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RPVCCA_CC_SR_2012_10_16_03_Rancho_LPG_Butane_StorageCITY OF MEMORANDUM RANCHO PALOS VERDES TO: FROM: DATE: SUBJECT: HONORABLE MAYOR &CITY COUNCIL MEMBERS CAROLYNN PETRU,AICP,DEPUTY CITY MANAGE~ OCTOBER 16,2012 RANCHO LPG BUTANE STORAGE FACILITY IN SAN PEDRO REVIEWED:CAROLYN LEHR,CITY MANAGER@).G\- Project Manager:Kit Fox,AICP,Senior Administrative Analyst4ID RECOMMENDATION Consider options for responding to community concerns regarding the Rancho LPG butane storage facility at 2110 North Gaffey Street in San Pedro,and provide direction to Staff as deemed appropriate. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Since September 201 0,Staff has been reporting on the Rancho LPG butane storage facility in San Pedro as a part of the regular,bi-monthly Border Issues Status Report.On August 21,2012,the City Council directed Staff to agendize a discussion of the Rancho LPG facility as a "stand alone"item for a future meeting.In response,Staff has prepared this report to identify a range of options for the City Council to consider in responding to on- going community concern about this facility.Representatives of the facility operator and concerned community groups have been advised of the City Council's discussion of this matter at tonight's meeting. BACKGROUND The Rancho LPG butane storage facility at North Gaffey Street and Westmont Drive in San Pedro (see Figure 1)was constructed in the early 1970s,roughly one-quarter (%)mile northeast of the nearest portion of what is now the Eastview area of the City of Rancho Palos Verdes.At the time that construction started,the City of Los Angeles did not issue a building permit for it because it was believed (erroneously,as it turned out)that the facility CITY OF MEMORANDUM RANCHO PALOS VERDES TO: FROM: DATE: SUBJECT: HONORABLE MAYOR &CITY COUNCIL MEMBERS CAROLYNN PETRU,AICP,DEPUTY CITY MANAGE~ OCTOBER 16,2012 RANCHO LPG BUTANE STORAGE FACILITY IN SAN PEDRO REVIEWED:CAROLYN LEHR,CITY MANAGER@).G\- Project Manager:Kit Fox,AICP,Senior Administrative Analyst4ID RECOMMENDATION Consider options for responding to community concerns regarding the Rancho LPG butane storage facility at 2110 North Gaffey Street in San Pedro,and provide direction to Staff as deemed appropriate. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Since September 201 0,Staff has been reporting on the Rancho LPG butane storage facility in San Pedro as a part of the regular,bi-monthly Border Issues Status Report.On August 21,2012,the City Council directed Staff to agendize a discussion of the Rancho LPG facility as a "stand alone"item for a future meeting.In response,Staff has prepared this report to identify a range of options for the City Council to consider in responding to on- going community concern about this facility.Representatives of the facility operator and concerned community groups have been advised of the City Council's discussion of this matter at tonight's meeting. BACKGROUND The Rancho LPG butane storage facility at North Gaffey Street and Westmont Drive in San Pedro (see Figure 1)was constructed in the early 1970s,roughly one-quarter (%)mile northeast of the nearest portion of what is now the Eastview area of the City of Rancho Palos Verdes.At the time that construction started,the City of Los Angeles did not issue a building permit for it because it was believed (erroneously,as it turned out)that the facility 3-1 October 16, 2012 Page 2 was exempt from City regulation. Eventually, a building permit was issued and an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) was prepared by the City of Los Angeles. Figure 1: Location of Rancho LPG Facility The facility includes two (2) large refrigerated butane storage tanks with a combined capacity of roughly twenty five (25) million gallons, and several smaller tanks for the storage of propane (see Figure 2). The butane stored in the large tanks is a by-product of petroleum refining at the nearby Valero and BP refineries. In the past, butane was transported from the site through an underground pipeline to a nearby berth in the Port of Los Angeles. Currently, butane is transported from the facility via rail car and tanker truck. Figure 2: Rancho LPG Facility (Looking North) Butane Tanks 3-2 MEMORANDUM:Rancho LPG Butane Storage Facility October 16,2012 Page 3 City Staff has been reporting on the Rancho LPG facility as a part of the Border Issues Status Report for over two (2)years (see attached summary as of October 2,2012),but there has been public concern about the facility in the surrounding community for many years before that.These concerns were most recently heightened following the explosion of an underground natural gas transmission line in a residential neighborhood in San Bruno,CA in September 201 O.At about this same time,the City of Los Angeles'Northwest San Pedro Neighborhood Council (NWSPNC)commissioned a risk assessment of the facility by Cornerstone Technologies.The Cornerstone report identified a variety of possible accident scenarios,ranging from a relatively small,on-site mishap to a sudden, catastrophic failure of the butane tanks,with impacts extending for several miles from the facility. In response to the Cornerstone report,the facility operator commissioned its own risk assessment of the facility by Quest Consultants.The Quest report of January 2011 concluded that the area affected by the most catastrophic events that could realistically occur would be several orders of magnitude less than the most-catastrophic scenario identified in the Cornerstone report.Third-party independent assessments of the Cornerstone and Quest reports-prepared at the request of the U.S.Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)-generally concluded that the Cornerstone report was flawed in its analysis of the risk of catastrophic upset at the facility,while the Quest report defined more realistic scenarios that were indicative of the actual risk posed by the facility upon the surrounding community.The operations of the facility have also been investigated by the Los Angeles City Attorney and the State Attorney General,neither of whom found any evidence of violations or other conditions that would warrant legal action against the facility operator.Furthermore,in a letter from the Los Angeles City Attorney's Office,it was pointed out that a prior lawsuit filed against the former owner of the facility (Don Brown v. Petrolane,102 Cal.App.3d 720 (1980»was unsuccessful under both public and private nuisance theories,and the facility was not closed or relocated as a result of the lawsuit. Notwithstanding the recent risk assessments and investigations,there remains a great deal of controversy about this facility in the surrounding community.Community members have questions about a number of topics,including (but not limited to): •The circumstances of the environmental review of the facility,both at the time of its construction and since that time; •The validity and accuracy of either of the risk assessments performed for the facility; •The potential effects of seismic activity from the Palos Verdes fault upon the facility, including liquefaction and earthquake-induced landslides;and, •The amount,type and sufficiency of liability coverage afforded to surrounding residents and property owners by the operator of the facility. Community opponents of the facility have pleaded with local,State and Federal officials and agencies to have the facility closed and/or relocated.They have frequently appeared 3-3 MEMORANDUM:Rancho LPG Butane Storage Facility October 16,2012 Page 4 before both the Board of Harbor Commissioners and our City Council to raise concerns about this facility,although neither of these bodies has direct jurisdiction over land use control or other aspects of the operation of the facility.This past summer,opponents did testify before Los Angeles City Councilman Joe Buscaino and the Los Angeles City Council Public Safety Committee on June 27,2012. Following Staff's regular bi-monthly update on issues related to this facility on the Border Issues Status Report of August 7,2012,Councilwoman Brooks suggested agendizing this matter as a "stand alone"item for a future meeting (see attached Minutes).The City Council received a report from Councilwoman Brooks on this suggestion on August 21, 2012,and directed Staff to report back to the City Council regarding the available options and strat~gies to address residents'concerns about this facility (see attached Minutes and Study Session report).Staff subsequently agendized this matterfor discussion at tonight's meeting. DISCUSSION Although a high level of concern about the Rancho LPG facility continues to exist in the surrounding community,it is important to note that the facility operator is not (to Staff's knowledge)proposing any changes to the facility or its operations that would trigger any kind of discretionary land-use review by the City of Los Angeles or any assessment of the environmental impact of such changes that would be required pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).Also,as discussed above,there is no evidence (to Staff's knowledge)that the facility is being operated in violation of the legal requirements of any local,State or Federal agency with jurisdiction over any aspect to the continued use and operation of the facility.Furthermore,since the facility is located outside of the corporate boundary of the City of Rancho Palos Verdes,the City has no jurisdiction over it. Since Staff began monitoring this facility on the Border Issues Status Report,there have been repeated requests by concerned members of the surrounding community-including Rancho Palos Verdes residents-for the City Council to take a position opposing the continued operation and/or existence of the Rancho LPG facility.On two (2)previous occasions,our City Council has taken a position on the facility in the form of letters signed by the Mayor (see attachments to August 21,2012,Study Session report).In letters sent to then-Los Angeles City Councilwoman Janice Hahn,Senator Dianne Feinstein and Senator Barbara Boxer in 2011 ,the Mayor and City Council encouraged the addressees to: •Regularly monitor the facility and enforce all applicable regulations and environmental review processes with respect to the on-going operation ofthe facility and any possible future proposals for its modification,renovation and/or expansion; and, 3-4 MEMORANDUM:Rancho LPG Butane Storage Facility October 16,2012 Page 5 •Provide to the general public a transparent and accountable clearinghouse for the dissemination of information and the discussion of issues about the facility. Since the City Council is desirous of exploring the available options and strategies to address on-going community concerns about this facility,Staff offers the following alternatives for its discussion and consideration: Alternative 1:No Further Action at this Time Items on the City's Border Issues Status Report are most frequently related to current development proposals for properties in surrounding jurisdictions.For example,another project in the San Pedro area that Staff has been monitoring for many years is the proposed Ponte Vista project on the site of the former Navy housing complex on Western Avenue.As mentioned above,Staff is not aware of any current or future proposals to change the facility or its operations that would be subject to discretionary review and/or CEQA analysis by the City of Los Angeles.Therefore,one possible alternative would be to remove this facility from the Border Issues Status Report until.such time as any changes to the facility might be proposed.In the event that there is such a future request,the matter would be placed back on the Border Issues Status Report,and Staffwould monitor,review and comment upon it as it does currently with development proposals in other surrounding jurisdictions.This alternative would result a small reduction in the expenditure of Staff time and resources. Alternative 2:Status Quo It is clear that residents in the neighborhoods near the Rancho LPG facility-including those located outside of the City-have long-standing concerns about and objections to the continued operation and existence of the facility.Given the results of recent investigations of the facility,however,it seems very unlikely that the facility will be shutting down and/or going away any time soon.Staff anticipates that the City Council will continue to be asked to take positions on issues related to the facility for the foreseeable future.Currently,the City Council has taken the "official"position articulated in the previous letters to Congresswoman Hahn and Senators Feinstein and Boxer in 2011 ,as summarized above. The City Council may desire to maintain its current position on the facility.If so,one possible alternative would be to continue to monitor this facility on the Border Issues Status .Report and take no further action beyond that at this time.Of course,in the event that circumstances were to change with the facility,this position could be reconsidered by the City Council.However,for the immediate term,this alternative would have no impact upon the expenditure of Staff time and resources. Alternative 3:More Active Participant with Affected Jurisdictions Since the Rancho LPG facility is located within the City of Los Angeles,it has jurisdiction of land use,environmental review (under CEQA)and related issues for the facility.One of the 3-5 MEMORANDUM:Rancho LPG Butane Storage Facility October 16,2012 Page 6 issues that was also made very clear at the Los Angeles City Council Public Safety Committee hearing this past June is that there are a large number of agencies and departments that have at least some jurisdiction over some aspect of the operations of the