http://www.daily- chronicle.com/articles/20 12/09/12/968442be81 dc4ae898d967I Sal f23ebb/illdex,xml 10/812012 Print Version:Tanker rail car has dangerous design flaw By JASON KEYSER·The Associated Press Tanker rail car has dangerous design flaw Page 1 of2 CHICAGO -For two decades,one of the most commonly used type of rail tanker has been allowed to haul hazardous liquids from coast to coast even though transportation officials were aware of a dangerous design flaw that almost guarantees the car will tear open In an accident,potentially spilling cargo that could catch fire,explode or contaminate the environment. The rail and chemical industries have committed to a safer design for new tankers but are pressing regulators not to require modifications to tens of thousands of exisllng cars,despite a spike in the number of accidents as more tankers are put into service to accommodate soaring demand for ethanol,the highly flammable corn-based fuel usually transported by rail. Derailments have triggered chemical spills and massive blasts like one in July in Columbus,Ohio,that blew up with such intensity that one witness said it 'looked like the sun exploded,"Some communities with busy railways are beginning to regard the tankers as a serious threat to public safety. Barrington's mayor is trying to build a national coalition to push for safety reforms.The wealthy Chicago suburb sees many ethanol tllnkers snake through a bustling downtown. The tanker,known as the OOT-111,is a workhorse of the American rail fleet,with a soda-cpnshape that makes it one of the most easily recognizable cars on freight routes. The tanker itself is not suspected of causing derailments,but its steel shell is too thin to resist puncture in accidents.The ends are especially vulnerable to tears from couplers that can rip off between cars.Unloading valves and other exposed fillings on the tops oftankers also can break during roll overs.The flaws were noted as far back as a 1991 safety stUdy.An Associated Press analysis of 20 years'worth of federal rail accident data found that ethanol tankers have been breached in at least 40 serious accidents since 2000.In the previous decade,there were just two breaches. The number ·of severe crashes is sma"considering the total mileage covered by the many tankers in seNice.But the accident reports show at least two people have been killed by balls of flame,with dozens more hurt.And the risk of greater losses looms large. The rail and chemical industries and tanker manufacturers have acknowledged the design flaws and VOluntarily committed to safety changes for cars built after October 2011 to transport ethanol and crUde oil.The improvements include thicker tank shells and shields on the ends of tanks to prevent punctures. But under their proposal to regulators,the 30,000 to 45,000 existing ethanol tankers would remain unchanged,including many cars that have only recently begun their decades-long service lives. The National Transportation Safety Board asked in March for the higher standards to be applied to all tankers,meaning existing cars would have to be retrofitted or phased out. The industry'S proposal "ignores the safety risks posed by the current fleet,"the NTSB said,adding that those cars "can almost always be expected to breach in derailments that involve pileups or multiple car-to-car impacts." The federal Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration,part of the U.S.Department of Transportation,is considering both arguments,but the regulatory process is slow and could take several years,experts said. Industry representatives say a retrofit isn't feasible because of engineering challenges and costs.They insist the threat of serious accidents is overstated. "How many millions of miles have the 111 cars run without problems?"said Lawrence Bierlein,an attorney for the Association ofHazmat Shippers Inc."It's more likely you're going to be hit by lightning." But worries about the tankers'weaknesses persist,especially since the volume of dangerous cargo on American rails is only expected to grow. Ethanol production has soared from 900 million gallons in 1990 to nearly 14 billion gallons last year.Seeking to lessen America's dependence on foreign oil,federal mandates will quadruple the amount of ethanol and other renewable fuel that's blended into the nation's gasoline and diesel by 2022. Nearly all of it moves by rail.In 2010,that meant 325,000 carloads of ethanol,according to the Association of American Railroads.Ethanol is now the highest-volume hazardous material shipped by rail.In 2000,it wasn't even in the top 10. "That may account for the increasing frequency of aCCidents involving the DOT -111 s and the current attention that's being dmwn to 'hem,'..