Rancho LPG facility.Since Councilman Joe Buscaino was elected to serve the 15th District late last year,our City Council has not formally expressed a position on the Rancho LPG facility to ,him (as it did with his immediate predecessor,Janice Hahn).Similarly,the City Council has not expressed its position to the various local,State and Federal regulatory agencies with jurisdiction over the facility.Furthermore,based upon continued public concern about the facility,the City Council may wish to re-assess its "official"position and propose new action,as was suggested by Councilwoman Brooks on August 21,2012.A possible alternative to effectuate this direction would be for the City Council to reconsider its "offici~I"position in this matter,and to direct Staff to take a more active role in reaching out to the City of Los Angeles and other agencies to express this new (and possibly more aggressive)position.This effort could be undertaken withintffe auspices of the existing Border Issues Status Report process,although it could result in the expenditure of more City Staff time and resources than is currently the case. Alternative 4:Lead Investigator The source of much of the community concern about the Rancho LPG facility appears to be a general mistrust of the facility operator and/or the regulatory agencies charged with overseeing it.The existence of two (2)vastly different risk assessments for the facility does not help to resolve these concerns.They are also a great many questions about the public record of the approval and environmental review of this facility,both at the time that it was originally constructed in the 1970s,and as it has changed ownership and operations over the years.Notwithstanding that the EPA has already commissioned a third-party review of the Cornerstone and Quest reports (as described above),Staff believes that truly independent,peer-reviewed risk assessment of the facility conducted by a reputable and experienced engineering firm might serve to address community concerns about the facility. The preparation of such an assessment would require the City to select,retain and pay for the services of a qualified consultant.The City could approach other cities on the Peninsula or in the harbor area to try to share the cost of this study,but Staff expects that it is unlikely that many jurisdictions will be willing to participate.It should also be noted that the facility operator might or might not be willing to cooperate in a City-commission study, including allowing access to the site and producing records.On occasion in the past,the City Council has authorized Staff to hire outside consultants to review matters that are part of the Border Issues Status Report,so this would not be unprecedented.However,Staff anticipates that such a report could easily cost $25,000 to $50,000 or more.If the City Council believes that it might desire to pursue this alternative,Staff recommends obtaining cost estimates and formally reaching out to other nearby cities for financial support before committing to this course of action.If ultimately pursued,Staff oversight of such a process would substantially increase the expenditure of Staff time and resources. 3-6 MEMORANDUM:Rancho LPG Butane Storage Facility October 16,2012 Page 7 Alternative 5:Lead Appellant and/or Plaintiff Since the City has no formal jurisdiction over or role in the approval of any aspect of the operations of the Rancho LPG facility,it is likely that the filing of appeals and/or legal action (or threat of such)would be one of the few remaining options available to the City to challenge any entitlement,permit or other action granted by the City of Los Angeles or some other agency (once administrative remedies had been exhausted).This alternative would require substantial expenditure of City Attorney time and resources,in an amount that Staff cannot reliably estimate at this time.Depending upon the City's bases for challenging any specific entitlement or permit,it would presumably also require the City to retain the services of expert subject-matter consultants,similar to Alternative 4 above. Such an .approach would be extremely uncommon as a part of the Border Issues Status Report,and would be likely to have significant fiscal impacts upon the City,regardless of the final outcome. The foregoing summary of alternatives is not exhaustive,but is intended to provide a range of options and strategies for the City Council's consideration and discussion.The City Council may select a course of action that incorporates elements of several of these alternatives.Staff seeks the City Council's direction from the City Council regarding our future role in monitoring the Rancho LPG facility on behalf of the City Council and the City's residents. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Attached to tonight's report are recent e-mails and other information related to the Rancho LPG facility that has been generated by or submitted to Staff since the last time that this matter was reported on in detail in the Border Issues Status Report of August 7,2012. Included among these is an e-mail that Staff sent to representatives of the facility operator and concerned community groups on October 4,2012,to advise them of the discussion of this matter at tonight's meeting. The facility operator has advised Staff that they would be willing to coordinate a tour of the facility for Staff and City Council members.However,if more than two (2)members of the City Council attend such a tour,it will be necessary agendize a duly-noticed special or adjourned meeting of the City Council in order to comply with the Brown Act. CONCLUSION In conclusion,Staff recommends that the City Council consider options for responding to community concerns regarding the Rancho LPG facility,and provide direction to Staff as deemed appropriate. 3-7 MEMORANDUM:Rancho LPG Butane Storage Facility October 16,2012 Page 8 ALTERNATIVES Alternative courses of action regarding the Rancho LPG facility are discussed in the body of tonight's report.Based upon public testimony and City Council discussion at tonight's meeting,different and/or additional alternative courses of action may be identified. FISCAL IMPACT The anticipated fiscal impacts of the alternative courses of action are discussed in the body of tonight's report.Alternatives 4 and 5 would involve expenditures that are not included in the adopted FY 2012-13 bUdget.If the City Council is interested in pursuing either of these options-.in part or in whole-a budget adjustment to the General Fund would be required. In addition,the fiscal impact of conducting a special or adjourned City Council meeting for a facility tour would involve the expenditure of additional Staff time and resources. Attachments: •Border Issues Status Report summary for Rancho LPG facility (as of 10/2/12) •City Council Minutes (excerpt)(dated 8/7/12) •City Council Minutes (excerpt)and Study Session report (dated 8/21/12) •Additional information and correspondence: o Staff E-mail to LA City Staff with attached CalEMA grant fact sheet (dated 9/4/12) o E-mail from Janet Gunter with attached letter from Anthony Patchett to LA City Attorney Cooley (dated 9/4/12) o E-mail from Janet Gunter regarding CalEMA grant opportunity (dated 9/4/12) o E-mail from Janet Gunter with attached Contra Costa County Risk Management ordinance and SEC filing information for Plains All-American (dated 9/8/12) o E-mail from Diana Nave with attached article about rail tank car safety (dated 9/13/12) o Staff E-mail to interested parties regarding tonight's meeting (dated 10/4/12) o E-mail from Janet Gunter to LA Councilman Buscaino (dated 10/4/12) M:\Border Issues\Rancho LPG Butane Storage Facility\20121016_RanchoLPG_StaffRpt.doc 3-8 Border Issues Status Report summary for Rancho LPG facility (as of 10/2/12) 3-9 RANCHO LPG BUTANE STORAGE FACILITY (CITY OF LOS ANGELES) • Last Update: October 2, 2012 For many years, residents in San Pedro and the Eastview area of Rancho Palos Verdes have been concerned about the existing Rancho LPG (formerly AmeriGas) butane storage facility at 2110 North Gaffey Street. The Rancho LPG facility is a 20-acre site located at the northeast corner of Gaffey Street and Westmont Drive, across the street from Home Depot and roughly three-quarters of a mile from the nearest homes in Rancho Palos Verdes. The site’s most visually-prominent features are two (2) large refrigerated butane storage tanks with a combined capacity of over twenty-five (25) million gallons. Nearby residents have actively sought the relocation of the former Amerigas facility to another site, most recently to Pier 400 in the Port of Los Angeles (POLA). The Rancho LPG facility handles and stores butane—a by-product of petroleum refining—from the nearby Valero and BP refineries in Wilmington and Carson, respectively. In the past, the transportation of butane from the site utilized an underground pipeline to nearby Berth 120 in Los Angeles Harbor. In 2004, POLA declined to renew AmeriGas’ lease for Berth 120. Currently, butane is transported from the facility via rail car and tanker truck. However, Staff understands that Rancho LPG may be pursuing a new lease with POLA to resume the use of the existing underground pipeline. The explosion of an underground natural gas transmission line in a residential neighborhood in San Bruno, CA, on September 9, 2010, has renewed concerns about the Rancho LPG facility among nearby residents. On September 15, 2010, the Daily Breeze reported on a closed-door meeting held by the new owners of the facility, Plains LPG. Another Daily Breeze article on October 18, 2010, reported that the City of Los Angeles’ Northwest San Pedro Neighborhood Council (NWSPNC) had commissioned an independent risk assessment of the Rancho LPG facility. The September 2010 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) has identified a variety of possible accident scenarios for the facility. These range from a relatively small, on-site mishap with impacts mainly contained to the site, to a sudden, catastrophic failure of the butane storage tanks with impacts extending within a 5- to 7-mile radius from the facility. The NWSPNC Planning and Land Use Committee was scheduled to meet to discuss the Rancho LPG facility and the QRA on October 28, 2010. Staff planned to attend this meeting. The Planning and Land Use Committee of the Northwest San Pedro Neighborhood Council (NWSPNC) met on October 28, 2010 to discuss the September 2010 quantitative risk assessment of the Rancho LPG butane storage facility that it commissioned earlier that year. The meeting was attended by roughly two (2) dozen residents and interested parties. NWSPNC’s consultant, Cornerstone Technologies, did not attend the meeting to answer questions about its report. Rancho LPG did send representatives to refute the findings and conclusions of the Cornerstone report. 3-10 Page 2 of 9 Rancho LPG asserts that the Cornerstone report is inaccurate, not credible and not a “true” risk assessment. Of the eight (8) scenarios analyzed in the Cornerstone report, Rancho LPG claims that four (4) were incorrectly modeled and the other four (4)— including the most catastrophic scenarios—are “impossible.” Rancho LPG indicated that it is preparing its own risk assessment for the facility, which it planned to release to the public in January 2011. Staff sent a letter to Rancho LPG on November 5, 2010, asking to be invited to the meeting at which the risk assessment would be presented. In telephone conversations on November 10, 2010, and November 29, 2010, Rancho LPG representatives confirmed that the City would be invited to attend this meeting, which was tentatively set for January 11, 2011. At the November 30, 2010, City Council meeting, several San Pedro and Rancho Palos Verdes residents addressed the City Council (under “Audience Comments”) expressing their concerns about the Rancho LPG facility. Language for a draft resolution was presented to the City Council by members of the San Pedro and Peninsula Homeowners’ Coalition. Rather than adopting a resolution, however, Staff recommended sending a letter from the Mayor to Los Angeles City Councilwoman Janice Hahn, relaying our residents’ concerns about this facility. A draft letter for this purpose was prepared for the City Council’s review and consideration on December 21, 2010. On December 17, 2010, Staff received an invitation from Rancho LPG Holdings, LLC to attend a January 11, 2011, community meeting regarding the risk analysis for the Rancho LPG facility on North Gaffey Street in San Pedro. The invitation to attend this meeting was extended to elected and appointed community representatives, mostly from San Pedro and its neighborhood councils (Northwest, Central and Coastal). On December 21, 2010, the City Council considered a letter from Mayor Long to Los Angeles City Councilwoman Hahn regarding the Rancho LPG facility. The letter was approved with modifications that evening, and sent to Councilwoman Hahn on January 6, 2011. Staff has provided a copy of this letter to Rancho LPG. The January 11, 2011, meeting hosted by Rancho LPG was held at the Crowne Plaza Hotel in San Pedro. It was the first opportunity for Rancho LPG to present its own risk analysis for the butane storage facility. At the outset, Rancho LPG representatives re- stated their position that the type of catastrophic explosion that occurred in 2010 in San Bruno, CA could not occur at its San Pedro facility; and that the report prepared in 2010 on behalf of the Northwest San Pedro Neighborhood Council (NWSPNC) by Cornerstone Technologies was flawed and could not be relied upon as a “true” quantitative risk analysis for the facility. Rancho LPG’s consultant, Quest Consultants, presented an extremely detailed 2½-hour oral presentation about the preparation of quantitative risk analyses (in general) and the 3-11 Page 3 of 9 risks associated with the Rancho LPG facility (specifically). The analysis concluded that the area potentially affected by the most catastrophic events that could realistically occur at the Rancho LPG facility would be several orders of magnitude less than the nearly 7-mile radius affected under the most-catastrophic scenario identified in the Cornerstone report. As modeled by Quest, the nearest residents to the Rancho LPG facility would experience a risk of fatality that is consistent with international standards of “acceptable risk” for similar facilities. It should be noted that seismic risk was not addressed in Quest’s analysis of the Rancho LPG facility. The explanation provided was that there is insufficient data available on the frequency of seismic events for Quest’s risk analysis models to generate meaningful results. However, it was noted that the refrigerated butane storage tanks have passed recent inspections and that they comply with the current International Building Code (IBC). Finally, the Quest representative touched briefly upon the risk of intentional/terrorist attacks upon the facility. Rancho LPG expected to conduct another similar meeting with elected and appointed community representatives in May 2011. At the April 5, 2011, City Council meeting, a representative of the San Pedro and Peninsula Homeowners’ Coalition addressed the Council and asked it to direct Staff to prepare a letter to U.S. Senators Dianne Feinstein and Barbara Boxer regarding the Rancho LPG facility. A draft letter and other materials were submitted as “Late Correspondence” at that meeting. The City Council received these materials and the comments of the speaker, but did not provide direction to Staff regarding the request for letters to be sent to our U.S. Senators regarding this matter. On May 11, 2011, Staff attended Rancho LPG’s community relations meeting in San Pedro. At that meeting, a representative of Rancho LPG provided updates on a number of topics related to the facility for the 2010 calendar year, including: • Incident (i.e., accident) rates for the Rancho LPG facility—which has never had a “significant release event”—were roughly one-third (⅓) of the industry standard for similar facilities; • Facility security has been enhanced with upgraded fencing, video surveillance and security personnel; • The facility operators have worked with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) on counter-terrorism issues and training; • Facility operations have been upgraded by the addition of personnel and the implementation of system automation; • Under the auspices of the California Accidental Release Prevention (CalARP) program, facility infrastructure has been inspected and (where needed) brought into compliance with the most recent building codes; and, • A geotechnical seismic evaluation found negligible risks of surface rupture, slope failure or liquefaction at the facility. 3-12 Page 4 of 9 Rancho LPG planned to hold another community relations meeting in September 2011. At the June 7, 2011, City Council meeting, the City Council discussed the previous request to send letters to U.S. Senators Dianne Feinstein and Barbara Boxer regarding the Rancho LPG facility. Staff subsequently prepared these letters for the Mayor’s signature, which were sent to Senator Feinstein and Senator Boxer on June 21, 2011. On August 26, 2011, a member of San Pedro and Peninsula Homeowners United e- mailed Staff, asking for the City Council to support a letter being written to Los Angeles City Attorney Carmen Trutanich. Staff responded that we believed that previous letters from the Mayor that were sent to then-Councilwoman (now-Congresswoman) Janice Hahn, Senator Dianne Feinstein and Senator Barbara Boxer expressed the City Council’s concerns and position regarding the Rancho LPG facility. We understood from a report published in the Daily Breeze on September 2, 2011, that a similar request was made by this group to the Los Angeles Board of Harbor Commissioners on September 1, 2011. On September 14, 2011, Staff attended Rancho LPG’s latest community relations meeting in San Pedro. At that meeting, a representative of Rancho LPG provided updates on a number of topics related to the facility for the 2011 calendar year. He also distributed copies of a 3rd-party independent assessment of the Fall 2010 Cornerstone Technologies and Quest Consultants risk assessment reports for the facility, which was prepared at the request of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) by Dr. Daniel Crowl with the Department of Chemical Engineering at Michigan Technical University. Dr. Crowl’s assessment concluded (in general) that the Cornerstone report was flawed in its analysis of the risk of catastrophic upset at the Rancho LPG facility, while the Quest report defined more realistic scenarios that were indicative of the actual risk posed by the facility upon the surrounding community. Unfortunately, the meeting deteriorated into a rather heated discussion about the credibility of the analysis on each side of the argument, and the perceived lack of transparency about the operation of the facility. On September 21, 2011, Staff received a follow-up letter from Rancho LPG. Staff believes that Rancho LPG plans to continue holding community relations meetings in the future. As “Late Correspondence” for the October 4, 2011, City Council meeting, Staff distributed a copy of a letter from Rancho LPG to the Central San Pedro Neighborhood Council, which included as an attachment a letter from Los Angeles City Attorney Carmen Trutanich to the attorney representing San Pedro and Peninsula Homeowners United. In essence, the letter concluded that the Los Angeles City Attorney’s office did not have sufficient evidence or grounds upon which to revoke Rancho LPG’s right to use a railroad line in Los Angeles city right-of-way or to compel the preparation of a new environmental impact report for the Rancho LPG butane storage facility. 3-13 Page 5 of 9 Related to this issue, additional developments and information include the following: • On October 4, 2011, “Late Correspondence” for that evening’s City Council meeting included an e-mail chain from Jeanne Lacombe. • On October 7, 2011, Staff was copied on an e-mail from Janet Gunter to the City and Port of Los Angeles regarding the discussion of the Rancho LPG facility at the Board of Harbor Commissioner’s meeting on September 1, 2011. • On October 10, 2011, the Los Angeles Times published an article regarding the Rancho LPG facility. • On October 13, 2011, Janet Gunter forwarded to Staff a copy of the revocable permit granted to rancho LPG by the Port of Los Angeles for the use of a portion of the rail spur line serving the property. • On October 17, 2011, Staff received a flyer announcing a community protest to be staged near the Rancho LPG facility on October 29, 2011 (the Daily Breeze subsequently reported on this protest on October 30, 2011). • On October 21, 2011, Staff received a letter from Rancho LPG, which included a letter from the State Attorney General’s office concluding that the State had no grounds to issue an injunction to shut down the facility. • On October 29, 2011, the Los Angeles Times reported that Los Angeles City Councilwoman Jan Perry was calling for an investigation of the Rancho LPG facility. • On November 14, 2011, Jeanne Lacombe forwarded to Staff a copy of a proposed motion by the Northwest San Pedro Neighborhood Council regarding the insurance requirements for Rancho LPG (which was subsequently adopted). • On November 20, 2011, Jody James forwarded to Staff a copy of the November 15, 2011, motion by the Port Community Advisory Committee (PCAC) demanding that the Port of Los Angeles revoke the permit allowing Rancho LPG to use the rail spur line serving the property. On January 9, 2012, Staff received an invitation from Rancho LPG Holdings, LLC to attend the latest regular community relations meeting regarding the Rancho LPG facility. The invitation to attend this meeting was extended to elected and appointed community representatives, mostly from San Pedro and its neighborhood councils (Northwest, Central and Coastal). On January 25, 2012, Staff attended Rancho LPG’s community relations meeting in San Pedro. At that meeting, representatives of Rancho LPG provided updates on a number of topics related to the facility for the 2011 calendar year, including: • Facility security continues to be enhanced with upgraded fencing, anti-vehicle measures and security personnel; 3-14 Page 6 of 9 • The facility operators continue to work with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) on counter-terrorism issues and training; • Facility operations continue to be upgraded by the addition of personnel, the implementation of system automation and upgrades to the on-site rail spurs; • Facility personnel completed a total of two hundred one (201) hours of safety training; and, • The facility passed fourteen (14) audits by various oversight agencies, with no “Notices of Violation” issued. It was noted that, during 2011, the facility received third-party validation of its regulatory and CEQA compliance from the Los Angeles City Attorney and the State Attorney General, as well as third-party validation of the Quest risk analysis by Michigan Tech under the direction of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Also, the facility operator recently launched a new website (http://www.RanchoLPG.com) to provide information about the facility to the general public. During the question-and-answer session at the end of the presentation, however, it was clear that concerned members of the nearby community remain opposed to the presence of the facility on the site due to its proximity to homes, schools and businesses, regardless of how safely it may be operated by Rancho LPG. Rancho LPG has not yet scheduled its next community relations meeting. The following events have transpired since the last Border Issues update on this facility in early February 2012: • On February 28, 2012, the Daily Breeze reported that LAUSD Board Vice President Richard Vladovic had sent a letter to Governor Brown asking for further investigations into the Rancho LPG facility; • On March 8, 2012, Staff received an e-mail and photographs from Jody James after a collision between a truck and a train just outside the Rancho LPG facility at Gaffey Street and Westmont Drive; • On March 12, 2012, Staff received another e-mail from Jody James announcing that the Board of Harbor Commissioners would be discussing the Rancho LPG facility at its meeting on March 15, 2012; and, • On March 13, 2012, Staff received an e-mail from Jeanne Lacombe regarding the Los Angeles City Attorney’s review of the Rancho LPG facility. On May 1, 2012, Los Angeles 15th District City Councilman Joe Buscaino announced that he was asking the City Council’s Public Safety Committee to hold a special meeting in San Pedro to consider issues related to liquid bulk storage facilities in the harbor area. Councilman Buscaino posted a brief video of this announcement on the 15th District website (http://www.la15th.com/), which can also be viewed on YouTube at the following link: 3-15 Page 7 of 9 http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=ptadTRmTQ3U In late May 2012, Staff received the e-mails from Janet Gunter regarding the June 7, 2012, Board of Harbor Commissioners (BHC) meeting as it related to a rail permit for the Rancho LPG butane storage facility in San Pedro. The rail permit in question covers a very short segment of the existing rail spur line adjacent to the Rancho LPG facility where it crosses Westmont Drive. A request for the BHC to revoke this permit was on the June 7th BHC agenda. As a bit of background, in Fall 2011 the City of Los Angeles’ Port Community Advisory Committee (PCAC) adopted a resolution recommending that the BHC revoke the permit for the rail spur line serving the Rancho LPG facility; perform risk assessments of the Rancho LPG facility and all hazardous commodities transported through the Port of Los Angeles; and establish a working group to examine the risks associated with the Rancho LPG facility. Port Staff recommended denying the PCAC recommendation, generally on the grounds that: • Revoking the permit for the rail line would not prevent its continued use by Rancho LPG, but would deprive the Port of insurance coverage, indemnification and lease revenue related to the rail spur; and, • The Port does not have jurisdiction over the operations of the Rancho LPG site because it is located outside of the Port Master Plan Area and the Coastal Zone. The Staff report did suggest that the BHC had the authority to ask an agency with direct jurisdiction over the Rancho LPG facility to undertake the studies requested by PCAC. Prior to the BHC meeting, Staff was copied on an e-mail exchange between Janet Gunter and Port of Los Angeles Executive Director Geraldine Knatz regarding the acceptance of public comments on this topic at the BHC meeting. Ms. Knatz clarified that PCAC and Rancho LPG would each be allotted ten (10) minutes to address the BHC, with all other public speakers limited to the customary three (3) minutes each. The BHC met on Thursday, June 7, 2012, at the Port of Los Angeles Administration Building in San Pedro to consider (among other things) the PCAC recommendation. The Daily Breeze subsequently reported on June 8, 2012, that the BHC had rejected the PCAC recommendation to revoke this permit. On June 18, 2012, Staff was notified that San Pedro Peninsula Homeowners United, the San Pedro & Peninsula Homeowners’ Coalition and other concerned community groups would be hosting a screening of their 12-minute video Before the Ashes on Thursday, June 21, 2012 at Holy Trinity Parish Center in San Pedro. Staff was unable to attend this screening. 