~P'ul St''''',e senJO,he"""""®",,,.eo'm,,,,,';g,,,,,,wim 'he N'IS•. http://www.daily-chl.onicle.comI20 12/09/12/tankel'-rail-car-has-dangerolls-design-flaw/am...9/13/2012 Print Version:Tanker rail car has dangct'ous design flaw Page 2 of2 Since 2005,ethanol has increasingly been shipped in higher densities using "virtual pipelines"-trains in which every car carries the same product.The NTSB says that practice increases the potential severity of accidents like one in 2009 in the northern Illinois city of Rockford. On the way home from her nursing job,Chris Carter stopped at a rail crossing near Rockford as a Canadian National freight train barreled past carrying more than 2 million gallons of ethanol to Chicago. Unknown to the train's two crew members and the small number of walting motorists,a section of track had washed out in a rainstorm earlier that evening. "I notice to my right side there's sparks like fireworks,like a sparkler,"Carter said."So thai calches my eye.In my head I'm going,'Oh my God,this is going to derail.'I could feel it,I could tell," The train began to come apart,its cars bouncing and colliding like toys thrown by a child,One exploded as it tumbled through the air. "I stood there just frozen,watching these unbelievable explosions,"Carter recalled."The concussion from the energy just blew your hair back." More than 20 miles away,Carter's husband and son saw the fire from their farmhouse.It looked 10 them like a sunrise. As Carter {lnd the others ran,an older woman who injured her knee couldn't move.She cast a tiny silhouette against an enormous wall of flame.A man ran back and rescued her. On the other side of the tracks,one of the explosions washed over the van of Jose Tellez-an'&his family.His Wife,Zoila,was killed. Witness Matthew Koch told a local newspaper he saw Zoila Tellez run from the vehicle in flames and fall 10 her knees with her arms outstretched as if she were reaching out for help. Jose Tellez suffered burns,and his adult daughter,Addriana,who was five months'pregnant,lost her baby. In addition to the fatality,11 people were injured,making it the nation's single worst ethanol tanker accident.Nineteen of the 114 cars derailed.Thirteen released ethanol and caught fire.In its final report in February,the NTSB cited the "inadequate design"of the tanker cars as a faclor contributing to the severity of the accident. The other accident in which a release of ethanol claimed a life was a 1996 derailment at Cajon Junction in southern California.The train's brakeman,who was thrown or jumped from the locomotive,burned to death after apparently trying to crawl to safety in a creek bed. The Ohio derailment forced a mile-wide evacuation just north of downtown Columbus.Three tankers,each carrying 30,000 gallons ofethanol,caught fire and filled the night sky with flames. "The heat was so excruciating that I had to ball up and cover my body"said Nicholas Goodrich,a grocery store employee who happened to be nearby and ran to the scene. The cost of retrofitting existing tankers is estimated conservatively at $1 billion and would be shouldered mostly by the ethanol-makers who own and lease the cars.The rail industry points to its improving safety record,but that's little comfort to communities like Barrington,said Village President Karen Darch. "There's a risk every day of affecting lots of people in one incident,"Darch said,"lots of property,but obviously most importantly,lots of people's lives: Copyright ©2012 Daily Chronic/e.All rights reserved. http://www.daily-chronicle.com/20 12/0911 2/tanker-rail-car-has-dangerolls-design-flaw/am,..9/1 3120 12 From:Ken Delong [ken.delong@verizon.net] Sent:Monday,October 15,2012 5:02 PM To:CC Subject:CC Agenda #3 -Oct.16,2012 October 16,2012 Council Agenda -Item 3.Rancho LPG Butane Storage Facility in San Pedro First I want to complement staff for a well-written staff report that has clearly outlined the issues and alternatives.However the succeeding concern is how much staff time /expense was incurred compiling this report?That 90 minutes of Council meeting time is allocated to this item, when many other items should have greater priority,is a misuse of taxpayer resources. Page 3 of the staff report "The operations of the facility have also been investigated by the Los Angeles City Attorney and the State Attorney General,neither of whom found any evidence of violations or other conditions that would warrant legal action against the facility operator. Furthermore,in a letter from the Los Angeles City Attorney's Office,it was pointed out that a prior lawsuit filed against the former owner of the facility (Don Brown v.Petrolane,102 Cal.App.3d 720 (1980»was unsuccessful under both public and private nuisance theories,and the facility was not closed or relocated as a result of the lawsuit."In view of these legal findings, what is the basis for RPV to further pursue the Rancho LPG operation on Gaffey Blvd?This facility has existed for some 40 years.What evidence is there that the Rancho facility has become a greater hazard? The bottom line of this situation is that the City of los Angeles is the controlling agency and RPV has no jurisdiction whatsoever.Prior to Councilmember Brooks deciding to involve herself in this matter,Council Members Misetich and Duhovic had spent considerable time and effort in meetings with LA Councilman Joe Buscaino on this matter.Wondering ...did Brooks ever seek input from with either of Misetich or Duhovic before putting the Rancho LPG facility matter on the Council agenda thus requiring staff expense to write a report and consuming Council time to further discuss? It would seem that the most appropriate action is for RPV to write a brief letter to Councilman Joe Buscaino expressing RPV's concerns and requesting to be kept informed on any future matters that may arise in regards to the Rancho LPG Butane Storage Facility in San Pedro. When there is evidence that the Rancho facility is not meeting regulations,one would anticipate that LA Councilman Joe Buscaino would quickly initiate the appropriate actions. Ken Delong 10/16/2012 3. 10/16/2012 From:April Sandell [hvybags@cox.net] Sent:Tuesday,October 16,20123:28 PM To:CC Cc:Anthony Misetich;Brian Campbell;Susan Brooks;Jerry Duhovic;Jim Knight;Lacombe Lacombe Subject:Tanks /agenda item 3#/comments Dear Councilmembers, Please consider the following : 1.The potential blast/flash absolutely positively cannot be contained.(Fact)." 2.RPV Western Avenue economic resources could be lost entirely.(Possibly) 3.Considered this issue as any other Los Angeles harbor area matter.(It would be nice) 4.Avoid disaster given there is no means to prepare.(fact) 5.Providing public safety should not be limited within city boundaries.(sadly, sometimes is) 6.Years earlier similiar size tanks were located in Eastview Park.These tanks were removed (jJ 3 after the tanks caused a serious fire.(fact) 7.Heighten security since 9/11 speaks volumes of why the tanks should no longer contain the dangerous product.(shared opinion) 8.It is not useful to discuss or debate potential cost to the city in regards to potential lawsuits ,consulanting firms or the like.Nor is it productive to consider the odds of potential disaster as if it were like any other.(my view) Please be proactive.Safety first!!! Thank you for your time and consideration. Sincerly, April L.Sandell 28026 Pontevedra Dr. RPV· 10/16/2012 TO: FROM: DATE: SUBJECT: HONORABLE MAYOR &CITY COUNCIL MEMBERS CITY CLERK OCTOBER 15,2012 ADDITIONS/REVISIONS AND AMENDMENTS TO AGENDA Attached ~re revisions/additions and/or amendments to the agenda material received through Monday afternoon for the Tuesday,October 16,2012 City Council meeting: fr Item No. D 3 Respectfully submitted, Description of Material Email from Sunshine Emails from:Rudy Svorinich;Diana Nave;Jane Gunter ~~ Carla Morreale W:\AGENDA\2012 Additions Revisions to agendas\20121 015 additions revisions to agenda through Mondayafternoon.doc Page 1 of 1 Carla Morreale From:SunshineRPV@aol.com Sent:Saturday,October 13,2012 10:13 AM To:CC Subject:October 16,2012 City Council Meeting Consent Calendar Item D. Attachments:1991 Staff opinion0355.pdf;Carolyn Lehr.doc MEMO from SUNSHINE TO:RPV City Council RE:October 16,2012 City Council Meeting Consent Calendar Item D. Once again,an item has appeared on your Consent Calendar which lacks due diligence on the part of Staff. Attached are two documents which predate Staff's description of the "Background".It worries me that there is no one in the City's employ who is authorized/skilled to negotiate win,win agreements.Lack of "nexus"and lack 'oflunding are just excuses. My focus is on trails preservation/maintenance and trails network improvement.It worries me that other General Plan level goals and policies are being neglected simply because Staff doesn't know how to critique/implement a willing donor's offer. In this case,it has been 21 years.There was "criteria"in the 1990 version of the Conceptual Trails Plan.All Staff needed to do was say "Thank you"for the design and engineering of the trail connection west of Crestmont Lane (entitlements were approved),hire the design and engineering (per the criteria)east of Crestmont Lane and produce an IRREVOCABLE OFFER OF EASEMENT DEDICATION (with EXHIBIT A and EXHIBIT B).Was that done?"NO". Actually,it still hasn't been done.The engineering and cost of construction is still pending.I say go ahead and approve this easement agreement simply because it does not preclude any future opportunities to improve these trail connections once some City Council adopts some trails "criteria"which I hope you will do next month. 10/1512012 <PR Sap I$Vilr'd (Planner:Joel Rojas) 'I GUPta comst!'Uota freestanding h_Oity.COLll"'loUhas directed that ~~;ef1vir()nmental'lmpaet Report , Qmmedawith the S8ahiU itiona February 13,2008 RE:Trail easement negotiations. Hi Carolyn, Last night's Planning Commission meeting revealed that Mayor (at the time) Peter Gardiner's precedent didn't get through to the Planning Department.That precedent is that whenever the City wants something from an applicant,(as in the implementation of Council approved goals),the Planning Staff should ask for it,nicely.If the Applicant says something like ..."OK,sure.No problem",a specific condition of approval should be drafted and included in the approval resolution. I suspect that if I hadn't given both the Salvation Army and Eduardo a "timely heads up",the conceptual trail across the Salvation Army's~.s6uthern frontage would not have gotten any mention in the Staff Report.As it turned out,the Staff Report took the old approach stating something like..."There is no nexus upon which to base a demand for such an easement." I hereby request your intervention.You are the Executive Branch of our local government. In the City's Conceptual Trails Plan (CTP),there is a statement:The trails contained in this document are conceptual only...That statement was included to calm the fears of the residents who thought approval of the CTP would send bulldozers into their back yards the very next day.It was never intended to provide Staff with an excuse to not pursue an