3-16 Page 8 of 9 On June 27, 2012, Los Angeles 15th District City Councilman Joe Buscaino hosted a meeting of the Los Angeles City Council’s Public Safety Committee to investigate the potential risks and overall safety of liquid bulk storage facilities in the harbor area, including the Rancho LPG butane storage facility. Councilman Buscaino invited experts and regulators from numerous Federal, State, regional and city agencies to testify before the Committee, and concerned residents were encouraged to attend. The meeting was held at Taper Avenue Elementary School in San Pedro. At the outset of the hearing, Councilman Buscaino invited elected officials to address the Committee. Dr. Richard Vladovic, Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) Board of Education member representing the San Pedro area, expressed his concerns about the Rancho LPG facility and his desire to protect children attending nearby schools. Rancho Palos Verdes City Councilman Jerry Duhovic stated that he appreciated Councilman Buscaino’s efforts in this matter, and noted that his family members and constituents on the east side of Rancho Palos Verdes were concerned about the Rancho LPG facility. Councilman Buscaino was joined by Councilman Dennis Zine and Councilwoman Jan Perry at the dais. They began with questioning of a number of representatives of Federal, State and regional agencies regarding their respective jurisdictions over liquid bulk storage. Agencies represented included the California Occupational Safety and Health Administration (Cal-OSHA); the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA); the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), which operates the Navy fuel depot in San Pedro; the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA); and the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD). Based upon the testimony provided, it was clear that each of these agencies has a very limited scope of authority over aspects of the operation of liquid bulk storage facilities. The Committee then continued with questioning of representatives of a number of City of Los Angeles departments and agencies, including the Emergency Management Department, the Department of Sanitation, the Fire Department (LAFD), the Building and Safety Department, the Police Department (LAPD), the Planning Department, the Port of Los Angeles and the City Attorney’s Office. Again, each agency appeared to have a limited scope of authority over liquid bulk storage (generally) and the Rancho LPG facility (specifically). However, based upon the discussion of the Committee, it appeared that the Emergency Management and Planning departments had the greatest potential to address the issue of the community impacts of liquid bulk storage on a more “global” scale. After completing its questioning, the Committee offered members of the public to comment on the issue at hand. The vast majority of these comments expressed specific opposition to the Rancho LPG facility (rather than addressing the general topic of liquid bulk storage), and a desire for the City of Los Angeles to take action to remove this facility. Staff understands that representatives of Rancho LPG may have been in 3-17 Border Issues Status Report Summary: Rancho LPG Facility (As of October, 2, 2012) Page 9 of 9 attendance at the hearing, but they were not questioned by nor did they address the Committee. Videos of the entire hearing—both agency staff testimony and public comment—may be viewed on-line at http://www.la15th.com/tanksafety. At the August 21, 2012, City Council meeting Councilwoman Susan Brooks presented an item regarding the Rancho LPG butane storage facility during the “Study Session” portion of the agenda. Two (2) members of the public addressed the City Council, urging it to consider taking a more proactive role in addressing community concern about the facility. The City Council unanimously agreed to direct Staff to agendize this matter for discussion at a future meeting, which is scheduled for October 16, 2012. Staff will continue to monitor this project in future Border Issues reports. M:\Border Issues\Rancho LPG Butane Storage Facility\Border Issues summary as of October 2, 2012.doc 3-18 City Council Minutes (excerpt) (dated 8/7/12) 3-19 City Council Minutes August 7, 2012 Page 9 of 10 vehicles. Discussion continued among Council Members and staff. Councilwoman Brooks moved, seconded by Councilman Knight, to: 1) Continue the public hearing for consideration of the College’s one-year time extension request for Phases 1 and 2 to the September 4, 2012 Council meeting so the extension request can be considered after completion of a temporary parking lot that is needed to help alleviate student street parking; 2) Affirm the Director’s determination that because the Parking Management Strategies employed by the College during the Fall 2011/Spring 2012 school terms were not effective in reducing street parking, pursuant to Condition of Approval No. 158, direct the College to provide an operational on-campus temporary parking lot to accommodate a minimum of 90 parking spaces before commencement of the 2012 Fall term (August 27, 2012); and, 3) Affirm Staff’s interpretation that because said parking lot is temporary in nature, minimal grading necessary to accommodate the temporary parking lot does not trigger the grading related Conditions of Approval associated with the College’s 2010 approval. The motion passed on the following roll call vote: AYES: Brooks, Campbell, Duhovic, Knight, and Mayor Misetich NOES: None ABSENT: None FUTURE AGENDA ITEMS: Councilwoman Brooks added the following two topics for future agenda items: 1) Reconsideration of the Recycle Drawing; and, 2) the LPG Butane Storage Tanks. Mayor Pro Tem Campbell added the following two topics to the future agenda items: 1) In consideration of upcoming negotiations with the newly formed employee union, a summary report of part-time employee pay and benefits as compared to full-time employees; and, 2) Consideration of the street name change from Ocean Trails Drive to Trump National Drive. CITY COUNCIL ORAL REPORTS: Each Council Member reported on his/her attendance at various organization and association meetings since the last City Council Oral Reports were provided on July 3, 2012. Councilman Duhovic reported on a recent incident where he was approached at his home by an individual soliciting for monetary donations; he encouraged residents to contact the Sheriff’s Department if they are suspicious of similar solicitations at their residences. 3-20 City Council Minutes August 7, 2012 Page 10 of 10 CLOSED SESSION REPORT: City Attorney Lynch reported on the following Closed Session items: 1) With respect to the VH Property case, a report was provided, but no action was taken; 2) With respect to the Potential Litigation, no discussion occurred due to the lateness of the hour; and, 3) With respect to the Claim, a report was provided, but no action was taken. ADJOURNMENT: At 10:12 P.M., Mayor Misetich adjourned the meeting. /s/ Anthony M. Misetich Mayor Attest: /s/ Carla Morreale City Clerk W:\City Council Minutes\2012\20120807 CC MINS.doc 3-21 City Council Minutes (excerpt) and Study Session report (dated 8/21/12) 3-22 City Council Minutes August 21, 2012 Page 1 of 10 MINUTES RANCHO PALOS VERDES CITY COUNCIL REGULAR MEETING AUGUST 21, 2012 The meeting was called to order at 6:00 P.M. by Mayor Misetich at Fred Hesse Community Park, 29301 Hawthorne Boulevard, and was immediately recessed into Closed Session. RECESS TO CLOSED SESSION: At 6:00 P.M. the meeting was recessed into Closed Session. RECONVENE TO REGULAR SESSION FOR A STUDY SESSION: At 6:46 P.M., Mayor Misetich reconvened the meeting to Regular Session for a City Council Study Session, with all Council Members present. Also present were Carolyn Lehr, City Manager; Carolynn Petru, Deputy City Manager/Interim Director of Recreation and Parks; Carol Lynch, City Attorney; Dennis McLean, Director of Finance/Information Technology; Joel Rojas, Community Development Director; Jim Hendrickson, Interim Director of Public Works; Kit Fox, Senior Administrative Analyst; and, Carla Morreale, City Clerk. PUBLIC COMMENTS FOR ITEMS LISTED ON THE AGENDA FOR THE STUDY SESSION: Public comments were considered prior to discussion of the individual items. DISCUSSION TOPICS: SS1. Review of Tentative Agendas in Light of City Council Goals, including questions of staff (Annotated Version of the City Council 2012 Goals & Priorities - attached for reference). Discussion ensued among Council Members, City Attorney Lynch, and staff regarding topics on the Tentative Agendas, the status of those items that were removed and the dates to which some of the items were rescheduled. There was discussion regarding the status of the following two items for upcoming agendas: Adopt-a-Median Program and Beautification Program. SS2. Future Agenda Items Proposed by Council Members to be Prioritized 3-23 City Council Minutes August 21, 2012 Page 2 of 10 Consideration of Changing the Name of Ocean Trails Drive to Trump National Drive Mayor Pro Tem Campbell provided an explanation of the proposal to change the name of the main street into the Trump National Golf Course from Ocean Trails Drive to Trump National Drive. There was general discussion regarding this item. Councilwoman Brooks moved, seconded by Mayor Pro Tem Campbell, to bring this item forward on a future agenda. Without objection, Mayor Misetich so ordered. Rancho LPG Butane Storage Facility City Clerk Morreale noted that there were two requests to speak regarding this item and that each speaker would be allowed one minute to speak regarding Study Session items. Jeanne Lacombe, Rolling Hills Riviera Homeowners Association (HOA), Rancho Palos Verdes, stated that she was present to show support to encourage federal, state and local authorities to review the LPG Facility and reports provided regarding the facility. Jody James, San Pedro Peninsula Homeowners United, Inc. and San Pedro Peninsula Homeowners Coalition, stated that there were concerns regarding the hazards of the facility. Councilwoman Brooks provided a brief explanation of this item and safety concerns regarding the LPG Tank facility and the proposal to bring this item forward as a future agenda item. Discussion ensued among Council Members, staff, and City Attorney Lynch regarding jurisdictional issues related to the Rancho LPG facility. Councilwoman Brooks moved, seconded by Councilman Duhovic, to bring this item forward on a future agenda, with City staff directed to work with staff members of City of Los Angeles Councilman Buscaino’s office in order to gather information regarding this topic. Without objection, Mayor Misetich so ordered. RECESS AND RECONVENE: Mayor Misetich called a brief recess from 7:32 P.M. to 7:46 P.M. REGULAR SESSION: 3-24 CITY OF STUDY SESSION MEMORANDUM RANCHO PALOS VERDES TO: FROM: DATE:. SUBJECT: HONORABLE MAYOR &CITY COUNCIL MEMBERS COUNCILWOMAN SUSAN BROOKS AUGUST 21,2012 RANCHO LPG BUTANE STORAGE FACILITY The Rancho LPG butane storage facility at North Gaffey Street and Westmont Drive in San Pedro was constructed beginning in the early 1970s.At the time that construction started, the City of Los Angeles did not issue a building permit for it because it was believed (erroneously)that the facility was exempt from City regulation.Eventually,a building permit was issued and an EIR was prepared. The facility includes 2 large refrigerated butane storage tanks with a combined capacity of 25 million gallons and several smaller tanks for the storage of propane.The butane stored in the large tanks is a by-product of petroleum refining at the nearby Valero and BP refineries.In the past,butane was transported from the site through an underground pipeline to a nearby berth in the Port of Los Angeles.Curtently,butane is transported from the facility via rail car and tanker truck. City Staff has been reporting on the Rancho LPG facility as a part of the Border Issues Status Report for nearly 2 years,but there has been public concern about the facility in the surrounding community for many years.These concerns were heightened following the catastrophic explosion of an underground natural gas transmission line in a residential neighborhood in San Bruno,CA in September 2010.At about this same time,the City of Los Angeles'Northwest San Pedro Neighborhood Council commissioned a risk assessment of the facility by Cornerstone Technologies.The Cornerstone report identified a variety of possible accident scenarios,ranging from a relatively small,on-site mishap to a sudden,catastrophic failure of the butane tanks,with impacts extending for miles. In response to the Cornerstone report,the facility operator commissioned its own risk assessment by Quest Consultants.The Quest report of January 2011 concluded that the area affected by the most catastrophic events that could realistically occur would be several orders of magnitude less than the most-catastrophic scenario identified in the Cornerstone report.Third-party independent assessments ofthe Cornerstone and Quest 3-25 MEMORANDUM:Rancho LPG Butane Storage Facility August 21,2012 Page 2 reports-prepared at the request ofthe U.S.Environmental Protection Agency-generally concluded that the Cornerstone report was flawed in its analysis of the risk of catastrophic upset at the facility,while the Quest report defined more realistic scenarios that were indicative of the actual risk posed by the facility upon the surrounding community. There is still a great deal of controversy about this facility in the surrounding community. Community members have questions about a number of critical