opportunity.In fact,earlier in the same paragraph,the CTP states:The purpose of the Conceptual Trails Plan is to identify the trail opportunities within the community,so that the acquisition and development of new public trails,through new development proposals,public works projects and voluntary efforts can be integrated into the City's existing public trails network. Regarding the conceptual trail along PV Drive South (A6),the Planning Commission settled for a verbal agreement with Staff and the Salvation Army.It turns out that the Salvation Army had already agreed to offering to dedicate a trail easement per the CTP,once when their Convention Center project was permitted and again just recently.They have been waiting for the City to produce the appropriate documents. Three corridors of a physically wonderful trail connection have been designed. The property owner is willing to cooperate.It is up to the City to make this a real trail in a timely fashion ....S From:Hon.Rudy Svorinich,Jr.[mailto:rudy@svorinich.com] Sent:Thursday,October 11,2012 10:57 AM To:Carolyn Lehr Subject:LA Council District 15 Info Link on Rancho Tanks http://la15th.com/wikilindex.php? CL- Here is a link from Councilman Buscaino's office that should be of value to you,staff and the council re: the Rancho tanks issue. RS 3 Tank Safety Main Page From Tank Safety Storage Tank Safety Your Council District (http://laI5th.com!)Internet Encyclopedia Encyclopedia Entries Will Be Regularly Updated Background """"""""""'.""""""', Basic facts about liquid bulk storage tanks •Background •Description of Facility •FAQs •History •Regulatory Environment •Risk Analysis Page 1 of7 •About District (http://www.laI5th.com!15th -Ia-district-info/) •Contact Us (http://laI5th.com!contact- us.htrnl/) •LA15th.com (http://la15th.com!) The Port of Los Angeles is a large hub of commerce,and subsequently serves as a portal for the export and import of items and materials.Liquid bulk storage tanks are used for the purpose of storing some of these materials so that they can be be exported, refined,or transported to other facilities throughout the countrY!].Much of these materials are related to petroleum and oil.There are also refineries in the Harbor Area that use these storage tanks as an essential part oftI1eir operations. Location &Types of Materials Stored in Harbor Area I.Kinder Morgan Liquid Terminals[2]are located on Berths 118-120, occupying 12.4 acres. •Materials:Crude oil,finished petroleum products, gasoline blending components, refinery feedstocks •18 storage tanks with a maximum capacity of 570,000 barrels .2.ConocoPhillips vessel unloading facility is located on Berths 148- 151,occupying 13.5 acres. •Materials:Partly or fully refined petroleum products •26 storage tanks with a total capacity of 800,000 barrels Contents • 1 Background •1.1 Basic facts about liquid bulk storage tanks •1.1.1 Location &Types of Materials Stored in Harbor Area •1.1.2 Why are these tanks here?Why are they needed? •1.2 Rancho LPG -description of facility •1.3 Rancho LPG History •1.3.1 1972 •1.3.2 1974 •1.3.3 1974 •1.3.4 1978 •1.3.5 1989 •1.3.61993 •1.3.72004 •1.3.82004 •1.3.92008 •1.3.10 2010 •1.3.11 2011 •1.3.122011 •1.3.13 2012 •1.4 Number ofliquid bulk storage tanks in Harbor Area and dates built •1.5 Neighboring land uses:residential,commercial,parks • 2 Regulatory Environment &Enforcement •2.1 Federal •2.2 State •2.3 Regional •2.4 Local • 3 Risk Analysis •3.1 Propane and Butane -What is it? •3.2 Risk Assessments •3.2.1 Cornerstone Technologies'Assessment •3.2.1.1 Scenario 1:Vapor Cloud Explosion •3'(1fj,n'rio 2,V""o'Cloud Exp!o'ion #2 -8mill!Le,k 10/1512012http://la15th.com/wiki/index.php?title=Main_Page Tank Safety Page 2 of7 •3.2.1.3 Scenario 3:Alternative Release -Pool Fire •3.2.1.4 Scenario 4:Alternative Release -Pool Fire #2 •3.2.1.5 Scenario 5:Vapor Cloud Explosion •3.2.1.6 Scenario 6:Vapor Cloud Explosion #2 •3.2.1.7 Scenario 7:BLEVE (Boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion) •3.2.1.8 Scenario 8:BLEVE #2 •3.2.2 Quest Consultants'Assessment • 4 Economic Impacts •4.1 Why are they here and what is the economic benefit to the region? • 5 Frequently Asked Questions •5.1 Does the City of Los Angeles own any of the Rancho LPG property? •5.2 Does the Rancho LPG facility lie on a fault? •5.3 Can the facility be relocated? •5.4 Has the facility been inspected recently? • 6 References 3.NuStar Energy facility located at Berth 163, occupying 5.8 acres •Materials: Marine oil •19 storage tanks with total capacity of 600,000 barrels 4.Valero facility located at Berth 164, occupying 10.5 acres •Materials:Fuels and lubricants •17 storage tanks with total capacity of 947,000 barrels 5.Shell facility located at Berths 167-169,occupying 9.1 acres •Materials:Fuels and lubricants •10 storage tanks with total capacity of 485,000 barrels 6.Vopak Teiminal[3110cated at Berths 187-191,occupying 34.7 acres. •Materials:Petroleum products,chemicals,biofuels .'i' •66 storage tanks with total capacity 0[700,000 barrels and an additional 22 storage tanks with 1,700,000 barrels capacity at inland site. 7.ExxonMobil facility located at Berths 238-240C,occupying 31.4 acres. •Materials:Fuels and lubricants •26 storage tanks with total capacity of 2,313,000 barrels. Why are these tanks here?Why are they needed? These tanks are located here because of the function of the Port of Los Angeles as a crucial hub of commerce.A high volume of chemical and petroleum products,among other materials,enter and leave the Port and require storage facilities.The tanks play an important role in the global energy and chemical products supply chain,as the materials are later transported across the country to other facilities.There are several refineries in the Harbor Area,and they rely on the presence and access ofthese facilities as part of their operations. Rancho LPG -description of facility •The Rancho LPG facility is located on Gaffey Street and encompasses approximately 20 acres ofland and was previously owned and operated by AmeriGas up until 2008,and Petrolane prior to Amerigas'purchase ofthe facility in 1993. (Cornerstone Technologies,Inc.,Quantitative Risk Analysis for Amerigas Butane Storage Facilities."Page 2.September 2010.)The facility primarily stores butane,as well as smaller amounts of propane. •The facility includes two 12.6 million gallon refrigerated tanks,five 60,000 horizontal-storage tanks,transportation vehicles, and pipeline and rail shipping capabilities.The facility provides access for vehicles and rail lines as alternative means of shipping or receiving butane and other LPGs.Prior to 2004,the facility was connected to a berth in the Port of Los Angeles through a 16"pipeline buried 10 feet below the ground,which had been used to load ships with butane for export. (Cornerstone,Page 2)(Rancho LPG page) •While most of the storage,transport,and rail car delivery is located farthest from Gaffey Street,the two largest butane storage tanks are located closest to the western boundary of the facility,which is closest to the nearest residential and commercial areas.(Cornerstone,Page 3) Rancho LPG History 1972 '~~""'-'._----._--_..~-- In 1972,the property underlying the current facility was purchased by Petrolane and later developed into a liquid bulk tank facility pursuant to an environmental impact report (EIR)under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).(City Attorney Letter pg 2 Overview)@) http://la15th.comlwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page 10/15/2012 Tank Safety 1974 Page 3 of7 On July 1,1974,the Port of Los Angeles entered into Revocable Pennit No.1212 for the construction and operation of a railroad spur track. 1974 On May 27,1974,the Port of Los Angeles entered into Revocable Pennit No.264 for subsurface pipelines.This would allow for the transportation of its products to Berth 120,where it would then be exported by ship. 1978 In 1978,a public and private nuisance lawsuit was filed against Petrolane.In Brown v.Petrolane.(1980),it was ruled that the facility and its functions did not constitute a nuisance[41. 1989 In 1989,Petrolane was transfonned into a facility with the primary purpose of storing and exporting butane,which it currently remains,because of an increase in demand for butane as a result of the Federal Clean Air Act Amendment of 1990.(In My Backyard paper,pg 3)." 1993 In 1993,AmeriGas purchased and acquired the facility from Petrolane. (http://www.nwsanpedro.org/pdfs/CAOCLAreport03142006.pdf pg 1) 2004 In July 2004,Pennit No.264 expired and subsequent calls were handled on an individual basis under a month-to-month holdover. 2004 In September 2004,the last vessel call at Berth 120 for AmeriGas occurred. 2008 In 2008,Rancho LPG purchased the liquid bulk tank facility from AmeriGas. 2010 In October 2010,Pennit No.263 was fully tenninated despite attempts by AmeriGas and Rancho LPG to have it renewed, subsequently removing the month-to-month holdover for the pipeline.Also,as per the tenns ofthe pennit,Rancho LPG was ordered to restore the Berth 120 property.Consequently,transportation ofthe Rancho LPG materials had to be shifted to truck and rail movement. 2011 In February 2011,Revocable Pennit No.1212 for a rail spur,was replaced by Revocable Pennit 10-05 which updated various pennit provisions. 2011 July 2011:Rancho LPG completed restoration ofthe Berth 120 property. 2012 June 2012:Board of Harbor Commissioners rejected a proposal to revoke Pennit 10-05. (1) http://la15th.com/wiki/index.php?title=Main_Page 10/15/2012 Tank Safety Number of liquid bulk storage tanks in Harbor Area and dates built Neighboring land uses:residential,commercial,parks •The nearest commercial land receptor is approximately 0.13 miles (around 675 feet)away •The nearest residential area is approximately 0.24 miles (around 1,290 feet)away.(Cornerstone pg.2) Regulatory Environment &Enforcement Federal I.Environmental Protection Agency 2.Department of Homeland Security 3.Defense Logistics Agency 4.Department of Transportation State 1.California EPA 2.Department of Toxic Substance Control 3.CAL OSHA 4.California Air Resources Board Regional 1.South Coast AQMD 2.LA County Fire Department Local 1.LAFD 2.Planning Department 3.Building and Safety Department 4.Port of Los Angeles 5.Emergency Management Department 6.Bureau of Sanitation 7.LAPD Risk Analysis Propane and Butane -What is it? Risk Assessments Page 4 of7 •There have been two risk assessments completed so far.In September 2010,a risk assessment was conducted by Cornerstone Technologies after being contacted by the Northwest San Pedro Neighborhood Council. •In October 2010,Quest Consultants was contacted by Rancho LPG.They released a risk assessment in response to Cornerstone Technologies'assessments . •Quest Consultants also refuted Cornerstone's findings,stating that an oversimplistic model was used to analyze scenarios,that they neglected to include site-specific s~ures that greatly reduced risk,and making physicalIy impossible or inapplicable assumptions.