topics,including (but not limited to): •The circumstances of the environmental review of the facility,both at the time of its construction and since; •T~e validity and accuracy of either of the risk assessments recently performed for the facility; •The potential effects of seismic activity from the Palos Verdes fault upon the facility, including liquefaction and earthquake-induced landslides;and, •The amount,type and sufficiency of liability coverage afforded to surrounding residents and property owners by the operator of the facility. Opponents of the facility have pleaded with local,State and Federal officials and agencies to have the facility closed and/or relocated.Opponents have also prepared a 12-minute video called "Before the Ashes"and recently testified before Councilman Joe Buscaino and the Public Safety Committee of the Los Angeles City Council in July 2012. On 2 previous occasions,this City Council has taken a formal position on the facility.In letters to then-Councilwoman Janice Hahn,Senator Dianne Feinstein and Senator Barbara Boxer in 2011,the City Council encouraged the addressees to: •Regularly monitor the facility and enforce all applicable regulations and environmental review processes with respect to the on-going operation of the facility and any possible future proposals for its modification,renovation and/or expansion; and, •Provide to the general public a transparent and accountable clearinghouse for the dissemination of information and the discussion of issues about the facility. Given the high level of concern that continues to exist in the surrounding community,I suggest that the City Council should re-assess its past position and potentially propose new action regarding this facility.In my view,it is incumbent upon our City Council to take action to ensure that our community is as safe and protected as possible,and to enlist the support of surrounding communities on the Peninsula to bring sufficient pressure to bear upon the facility operator and the local,State and Federal agencies charged with overseeing this facility.To this end,I recommend that we direct Staff to report back to the City Council on the next available agenda regarding our available options and strategies to ensure that the health,safety and welfare of our residents are protected. 3-26 MEMORANDUM:Rancho LPG Butane Storage Facility August 21,2012 Page 3 Attachments Letter to Councilwoman Janice Hahn (dated 1/6/11) Letters to Senators Feinstein and Boxer (dated 6/21/11) M:\Border Issues\Rancho LPG Butane Storage Facility\20120821_RanchoLPG_StudySessionRptdoc 3-27 January 6,2011 CITYOF RANCHO PALOS VERDES Councilwoman Janice Hahn,15 th District City of Los Angeles 200 N.Spring St.,Room 435 los Angeles,CA 90012 SUBJECT:City of Rancho Palos Verdes'Concerns regarding the Rancho LPG Butane Storage Facility,2110 North GaJfey Street,San Pedro Dear Councilwoman Hahn: As you may be aware,residents in San Pedro and Rancho Palos Verdes have been ooncerned for many years about the RanchO LPG (formerly AmeriGas)butane storage facility at North Gaffey Street and Westmont Drive.Recently,these concerns have returned to the forefront,particularly in the aftermath of the oatastrophic gas pipeline failure tn the Bay Area community of San Bruno in September 2010. We understand that plans were made several years ago for this faoility to be rewlooated to Pier 400 in the Port of los Angeles-away from homes,schools and looal business-· plans that (for some reason)have never oome to fruition.The facility was approved for this site more than thirty (30)years ago,at a time When less-rigorous environmental review and public participation processes were in effect than is the case today. Earlier this year,the Northwest San Pedro Neighborhood Council (NWSPNC) commissione.d a quantitative risk assessment of the Rancho LPG facility.The risk assessment-released in September 201 Q-identified a variety of posslbleaocident scenarios for the facility.These ranged from a relatively small,on-site mishap with impacts mainly contained to the site,to a sudden,catastrophic fallure of the butane storage tanks with impacts extending for a 5-to 7-mile radius from the facility. The facility's operator,Rancho LPG Holdings,LLC,has refuted the conclusions of the NWSPNC risk assessment,and the assessmenfs authors have not (to the City's knowledge)responded publicly to questions about how the risk assessment was prepared or how its conclusions were reached.Although Ranoho LPG has stated that it intends to prepare its own risk assessment of the facility and to publicly release its findings,there remain today many unanswered questions about the safety of this facility for residents living nearby. 30940 HAWTHORNE BLVD /IWicHO B\LOS VERDES,LA 90275·5391 3-28 Councilwoman Janice Hahn January 6,2011 Page 2 Ideally,the City of Rancho Palos Verdes and its residents would like to see this facility relocated to another site that does not pose such a significant "risk of upset"to surrounding property and neighborhoods.Failing that,however,we wish to be assured that the facility is operated as safely as possible,and in complete accordance the regulations of all local,State and Federal agencies having Jurisdiction over this site and these typesot facilities.To these ends,we respectfully request your assistance in the fulfilling the foHowing community objectives: •Regularly monitor the Rancho LPG site and facility,and enforce (to the maximum extent possible)the City of Los Angeles'land use regulations and the State's environmental review processe.s (Le.,CEQA)with respect to the on-goIng operation of the facility and any possible future proposals for its rnodification, renovation and/or expansion;and, •Provide to the general public a transparent and accountable clearinghouse for the dissemination of information and the discussion of issues about the Rancho LPG site and facility. Our Planning Staff continues to monitor issues related to the Rancho LPG site and facility,and to report these issues regularly to our City Council.We look forward to working with you and the facility's owner/operator to ensure the future safety and tranquility of our respective communities and residents. Sjnce~~I¥you~s, \ .'-..- Thomas D.Long Mayor / cc:Rancho Palos Verdes City Council Carolyn Lehr,Oity Manager IJoel Rojas,Community Development Director'V Kit Fox,Associate Planner M:\Border Issues\Rancho LPG Butane Storage Facility\20101221_Hahn_RanchoLPG.doc 3-29 CITYOF THOMAS D.LONG,MAYOR ANTHONY M.MISETICH,MAYOR PRO TEM BRIAN CAMPBELL,COUNCILMAN DOUGLAS W.STERN,COUNCILMAN STEFAN WOLDWICZ,COUNCILMAN June 21,2011 RANCHO PALOS VERDES The Honorable Dianne Feinstein United States Senate 331 Hart Senate Office Building Washington,DC 20510 SUBJECT:City of Rancho Palos Verdes'Concerns regarding the Rancho LPG Butane Storage Facility,2110 North Gaffey Street,San Pedro,California Dear Senator Feinstein: Residents in San Pedro and Rancho Palos Verdes have been concerned for many years about the Rancho LPG (formerly AmeriGas)butane storage facility at North Gaffey Street and Westmont Drive in San Pedro.Within the past year,these concerns returned to the forefront,particularly in the aftermath of the catastrophic gas pipeline failure in the Bay Area community of San Bruno in September 2010. We understand that plans were made several years ago for this facility to be re-Iocated to the Port of Los Angeles-away from homes,schools and local business-plans that (for some reason)have never come'to fruition.The facility was approved for its current site more than thirty (30)years ago,at a time when less-rigorous enVironmental review and pUblic participation processes were in effect than is the case today. In September 2010,the City of Los Angeles'Northwest San Pedro Neighborhood Council (NWSPNC)released a quantitative risk assessment of the Rancho LPG facility,prepared by Cornerstone Technologies.The Cornerstone report identified a variety of possible accident scenarios for the facility.These ranged from a relatively small,on-site mishap with impacts mainly contained to the site,to a sudden,catastrophic failure of the butane storage tanks with impacts extending for a 5-to 7-mile radius from the facility. The facility's operator,Rancho LPG Holdings,LLC,immediately refuted the conclusions of the Cornerstone report,whose authors have not (to the City's knOWledge)responded publicly to questions about how the risk assessment was prepared or how its conclusions were reached.Rancho LPG subsequently commissioned its own risk assessment of the 30940 HAWTHORNE BLVD./RANCHO PALOS VERDES,CA 90275·5391/(310)544·5205/FAX (310)544·5291/WWW.PALOSVERDES.COM/RPV '.,~;~>PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER 3-30 Senator Dianne Feinstein June 16,2011 Page 2 facility,prepared by Quest Consultants.The findings of the Quest report,which were publicly released in January 2011,concluded that the area potentially affected by the most catastrophic events that could realistically occur at the Rancho LPG facility.would be several orders of magnitude less than the nearly 7-mile radius affected under the most- catastrophic scenario identified in the Cornerstone report.Despite this,there remain today many unanswered questions about the safety of this facility for residents living nearby. Ideally,the City of Rancho Palos Verdes and its residents would like to see this facility relocated to another site that does not pose such a significant "risk of upset"to surrounding property and neighborhoods.Failing that,however,we wish to be assured that the facility is operated as safely as possible,and in complete accordance the regulations of all local, State and Federal agencies having jurisdiction over this site and these types of facilities. To these ends,we respectfully request your assistance in the fulfilling the following community objectives: • Regularly monitor the Rancho LPG site and facility,and enforce (to the maximum extent possible)any applicable Federal regulations and environmental review processes (i.e.,NEPA)with respect to the on-going operation of the facility and any possible future proposals for its modification,renovation and/or expansion;and, •Provide to the general public a transparent and accountable clearinghouse for the dissemination of any information and the discussion of issues about the Rancho LPG site and facility. Our Planning Staff continues to monitor issues related to the Rancho LPG site and facility, and to report these issues regularly to our City Council.We look forward to working with you and the facility's owner/operator to ensure the future safety and tranquility of our respective communities and residents. Thomas Mayor cc:Rancho Palos Verdes City Council Carolyn Lehr,City Manager Joel Rojas,Community Development Director Kit Fox,Associate Planner 3-31 CITYOF THOMAS D.LONG,MAYOR ANTHONY M.MISETICH,MAYOR PRO TEM BRIAN CAMPBELL,COUNCILMAN DOUGLAS W STERN,COUNCILMAN STEFAN WOlDWICZ,COUNCILMAN June 21,2011 The Honorable Barbara Boxer United States Senate 112 Hart Senate Office Building Washington,DC 20510 RANCHO PALOS VERDES SUBJECT:City of Rancho Palos Verdes'Concerns regarding the Rancho LPG Butane Storage Facility,2110 North Gaffey Street,San Pedro, California Dear Senator Boxer: Residents in San Pedro and Rancho Palos Verdes have been concerned for many years about the Rancho LPG (formerly AmeriGas)butane storage facility at North Gaffey Street and Westmont Drive in San Pedro.Within the past year,these concerns returned to the forefront,particularly in the aftermath of the catastrophic gas pipeline failure in the Bay Area community of San Bruno in September 2010. We understand that plans were made several years ago for this facility to be re-Iocated to the Port of Los Angeles-away from homes,schools and local business-plans that (for some reason)have never come to fruition.The facility was approved for its current site more than thirty (30)years'ago,at a time when less-rigorous environmental review and public participation processes were in effect than is the case today. In September 2010,the City of Los Angeles'Northwest San Pedro Neighborhood Council (NWSPNC)released a quantitative risk assessment of the Rancho LPG facility, prepared by Cornerstone Technologies.The Cornerstone report identified a variety of possible accident scenarios for the facility.These ranged from a relatively small,on-site mishap with impacts mainly contained to the site,to a sudden,catastrophic failure of the butane storage tanks with impacts extending for a 5-to 7-mile radius from the facility. The facility's operator,Rancho LPG Holdings,LLC,immediately refuted the conclusions of the Cornerstone report,whose authors have not (to the City's knOWledge)responded publicly to questions about how the risk assessment was prepared or how its conclusions were reached.Rancho LPG subsequently commissioned its own risk assessment of the facility,prepared by Quest Consultants.The findings of the Quest 30940 HAWTHORNE BLVD./RANCHO PALOS VERDES,CA 90275-5391/(310)544-5205/FAX (310)544-5291/WWW.PALOSVERDES.COM/RPV ;::,~>PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER 3-32 Senator Barbara Boxer June 16,2011 Page 2 report,which were pUblicly released in January 2011,concluded that the area potentially affected by the most catastrophic events that could realistically occur at the Rancho LPG facility would be several orders of magnitude less than the nearly 7-mile radius affected under the most-catastrophic scenario identified in the Cornerstone report.Despite this,there remain today many unanswered questions about the safety of this facility for residents living nearby. Ideally,the City of Rancho Palos Verdes and its residents would like to see this facility relocated to another site that does not pose such a significant "risk of upset"to surrounding