~ http://la15th.comiwiki/index.php?tit1e=Main_Page 10/15/2012 Tank Safety Page 5 of7 •In April 2011,the City Attorney's office contacted the EPA's Risk Management Plan Enforcement Unit,who then contacted Michigan Technological University's Department of Chemical Engineering to conduct an independent review of the assessments. •The independent review found Cornerstone Technologies'findings to be flawed,and found Quest Consultants' assessment to be far superior. Cornerstone Technologies'Assessment Scenario 1:Vapor Cloud Explosiou • A puncture area of9 inches,releasing 7,790 pounds per minute. •Resulting in an impact distance ofless than 0.1 miles 1.Quest Consultants states the results are incorrect due in part to a lack of knowledge regarding the behavior of liquid butane,and in part due to the use of an ineffective/incompatible analysis model[51. 2.Michigan Tech states this is physically impossible because refrigerated butane will not instantly vaporize,as the scenario assumes Scenario 2:Vapor Cloud Explosion #2 -Small Leak • A small leak from improper maintenance or construction releasing 1,000 pounds per minute •Resulting in an explosion radius of less than 0.1 miles i' 1.Quest Consultants states the results are incorrect due in part to a lack of knowledge regarding the behavior ofliquid butane,and in part due to the use of an ineffective/incompatible analysis model. 2.Michigan Tech states this is physically impossible because refrigerated butane will not instantly vaporize,as the scenario assumes Scenario 3:Alternative Release -Pool Fire •500 pounds of liquid butane or less released per minute due to bad construction or maintenance.Some would tum to vapor. Release duration of360 minutes •The vapor would be ignited and lead back to liquid release point,resulting in large fire. •Impact radius of 0.4 miles 1.Quest Consultants stated the results are flawed and physically impossible because it assumes the liquid would flow unobstructed and unconfined over a flat surface.It neglects to consider the impoundment basin that is present that would serve to reduce the surface area ofthe pool. 2.Michigan Tech states that it is important to consider the impoundment basin,which Cornerstone did not do,as the area of the pool and the vaporization rate would be much lower. Scenario 4:Alternative Release -Pool Fire #2 •7790 pounds of liquid butane released per minute for a duration of 360 minutes. •Impact radius of 1.7 miles 1.Quest Consultants stated the results are flawed and physically impossible because it assumes the liquid would flow unobstructed and unconfined over a flat surface.It neglects to consider the impoundment basin that is present that would serve to reduce the surface area of the pool. 2.Michigan Tech states that it is important to consider the impoundment basin,which Cornerstone did not do,as the area ofthe pool and the vaporization rate would be much lower. Sc~nario 5:Vapor Cloud Explosion • A catastrophic earthquake occurs that causes complete failure of one of the tanks and instant release of all 63 million pounds of the butane in vapor form •It disperses its maximum distance before reaching an ignition source •Impact radius of3.2 miles 1.Quest Consultants states that that the results are invalid as it is physically impossible for 12.6 million gallons of butane to instantaneously vaporize. 2.Michigan Tech concurs with Quest Consultants,adding that if a tank were to completely fail,liquid butane would flow into the impoundment area and a boiling pool would result,resulting in a small amount of vapor release.They also add that it is highly unlikely that the vapor would disperse to a precisely flammable mixture and then ignite at that exact instant. http://laI5th.com/wiki/index.php ?title=Main_Page 1011512012 Tank Safety Scenario 6:Vapor Cloud Explosion #2 Page 6 of7 • A catastrophic earthquake causes complete failure of both tanks,resulting in instant release of all 126.5 million pounds of butane in vapor form •It disperses its maximum distance before reaching an ignition source •Impact radius of 4.0 miles 1.Quest Consultants states that that the results are invalid as it is physically impossible for 25 million gallons of butane to instantaneously vaporize. 2.Michigan Tech concurs with Quest Consultants,adding that if a tank were to completely fail,liquid butane would flow into the impoundment area and a boiling pool would result,resulting in a small amount of vapor release.They also add that it is highly unlikely that the vapor would disperse to a precisely flammable mixture and then ignite at that exact instant. Scenario 7:BLEVE (Boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion) •Sudden drop in pressure inside a container causing violent boiling ofliquid,which rapidly releases large amounts of vapor and results in a large rapid expansion similar to an explosion • I tank gone due to an earthquake •Impact radius of5.2 miles 1.Quest Consultants state the results are incorrect and physically impossible,pointing out a lack of understanding of BLEVE's.They state the definition is actually a "release ofa large mass of pressurized liquid to the atmosphere". 2.Michigan Tech concurs with Quest Consultants.,>' Scenario 8:BLEVE #2 •Both tanks rupturing •Impact radius of6.8 miles 1.Quest Consultants state the results are incorrect and physically impossible,pointing out a lack of understanding of BLEVE's.They state the definition is actually a "release ofa large mass of pressurized liquid to the atmosphere". 2.Michigan Tech concurs with Quest Consultants. Quest Consultants'Assessment •The tanks have two methods of detection for leaks and ruptures for both tanks,When activated,an Emergency Shut-Down (ESD)valve closes.It is reasonable to believe that a leak would be detected and the valve would be closed within seconds. •Quest Consultants assumes a full 14-inch rupture between the ESD valves and transfer pumps • 7 scenarios are provided in which the ESD valve takes a certain time to close 1.ESD valve would close five minutes after the 14-inch line rupture occurs. 2.ESD valve would close 10 minutes after the 14-inch line rupture occurs. 3.ESD valve would close 15 minutes after the 14-inch line rupture occurs. 4.SD valve would close 30 minutes after the 14-inch line rupture occurs. 5.ESD valve would close 60 minutes after the 14-inch line rupture occurs. 6.ESD valve would close 120 minutes after the 14-inch line rupture occurs. 7.ESD valve would not close after the 14-inch line rupture occurs and the insulated tank is allowed to completely drain to the impoundment basin. •Upon rupture,the cooled liquid butane would be diverted to the impoundment basin.The result would be an initial short-lived high vaporization rate,followed by a rapid decline of vaporization. •Any release duration below 15 minutes (Scenarios 1-3)would not be sufficient for vapor to overflow the basin. • A release duration exceeding 30 minutes,along with a stable atmosphere,and low winds,could result in a flammable cloud that can extend up to 600 feet westwards. •Ifit encounters an ignition source,it can ignite and bum back to the source of the vapors (the impoundment basin), resulting in a flash fire.Those within the cloud can be injured or killed •Another possibility is a vapor cloud explosion with overpressure waves.Strength of the blast wave depends on reactivity of flammable gases involved,the presence of buildings of walls that partially confine the vapor cloud,and spatial density of obstructions within the flammable cloud •Predicted blast wave strength is capable of causing broken windows and possible injury,but not enough to cause a fatality •Another possibility is a pool fire following ignition of the flammable vapors once the impoundment basin floor is covered with butane. •Can cause up to 2nd-degree bums on persons nearby. •Michigan Tech believes these are realistic assessments prod(7)ing sound methodology and knowledge. http://1a15th.comlwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page 10/15/2012 Tank Safety Economic Impacts Why are they here and what is the economic benefit to the region? Frequently Asked Questions Page 7 of7 Does the City of Los Angeles own any of the Rancho LPG property? No,the City does not own or lease any of the property.(City Attorney response) Does the Rancho LPG facility lie on a fault? No,but is within proximity to the Palos Verdes Hills fault zone (*pic will be attached).(USGS Source).However,there has not been demonstrated fault activity within the last 10,000 years[6 j and subsequently does not meet the threshold for Alquist-Priolo Act regulatory action through the CA Geological Survey[7]. Can the facility be relocated? Actions have been taken in 2004 and 2005 in conjunction with and between Rancho LPG,the Port of Los Angeles,and the City of Los Angeles to attempt to relocate the facility and its functions.However,no suitable locations or alternative solutions could be identified within the Port of Los Angeles or the Port of Long Beach areas.(Patchett 08-07 correspondence pg 2)and (POLA Exec Director pgs.2-3) •Also in 2005,the City Attorney determined that the City of Los Angeles did not have the authority or legal basis to compel the relocation ofAmeriGas (now Rancho LPG)from its site.(POLA Exec Director pg.3 July 2005) Has the facility been inspected recently? erences I.r http://petroleum-refining.blogspot.comI2012/05/intertek-bulk-liquid-storage-terminals.html 2.r http://www.kindermorgan.comlbusiness/products-pipelines/terminals_W_Ia_harbor.cfm 3.r http://www.vopak.com/north-america/vopak-terminal-Ios-angeles-cbm.html 4.r http://law.justia.com/cases/california/calapp3d/l02/720.html 5.r http://www.portoflosangeles.org/pdf/ranchoJacility_attachments.pdf pg 50 6.r http://geohazards.usgs.gov/cfusion/qfault/qCweb_disp.cfm?qfault_or=320&ims_cCcd=cf&disp_cd=C 7.r http://www.conservation.ca.gov/cgs/rghrn/ap/Pages/main.aspx Ret;ieved from ''http://la15th.com/wiki/index.php?title=Main_Page&oldid=57'' •This page was last modified on 6 August 2012,at 21:13. http://la15th.comiwiki/index.php?title=Main_Page 1011512012 From: Sent: To: Page 1 of 1 Kit Fox diana nave [diananave@earthlink.net] Friday,October 12,2012 