property and neighborhoods.Failing that,however,we wish to be assured that the facility is operated as safely as possible,and in complete accordance the regulations of all local,State and Federal agencies having jurisdiction over this site and these types of facilities.To these ends,we respectfully request your assistance in the fulfilling the following community objectives: •Regularly monitor the Rancho LPG site and facility,and enforce (to the maximum extent possible)any applicable Federal regulations and environmental review processes (Le.,NEPA)with respect to the on-going operation of the facility and any possible future proposals for its modification,renovation and/or expansion; and, •Provide to the general public a transparent and accountable clearinghouse for the dissemination of any information and the discussion of issues about the Rancho LPG site and facility. Our Planning Staff continues to monitor issues related to the Rancho LPG site and facility,and to report these issues regularly to our City Council.We look forward to working with you and the facility's owner/operator to ensure the future safety and tranquility of our respective communities and residents. Thomas D.Long Mayor cc:Rancho Palos Verdes City Council Carolyn Lehr,City Manager Joel Rojas,Community Development Director Kit Fox,Associate Planner 3-33 Staff E-mail to LA City Staff with attached CalEMA grant fact sheet (dated 9/4/12) 3-34 Page 1 of 1 Kit Fox From:Kit Fox Sent:Tuesday,September 04,2012 10:20 AM To:'Allison.Becker@lacity.org';'Jacob.Haik@lacity.org' Cc:Diana Nave;'John Greenwood';'Jody James';'Janet Gunter' Subject:Possible Grant Funding related to Rancho LPG Facility Attachments:FS - _EXTENDED_DEADLlNE_CaIEMA_Hazardous_Materials_EmergencLPreparedness_111512.pdf All: The City of Rancho Palos Verdes'grant consultant has recently brought to our attention an opportunity for CalEMA Hazardous Materials Emergency Preparedness (HMEP)grants for "public sector planning and training in support of the emergency planning and training efforts of...Iocal communities to deal with hazardous materials emergencies,particularly those involving transportation."Funding is provided by the U.S.Department of Transportation Pipeline &Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA).The attached fact sheet prepared by our grant consultant includes more details and contact information about this grant opportunity. It occurs to us that these grant funds might be of some value in dealing with community concerns regarding the Rancho LPG facility on North Gaffey Street in San Pedro.The application deadline is November 15,2012.If you have questions,please refer to the contact information on the third page of the attached fact sheet.Please do not contact the City of Rancho Palos Ver-des'grant consultant with questions about this grant opportunity. Sincerely, Kit Fox,AICr Senior Administrative Analyst City Mana.aer'sOHice City of Rancho Palos Verdes 30940 Hawthorne Blvd. Rancho Palos Verdes,CA 90275 T:(310)544~5226 F:(310)544~5291 E:kitf@rpv,com 10/8/2012 3-35 (949) 589-6338 u www.blaisassoc.com Page 1 FACT SHEET CalEMA Hazardous Materials Emergency Preparedness (HMEP) Funding  Information  and  Application  Requirements     FAST  FACTS     1  Application  Deadline  The  grant  deadline  has  been  extended  to  November  15,  2012  as   long  as  funds  are  available.         Application packages must be coordinated through the Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) for their approval and prioritization prior to Cal EMA acceptance.   2  Workshops  (if  any)  There  are  no  workshops  scheduled  at  this  time.   3  Eligible  Applicants  State  or  local  agencies  and  federally  recognized  tribal   governments.     Local  governments  are  defined  as,  "A  county,  municipality,  city,   town,  township,  local  public  authority  such  as  school  district,   special  district,  intrastate  district,  council  of  governments...any   other  regional  or  interstate  government  entity,  or  any  agency  or   instrumentality  of  a  local  government.”   4  Purpose  of  Program  For  public  sector  planning  and  training  in  support  of  the   emergency  planning  and  training  efforts  of  States,  Indian  tribes,   and  local  communities  to  deal  with  hazardous  materials   emergencies,  particularly  those  involving  transportation.   5  Success  Rate  Last  Year  15  Sub-­‐grant  applications  were  received  and  all  were  approved  for   funding.   6  Authorizing  Resolution  Required?  Not  stated  as  required.   FUNDING  INFORMATION     7  Total  Funds  Available  Not  available  at  this  time.  U.S.  DOT  Pipeline  &  Hazardous  Materials   Safety  Administration  (PHMSA)  sets  the  amount  of  funding  for   each  state  or  territory  and  approves  the  amount  of  the  award   allocated  to  the  State  of  California.    CA  received  $739,227  in   2011/2012  and  a  similar  funding  amount  is  expected  this  year.     8  High,  Low,  Average  Grant  Last  Year  High:  $64,000;  Average:  $26,588;  Low:  $4,000   9  Maximum  Funding  Request  There  is  no  stated  maximum   10  Local  Match  Required  20  percent  of  the  total  cost  of  the  approved  project  with  non-­‐ Federal  fund.   11  Funding  Cycle  Annual   PROJECT  INFORMATION     12  Examples  of  Funded  Projects  City  of  Anaheim  –  Area  Plan  Update:  Update  administrative   procedures;  integration  of  information  of  HazMat  Business  Plan;   update  personnel  training,  recordkeeping,  and  hazmat  response   3-36 (949) 589-6338 u www.blaisassoc.com Page 2 drills;  update  supplies  &  equipment  inventories;  update   emergency  response  procedures;  update  target  hazard  facilities   list;  and  update  hazmat  transportation  routes  &  alternatives.     $11,000.   Tulare  County  Environmental  Health  –  Area  Plan  Update:  Triennial   update  objectives  include:  Review  current  plan  to  identify  and   address  any  areas  needing  revision  and  to  maintain  consistency   with  the  parent  document  (County  EOP),  currently  under  revision.   $20,000.   L.A.  County  Fire  Department  -­‐  8-­‐Hr  Hwy  &  Rail  Emergency   Awareness  Program  &  HazMat  Emergency  Response  Plan   Evaluation:    Multi-­‐year  proposal  builds  on  previous  HMEP-­‐funded   activities  to  evaluate  &  update  the  HazMat  Emergency   Preparedness  Plan  (HMEPP).  This  year  will  finalize  development  of   an  8-­‐hr  Highway  and  Rail  Awareness  Program,  associated  with  the   HMEPP,  and  implement  delivery  to  all  department  BCs  and  HazMat   response  personnel.  Program  consists  of  a  4-­‐hr  classroom  module   and  a  4-­‐hr  hands-­‐on  field  exercise  module  at  Del  Valle  Training   site.  Conduct  annual  review  of  HMEPP.    $64,000.   13  Priorities    There  are  certain  geographical  areas  that  are  of  particular  concern,   especially  considering  transportation-­‐related  risks.   14  Eligible  Project  Types  • Project  MUST  be  HazMat  and  Transportation  related.   • Development,  improvement,  and  implementation  of   emergency  plans  required  under  the  EPCRA.     • Enhancement  of  emergency  plans,  including  hazards  analysis,   and  response  procedures  for  emergencies  involving   transportation  of  hazardous  materials,  including  radioactive   materials.     • An  assessment  to  determine  the  flow  patterns  of  hazardous   materials  within  the  state,  between  states  or  Native  American   lands,  and  development  and  maintenance  of  a  system  to  keep   such  information  current.     • An  assessment  of  the  need  for  regional  hazardous  materials   emergency  response  teams.     • An  assessment  of  local  response  capabilities.     • HazMat  emergency  response  drills  and  exercises  to  test   capabilities  and  identify  gaps  in  training  (Allowable  costs   include  planning  and  design,  participation,  evaluation,  and   after  action  review  costs.).   • Provision  of  technical  staff  to  support  the  planning  effort.     • Additional  activities  appropriate  to  implement  the  scope  of   work  for  the  proposed  project  plan  and  approved  in  the  grant   (these  activities  must  be  approved  by  Cal  EMA  before   initiated.).     15  Ineligible  Activities  • Cost  incurred  outside  the  performance  period.   • Equipment  purchases  –  Some  equipment  necessary  for  the   completion  of  allowable  project  activities  may  be  approved  on   a  case-­‐by-­‐case  basis,  but  will  likely  be  funded  at  less  than  80   3-37 (949) 589-6338 u www.blaisassoc.com Page 3 percent  of  the  total  cost.   • Overtime  wages  or  Call  Backs/Backfill     • Food  items     • Software  –  with  the  exception  of  CAMEO     • Weapons  of  Mass  Destruction  (WMD)  planning  or  exercise   activities     • All-­‐hazards  or  fixed-­‐facility  only  planning  or  exercise  activities     • Community  Emergency  Response  Team  (CERT),  Neighborhood   Watch,  and  other  community  planning  organization  activities     16  Project  Readiness  The  grant  performance  period  is  October  1  through  September  30.       HOW  TO  APPLY     17  Application  Requirements  • Application  Form   • Project  Narrative  (limited  to  two  pages)   • Designation  Statement   • Budget  Worksheet  and  Budget  Narrative   • Work  Schedule  and  Deliverables  Form   • Grant  Assurances   18  Submission  Requirements  Eligible  public  agencies  must  submit  their  planning  grant   applications  to  the  LEPCs  for  review,  prioritization,  and  approval.   HOW  APPLICATIONS  WILL  BE  SCORED     19  Evaluation  Criteria  and  Process  • Each  LEPC  is  responsible  for  evaluating,  approving  and   prioritizing  the  HMEP  Planning  sub-­‐grant  applications  from   within  their  region,  and  Cal  EMA  does  not  dictate  that  criteria.       • Once  Cal  EMA  receives  the  applications,  they  are  evaluated  to   determine  if  they  are  allowable,  reasonable,  and  allocable  to   the  HMEP  grant  program.   • Additionally,  the  project  is  evaluated  against  the  goals,   objectives,  and  planning  priorities  for  that  grant  cycle  and   whether  the  criteria  listed  on  the  application  forms’   instructions  have  been  met.     • Awards  are  expected  September  30,  2012.   WHO  TO  CONTACT   20  Agency  Cal  EMA   21  Contact  Name/Phone  Number  Neverley  Shoemake  at:  (916)  845-­‐8765  or   neverley.shoemake@calema.ca.gov     Contact  California  Specialized  Training  Institute  (CSTI)  Training   Grants  Coordinator  Susan  Kocher  at  (805)  549-­‐3534  for  HazMat   responder  training  information.   22  Web  Site  http://www.calema.ca.gov/HazardousMaterials/Pages/HMEP-­‐ Grant.aspx       3-38 E-mail from Janet Gunter with attached letter from Anthony Patchett to LA City Attorney Cooley (dated 9/4/12) 3-39 Cc: From: Sent: To: Page 1 of 1 Kit Fox Janet Gunter [arriane5@aol.com] Tuesday,September 04,2012 10:43 AM susanbrooks01@yahoo.com;Brian Campbell;Jim Knight;Jerry Duhovic;Kit Fox; jdear@carson.ca.us;myfrancisone@yahoo.com;mgipson@carson.ca.us; cc.gazeley@lomitacity.com;cc.estrada@lomitacity.com;cc.sanchez@lomitacity.com; cc.savidan@lomitacity.com;cc.traina@lomitacity.com;fscotto@torranceca.gov; gbarnett@torranceca.gov;tbrewer@torranceca.gov;pfurey@torranceca.gov; cnumark@torranceca.gov;srhilinger@torranceca.gov;bsutherland@torranceca.gov; sherbers@torranceca.gov;susans@ci.rolling-hills-estates.ca.us frankz@rolling-hills-estates.ca.us;judym@rolling-hills-estates.ca.us;johna@rolling-hills- estates.ca.us; stevez@rolling-hills-estates.ca.us;citycouncil.web@ci.gardena.ca.us; citycouncil@pvestates.org;district1@longbeach.gov;info@longbeach.gov; district4@longbeach.gov;district3@longbeach.gov; district5@longbeach.gov; district7@longbeach.gov;district6@longbeach.gov; district8@longbeach.gov; district9@longbeach.gov Subject:Fwd:Letter to Steve Cooley from our retired LA DA Prosecutor Pro Bono Atty,Anthony Patchett Attachments:Letter_to_Steve_Cooley-Sept_3_2012.pdf Atty Anthony Patchett is a wonderful man.Our homeowners are so grateful to have his assistance. The Rancho LPG storage facility in San Pedro has a worst case scenario of impact from an event at their facility (using the EPA calculation for total failure of all butane and propane tanks -25 million gals.of butane and 300,000 gallons of propane)of 10.5 miles.This facility suffers from unique vulnerable seismic conditions and assorted other opportunities for disaster from its antiquated 40 yr.old infrastructure and its attraction as a prime target of terrorism.It is the largest storage facility of its type in a densely populated area in the United States.This devastating potential would impact all bordering and adjacent municipalities of San Pedro including RPV,Rolling Hills,Palos Verdes Estates,Lomita,Torrance,Carson, Gardena,and Long Beach.Rancho LPG,a subsidiary of Plains All American Pipeline,carries a third party liability insurance coverage of $500,000,000.(according to LA City Atty Tom Russell)and is self insured. Please help in bringing attention to this extraordinary and unacceptable risk to all of those whose lives are at stake.An event at this facility could easily dwarf the disasters at San Bruno,the Gulf and even Fukushima. Thank you, Janet Gunter San Pedro Peninsula Homeowners United 10/8/2012 3-40 LAW OFFICES OF ANTHONY G.PATCHETT P.O.BOX 5232 Glendale,California 91221-1099 818-243-8863 Fax 818-243-9157 Email:mrenvirlaw@sbcglobal.net September 3,2012 Steve Cooley District Attorney Los Angeles County Clara Shortridge Foltz CCB 210 W Temple Street Suite 18-709 Los Angeles,California 90012 Stanley Williams Head Deputy District Attorney Consumer Protection Division 201 N Figueroa Street Suite 1200 Los Angeles,CA 90012 Fax 213-482-9420 RE:FOLLOW UP REQUEST FOR "ULTRAHAZARDOUS ACTIVITY"INJUNCTION RANCHO PLAINS LPG 25 MILLION GALLONS OF BUTANE AT PETROLANE STORAGE FACILITY,2011 N GAFFEY ST.SAN PEDRO Dear Steve and Stan, I have not heard anything from your office in some time regarding the status of your investigation of Rancho LPG. Christine Todd Whitman,former Governor of New Jersey and former head of the Environmental Protection Agency,wrote in the New York Times on August 29,2012,an article that fits Rancho LPG like a glove entitled "THE CHEMICAL THREAT TO AMERICA"."Since September 11,2001,the American Government,under two presidents,has taken unprecedented steps to ensure the safety of its citizens.Unfortunately,more than a decade later,a major flaw in our national security remains,leaVing millions of Americans at risk.It's a flaw that policy makers have known for years but not done enough to fix." "Fortunately,The Clean Air Act does not contain any of these limitations or loopholes.It obligates facilities handling the most dangerous chemicals to prevent catastrophic releases to surrounding communities.This could allow the E.P.A.to require chemical facilities at risk of attack to switch to safer alternatives best suited those individual plants'needs." "It would not take an elaborate plot by AI Qaeda to endanger many lives.In the past few years,we have seen too many accidents,homegrown incidents and numerous warnings from the Department of Homeland Security.We've got to draw the line." Carl Southwell,USC doctoral candidate,has written the most compelling evaluation of Rancho LPG: "IN MY BACK YARD:A CASE STUDY OF INSTITUTIONAL OBDURACY IN THE FACE OF PUBLIC SAFETY OR A CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS OF A TERRORIST ATTACK ON THE RANCHO LPG FACILITY. Footnote 5:"This area lies in a well-documented area of ~<:i:~mic activit).An earthquake similar to the recent Christchurch temblor (Le.,near the surface,long duration,approx.6.3 magnitude)would be both consistent with the Long Beach Earthquake of 1933 and could collapse the Rancho LPG butane tanks.In the event of such an earthquake-induced collapse,a huge pool fire would probably ensure,but the severity from the facility collapse alone relative to the terrorism event outlined in this report would probably be smaller.However,it should also be noted that,due to simultaneous and/or cascading effects of an earthquake (and perhaps a following tsunami)(Le.,the Naval Depot tanks might collapse, the COl1ocoPhillips refinery might have numerous failures),a catastrophic fire greater in scope that the event outlined in this report could occur."The Japanese events,of course, make this even more prescient. Professor Southwell's conclusion,"the facility should be condemned,and,ifthere is a continued need for such a facility,it 1 3-41 should be situated in a more appropriate location after a thorough and complete environmental review". A University of Southern California study,which appears in the April '05 edition of Civil Engineering magazine,finds that the potential damage from a tsunami in Southern California could range from $7 billion to as much as $42 billion. The report was the first attempt to calculate possible losses from tsunamis,as opposed to earthquakes,in the Southern California area.Entitled 'Could it happen here?'the article builds on research by Jose Borrero,assistant research professor of civil engineering,and Costas Synolakis,professor of civil engineering,at the USC Viterbi School of Engineering regarding tsunamis caused by underwater landslides in unstable sediments off Palos Verdes peninsula.Synolakis is director of the USC Viterbi School Center for Tsunami Research.A tsunami in this area could inundate Terminal Island and much of the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach,as well as producing substantial run-up on Orange County beach cities,with maximum waves arriving only one minute after the slide.Municipalities potentially affected include Carson,Long Beach,Wilmington/San Pedro,Palos Verdes Estates and Rancho Palos Verdes,Seal Beach,Westminster,Garden Grove,Huntington Beach,Hawaiian Gardens,and unincorporated areas of Los Angeles and Orange Counties. The study uses methodology co-created by one of the authors,Harry W.Richardson,who holds the James Irvine Chair in Urban and Regional Planning at the USC School of Policy,Planning and Development,with a PPD colleague,Professor Peter Gordon. This scheme breaks down Southern California into 308 zones,whose individual contribution to the area's economy is noted in detail,along with their economic connections to other zones. Researchers used an improved version of the system,called the Southern California Planning Model,to incorporate effects caused by damage to the highway system. James Moore II,who is a professor of Industrial and Systems Engineering,Civil Engineering and Public Policy and Management at the Viterbi School,worked with Richardson on the application of the model to a tsunami."We have not attempted to account for the cost of fatalities in our estimates,"said Moore."We chose not to model fatalities because we were being deliberately conservative,and because we wanted to avoid contentious assumptions about the economic value of life."Moore noted that "the Papua New Guinea tsunami of I 998 was generated by a mechanism similar to the one modeled here,and that event cost over 2,000 lives.The toll here could be much higher." The study assumed four possible scenarios,of increasing severity.In scenario one,losses were confined to inundated areas,with no freeway links closed,and no crippling damage to the ports of Los Angeles/Long Beach.The following three scenarios assumed escalating problems,with a worst case being closure of critical freeway links and the ports for one year,forcing the shipment of $83 billion in exports now going through these facilities elsewhere. The study also breaks down direct losses by municipality,with Long Beach suffering some $3.6 billion in damage,by far the largest for any single city. The authors note that these losses,significant as they are,would be only a part of a general picture of damage.The most likely trigger of a landslide off Palos Verdes would be a large earthquake -which itself would produce billions in damage."However, it is important to remember that these tsunami costs would be incurred in addition to earthquake costs," "LPG is such a powerful explosive that it is used by the Defense Department in concussion bombs.These weapons were employed in Vietnam to create,among other things,instant helicopter pads in the jungle. Another Los Angeles Times article by Bryce Nelson stated:"the GAO argues that a serious earthquake,flood or terrorist attack could cause a tank holding liquefied gas to rupture and that the gas that would then vaporize could explode." The report asserts that "the closest analogy to this may be the large World War II bombing raids.The total energy in the bombs dropped in the 1945 raid on Tokyo,which killed 83,000 people and destroyed more than 250,000 dwellings,was about 1%of the energy for one large liquefied gas storage tank,"the report saysooThe report makes several recommendations for national safety policy on LNG and other liquefied energy gases such as propane and butane. There should be no new large storage facilities built in urban areas and no expansion of present facilities. 2 Any new large storage facilities built in remote areas should be built "in ground with the highest level of fluid below ground level. 3 Liquefied energy gas tanks in populated areas should be built and operated under the same standards as nuclear plants. 4 Liquefied energy gases "should not be moved through urban areas if there is any other way to deliver the material." 2 3-42 5 "A much more equitable system is needed to assign liability and compensate victims"after a liquefied gas accident. Under the present law,the report said,injured parties could not be fully compensated after a severe accident. "The GAO investigators concluded that no equipment could put out a very large liquefied gas fire and that liquefied energy gas and naphtha facilities have virtually no protection against saboteurs." CALCULATIONS BY CONNIE RUTIER (Retired oil refinery consultant) The Rancho facility has the following capacities:two refrigerated tanks with capacity to store 12.6 million gallons of butane each,for a total of 25.2 million gallons of butane storage.(There are 42 gal/bbl,so 25,200,000 gal x bbl/42 gal =600,000 bbl. Butane weighs 4.8Ib/gal (National Fire Protection Association 58 Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code)so the weight of butane in one tank is (12,600,000 gal x 4.8 Ib/gal)60,480,000 Ibs.or (60,480,000 x ton/2000 Ibs)30,240 tons.The butane in both tanks would be 121,000,000 Ibs or 60,480 tons. The propane is stored in five pressurized tanks of 60,000 gal.each,so the maximum propane stored would be 300,000 gal. Propane weighs 4.2 Ibs/gal (NFPA 58),so there is capacity for (300,000 gal x 4.2 Ib/gal)1.260,000 Ibs of propane. Both gases are very volatile,since they exist as gases at room temperature and can only be liquefied for ease in handling by subjecting them to increased pressure and/or cooling them below their boiling points.At the Rancho facility butane is refrigerated at 28°F;its boiling point is 31°F.(Refrigeration is created by storing the butane in insulated tanks,and taking suction from the top of the tank through three compressors,fueled by natural gas,compressing the gas and then allOWing it to expand again,and therefore drop in temperature,liquefy as a result,and return to the tank.This is described as 'self- refrigeration.') If butane is released,it will pick up heat from the surrounding soil and air,and qUickly evaporate.When it evaporates,it increases 230 times in volume,creating a type of non-flammable explosion,called a vapor cloud.This vapor is heavier than air, (2.0 times as heavy from NFPA 58)and so would not disperse and mix with air easily,as liquid natural gas (LNG)would tend to do,but would tend to flow,invisibly,responding to gravity.However,butane would mix gradually with air at the butane/air interface,until it reaches its limits of flammability.(These are 1.55 %butane in air at the low end and 8.60 %at the upper end.) If the butane/air mixture finds a source of ignition,and there are five sources of ignition on site in the three compressors,a heater,and a flare,it will explode a second time,creating a fireball this time.Both types of explosions can cause injury and death and massive property damage.Other possible sources of ignition are the car engines passing on Gaffey Street or Westmoreland,a cigarette or even a static charge. Propane boils at -44°F (NFPA 58)-that's 44°F below zero.At Rancho,propane is stored under pressure at ambient temperature.If it is released,it will rapidly flash to a vapor,and expand 270 times its original volume (NFPA 58).It will also create an initial explosive vapor cloud,which will seek an ignition source,and then explode a second time,creating a fiery explosion this time. There is some confusion over the term BLEVE,or boiling liquid-expanding vapor explosion.This term is applied by the experts to the phenomenon when a pressurized vessel,like the propane tanks,through some accident like an external fire,or damage to the vessel or its piping,leads to boiling or vaporizing within the vessel and then causes an explosion which rips the tank apart. Sometimes,if the hole created by the explosion is on an end of a horizontal tank,the entire vessel will act like a jet plane and cause the vessel to be shot off in its horizontal direction.So,strictly speaking,BLEVE occurs only in pressure vessels. However,the creation of an explosive vapor cloud occurs when LPG is released and allowed to warm or to come to atmospheric pressure.