5:28 PM katie marrie;pete burmeister;bob bryant;CYNTHIA Gonyea;Carolyn Grayson;Kristina Smith; Scott Allman;Barbara schach;dan dixon;craig goldfarb;Ray Regalado;Gary Buss;Laurie Jacobs;george thompson;laureen vivian;Ana R.Ortiz,DDS;Pat Nave;chuck hart;Irene Mendoza;Phil Nicolay;Anna Hill;david rivera;tim mcosker;Kit Fox;jim krause;Molly Abbatiello; Alison Becker;Grieg Asher;Jennifer Zivkovic;Jim Maclellan;rob katherman;glenn Cornell;Mitch Harmatz Subject:Fwd:Council Motions Introduced today Attachments:20121012120224599.pdf Begin forwarded message: From:Kevin Bingham <kevin.bingham@lacity.org> Date:October 12,20124:30:55 PM PDT ,+ To:June Smith <burling102@aol.com>,Linda Alexander <Ialex@cox.net>,Diana Nave <diananave@earthlink.net> Subject:Council Motions Introduced today All, Please see the following motions introduced in Council today: -A motion to make it easier to transfer money from our GCP account to non-profit groups -A motion to extend for another six months the $50k reward for information on the murder of Amado Lozano -A motion asking Planning Department to report on the zoning codes and permits of the Rancho LPG facility and what effect,if any,changing the zoning codes at the site would have on their operations. Kevin Bingham CDI5,Councilmember Joe Buscaino San Pedro Field Representative (310)732-4515 10/15/2012 (j)3 "~",;';,.''-'. MOTION Residents and neighbors surrounding the Rancho LPG facility located in San Pedro have expressed various concerns regarding the safety and legality of this facility.This particular liquid bulk tank facility was built in 1973,and is located on private property outside the Port of Los Angeles.It includes two 12.5 million gallon refrigerated tanks containing butane,a liquefied petroleum gas which is a by-product of the refining process.Within the past decade,there have been various city reviews of the storage facility,dating back to 2004,and have involved the Planning Department,City Attorney,Harbor Department,Fire Department,the City Administrative Office (CAO)as well as the Chief Legislative Analyst (CLA). Aside from the Rancho LPG facility in San Pedro,there are a variety of other liquid bulk storage facilities both above and below ground in the Harbor area,which have also raised concerns among nearby residents.It is imperative that the City ensure that any potential threats are thoroughly explored and mitigated.'· Concerned about the potential risks posed to local residents by a breach of a Liquid Bulk Storage (LBS)and Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG)facility in the event of an accident,residents have expressed interest in knowing how the land at Parcel 7412026006,on which the Rancho LPG facility is located,was originally zoned,and what options a change in zoning for the parcel would mean for continued operations of a LBS facility. I THEREFORE MOVE that the Department of City Planning be instructed to report on the original zoning designation of Parcel 7412026006 and what industrial activities were authorized at that site when it was constructed and what industrial activities are currently authorized. I FURTHER MOVE that the Department of City Planning be instructed to report what restrictions,if any,a change in zoning at Parcel 7412026006 would have on the operations of the Rancho LPG facility and what effect zoning changes wo.uld h?ve on other LBS/LPG facilities located in the City of Los Angeles.~?. Presented BY~~) JOE BUSCAINO Councilmember,15th Seconded By...:::::s;;==:!o~=-~_~~~-.!:..._ Page 1 of 1 Kit Fox From:Janet Gunter [arriane5@aol.com] Sent:Monday,October 15,2012 8:41 AM To:Kit Fox Subject:Re:Staff report for the Rancho Agenda Item for Oct.16,2012 Great!Just confirming since I don't remember seeing it referenced in the staff report for tomorrow night's meeting.The governor's report goes a very long way in validating our claims of improper exemptions and underscores the lack of any real oversight of all aspects regarding safety and operation of this facility. Remember,that the Governor's report directive is for the "creation"of a single oversight entity to be able to better review these findings and better establish risk ...as well as physical changes to the LPG facility site itself...etc.Important.None of which was ever performed. Thanks Kit.See you tomorrow. JG -----Original Message----- From:Kit Fox <KitF@rpv.com> To:Janet Gunter <arriane5@aol.com> Sent:Mon,Oct 15,2012 8:25 am Subject:RE:Staff report for the Rancho Agenda Item for Oct.16,2012 Hi Janet: The City Council received a copy of the 1977 report as "late correspondence" at its meeting of February 7,2012.I have a PDF of the report. Kit Fox,AIcr Senior Administrative Analyst City Mand$er's OHice City of Rancho Pa.los Verdes 30940 Iiawthorne Blvd. Rancho Palos Verdes,CA 90275 T:(310)544~5226 F:(31O)544~5291 E:kitf@rpv.com From:Janet Gunter [mailto:arriane5@aol.com] Sent:Sunday,October 14,2012 3:35 PM To:Kit Fox Subject:Staff report for the Rancho Agenda Item for Oct.16,2012 Hello Kit- I noted that your report doesn't mention Governor Brown's report performed by the PUC in 1977 that confirms many of the problems with the Petrolane/Amerigas/Rancho facility.It was submitted to your City at least a year ago.It is a 136 page report.Do you have this copy on file? Thanks, Janet G 10/15/2012