(There has been some word games played,when Rancho personnel have testified that the butane tanks can't undergo a BLEVE.However,an LPG release will most certainlv boil rapidly;expand greatly to form an extremely flammable vapor cloud,which will most probably result in a second fiery explosion.Both explosions can cause great damage. Estimate of extent of damage The EPA (Environmental Protection Agency)in its Guidance to its Risk Management Plan regulations (40 CFR 68)sets forth how the risk is to be calculated,so that all sources are ranked by the same parameters.For flammable sources like butane and 3 3-43 propane,to quantify a 'Worst Case Analysis:~ompanies are required to use a calculation which relates the probable damage to an equivalent amount of TNT (Tri-nitro-toluene.)Companies which have a 'passive mitigation'system (in the case of Rancho, an impound basin,designed to hold the liquid contents of one tank)are allowed to take a 90%reduction credit,apparently assuming that the contents of the impound basin will not evaporate instantly.But companies are required to assume that the largest tank which would flow into the impound basin empties completely.Companies are also allowed to reduce the total weight by some amount,if there are 'administrative'procedures in place which would preclude the tank from filling to its capacity. In Rancho's case they reduced the total weight from 60,480,000 Ibs to 57,000,000 Ibs,and designated that amount to be how much butane would be released.Then,inexplicably,they reported the 'distance to the endpoint'of 1 psi (pound per square inch),which is specified in the Guidance,as 0.50 miles and the 'residential population'within that distance as 772. The actual calculation for the EPA-designated 'worst case'should have been calculated according to formula C-2,given in Appendix C of the Guidance,"RMP Offsite Consequence Analysis Guidance,May 1996."The formula in miles is: Distance (mi)=0.0081 (conv.factor)x (0.1 *x pounds released x ratio of heats of combustion,butane to TNT)cube root. *90%reduction for 'passive mitigation:the impound basin Substituting, Mi =0.0081 x (0.1 x 57,000,000 x 45719 Kj/Kg/4680 Kj/Kg ),,(1/3) This calculation gives the distance to the 1 psi endpoint,required by the Guidance,as 3 miles,not Y,mile.Three miles reaches just about to the Terminal Island Freeway on the east,and involves most of the LA Port and part of the Long Beach Port.Since three miles is a radius,that is,it forms a circular area around the site,the area affected is greatly increased from (0.5 2 x 3.1416 (pi)or)0.8 sq.mi.to (3 2 x 3.1416 or)28 sq.mi. Since the residents were estimated as 772 under the incorrect affected area of 0.8 sq.mi.using a simple ratio of 772/0.8 = x/28,the more correct residential count is 27,000.This is only an estimate,because part of the more correct area would be over the ocean. The 3 mile radius is the value that should have been reported in Rancho's RMP.But that doesn't tell the full story.If a tank were to release all its contents,and if the other tanks were full,the total volume at the terminal would be released,since it is extremely likely,almost certain,that a fire would occur,and that that fire would compromise the other tanks at the facility. These fires can't really be extinguished.For heavier hydrocarbons,foam is used to float on the flammable liquid and cut off the oxygen,and quench the fire.But using foam on liquid butane or propane is not advised by the API (American Petroleum Institute),because it would hasten vaporization and therefore burn faster. The actual radius would be: For butane: Miles =0.0081 x (121,000,000 Ibs x 45719/4680 Kg/Kj),,1/3 or 8.6 Miles! For propane: Miles =0.0081 x (1,260,000 Ibs.x 46333/4680 Kg/Kj)"1/3 or 1.9 Miles! So,the combined blast radius would be 10.5 Miles! In these calculations,the effect of the impound basin is not included,because it is assumed that the entire contents of all the tanks would be released,due to explosions and fires.This is a maximum case,because it assumes that all the tanks are at 4 3-44 capacity,which would be very unlikely.Nevertheless,it would be more than the three miles given in the correct calculation of the 'worst-case'analysis,and very much more than the half mile reported to the EPA and to the public on several occasions. The attached Google Satellite photo shows a 10 mile radius around Rancho LPG including the ocean canyon drop off adjacent to the west coast of the Palos Verdes peninsula.Any major incident at Rancho LPG could cause untold devastation to the entire peninsula. CEQA regulations were violated when this facility was constructed.Bad behavior should not be grandfathered or rewarded. I have reviewed the Final Environmental Impact Report;Harbor Commission Board Order 4579, "Council finds the subject project is categoricallv exempted in accordance with the California Environmental Quality Act or 1970 and the City's Guidelines";Permit Order 263,Revocable Permit 1212 dated December 3,1974;Revocable Permit #10-05 dated February 15,2011,Carmen Trutanich,City Attorney,by Heather M.McCloskey,Deputy City Attorney. I believe the Los Angeles City Attorney's Office has a conflict of interest in reviewing this matter as an ultra hazardous activity. CITY OF LOS ANGELES ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT GUIDELINE General Rule and General Exemption. "These Guidelines apply generally to discretionary actions by City agencies which may have a significant effect on the environment.However,where it can be seen with certainty that there is no possibility that the activity in question may have a significant effect on the environment,the activity is not covered by CEQA and these Guidelines do not apply. Exempt Activities. The following activities are exempt from the requirements of CEQA and these Guidelines: a.Emergency projects,such as: I)Projects undertaken,carried out,or approved by a City agency to maintain,repair,restore,demolish or replace property or facilities damaged or destroyed as a result of a disaster in a disaster-stricken area." This was no emergency project nor do any of the listed exemptions apply to this facility.This was gross error for the City of Los Angeles to exempt this facility from following the CEQA Guidelines and has exposed the residents of Los Angeles County to a potential disaster of a catastrophic degree. How the Mayor,City Attorney,City Council,Port of Los Angeles,Harbor Commission and other government workers could think this facility does not have a significant impact on the environment is beyond belief? The EIR for this facility is the perfect example of the art of deception and omission. In reading the EIR and reviewing the drawings,one would think this facility is surrounded by oil refineries in a non-residential area. The biggest fear in the EIR appears to be plant life.No mention is made what will happen to people."Extensive spills would decimate the area through rapid cooling of the water,killing all communities in the immediate and probably adjacent areas.They would also present an extreme fire hazard.It is essential that precautions be taken against this sort of accident.Even extensive kills,however,would have a very short-lived effect on the animal communities of the area".(Environmental Impact Report for Petrolane Corporation June 5,1973) This facility carries a $300,000 policy liability coverage. The worst case scenario could result in billions of dollars of loss.Is the City of Los Angeles also liable for any damages since they illegally permitted the facility and receive permit fees? 5 3-45 Does the County of Los Angeles have the capability to cover the potential multi-billion dollar loss? The threat is real.Home Depot parking lot is at the bottom of the hill from Rancho LPG. I again sincerely request your office seek an Injunction against Rancho Plains LPG as an "Ultra hazardous Activity". 1.Existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person,land,or chattel of others; 2.Likelihood that the harm that results will be greot; 3.Extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; 4.Inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; 5.Inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried out; 6.Extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes. The essential question is whether the risk created is so unusual,either because of its magnitude or because of the circumstances surrounding it,as to justify the imposition of strict liability from the harm that results,even though it is carried on with all the reasonable care. DAMAGES There has never been any disclosure by real estate brokers to buyers that Rancho LPG stores 25 million gallons of butane on a site that is a known liquefaction,landslide,and tsunami zone.Butane bums hotter than other fuels. Rancho LPG's position states they are not in a liquefaction zone.However,the State Seismic Hazard Report of2009 clearly refutes this misstatement. A disclosure would result in a decline of value of homes within a radius of 10 miles (BLEVE distance). Notice should be given to future prospective buyers of the potential devastation of the entire surrounding community by an explosion at Rancho LPG's facility by a severe earthquake,tsunami or terrorist attack. Damages would be the loss in value of any real estate in the area caused by the disclosure of the above San Pedro and its harbor are more of a terrorist target than most cities in the United States.With its multitude of refineries, chemical storage,pipelines,fault zones and landslide zones,the recipe for a disaster looms precariously on the horizon. What does your Office intend to do?What harm would there be in seeking an Injunction in Superior Court?The elements of an Ultra hazardous activity are clearly satisfied. Sincerely,p~~onyG.atc ~ CC:Michael Karzas,60 Minutes,Dan Weikel LA Times 6 3-46 "~i-:r.l.:~v.-:li}'I·v ~'"''''''~'''''~.~•".•-.'.J ,.C,'·-:·'l·';·'$v~'-"_.1_,'..._,_"...\...:,\....,.~._..._~__....,,-..~.J'4I'...~~~....~...'-A'......""Sti-.::~.....,3-47 ---------- 9/3/12 August 29,2012 The E.P.A.Can Fix the Chemical Flaw -NYTimes.com ',BEASTS l..'f ••,~ SOliTHEKN •WILD .., The Chentical Threat to Anterica By CHRISTINE TODD WHITMAN SINCE Sept.11,2001,the American government,under two presidents,has taken unprecedented steps to ensure the safety of its citizens.Unfortunately,more than a decade later,a major flaw in our national security remains,leaving millions of Americans at risk.It's a flaw that policy makers have known about for years but not yet done enough to fix. Hundreds of chemical plants and other facilities maintain large stockpiles of dangerous substances and are in or near major American cities like New York,Los Angeles and Chicago,as well as many smaller but no less important towns.According to the Environmental Protection Agency,a deliberate release of these chemicals at just one of these plants could threaten the health and lives of hundreds of thousands of people. In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks,there was bipartisan support for addressing the vulnerabilities posed by these chemicals.After all,even small chemical accidents involving poison gas can result in the evacuation of an entire community,As the head of the E.P .A.at the time,I knew what could happen,if a terrorist were to target a chlorine gas facility, to the hundreds of thousands of people living downwind.This knowledge spurred the agency to take action. We considered using existing authority in the Clean Air Act to reduce the vulnerability of chemical facilities to acts of terrorism,primarily by requiring facilities to evaluate the use of safer chemicals and processes.After considerable internal discussion,however,we decided that the best way forward was to enact legislation that would give the E.P .A.additional authority to do so.Unfortunately,and much to my frustration,after a long,multiagency effort,the White House declined to endorse a draft bill,and Congress did not act on its own. This has now become a la-year battle.Today,Congress is hopelessly gridlocked on extending the inadequate homeland security appropriations statute that currently regulates the industry. And yet I am encouraged,because the E.P A.,under its current administrator ~ is once again seriously considering addressing chemical facility security.In Me ~ III Environmental Justice Advisory Council urged the agency to "use its authorit~z Clean Air Act ...to reduce or eliminate these catastrophic risks."This is the ri! www.nytimes.com/2012/08/30/opinion/the-epa-can-fix-the-chemical-flaw.html?pa gewanted =print MORE IN OPI Opiniol1 Praise 0 Read rvlore ) 1/3 3-48 9/3/12 The E.P.A.Can Fix the Chemical Flaw -NYTimes.com and it is a step that the E.P .A.could take right now.All the agency needs is the support from President Obama to use its Clean Air Act authority. The conventional wisdom in an election year is that nothing will get done until after the election. I believe,however,that the current administration,which is on record supporting these disaster prevention policies in the context of security legislation,must not wait any longer. Reducing the vulnerability of these facilities to terrorism is not about politics -it's about public safety. The current chemical security statute is inadequate to the task.The policy bars the Department of Homeland Security from requiring some specific security measures,like the use of safer chemical processes,and exempts thousands of dangerous chemical facilities,including all water treatment plants and refineries located on navigable waters,from complying with even the weakest security measures.Since 2009,both the E.P .A.and the D.H.S.have been asking Congress for authority to require safer chemical processes and eliminate these wholesale exemptions. Fortunately,the Clean Air Act does not contain any of those limitations or loopholes.It obligates facilities handling the most dangerous chemicals to prevent catastrophic releases to surrounding communities.This could allow the E.P .A.to require chemical facilities at risk of attack to switch to safer alternatives best suited those individual plants'needs. These alternatives are widely available and cost-effective,and some facilities have made these changes already.Soon after 9/11,Washington's wastewater treatment plant converted from chlorine gas to safer liquid bleach.Several other water treatment plants have switched from sulfur dioxide gas to liquid bleach and sodium bisulfite.Most recently,the Clorox Company converted its facilities in the United States from chlorine gas to liquid bleach as well.In California,several power plants made the transition from ammonia gas to liquid ammonia. Taken together,all of these plants have eliminated risks to millions of Americans.Now we need to promote the use of such safer alternatives nationwide,to eliminate catastrophic risks and make our chemical facilities less attractive terrorist targets. It would not take an elaborate plot by AI Qaeda to endanger many lives.In the past few years, we have already seen too many accidents,homegrown incidents and numerous warnings from the Department of Homeland Security.We've got to draw the line.It's both good policy and good politics for the Obama administration to act to secure the nation's chemical plants now. Christine Todd H'lzitnwl1,aformer governor ofNew Jersey and head of the Environmental Protection Agency,is a consultant on energy and environmental issues. www.nytimes.com/2012/08/30/opinion/the-epa-can-fix-the-chemical-flaw.html?pagewanted=print 2/3 3-49 E-mail from Janet Gunter regarding CalEMA grant opportunity (dated 9/4/12) 3-50 Kit Fox From:Janet Gunter [arriane5@aol.com] Sent:Tuesday,September 04,201210:23 PM To:Kit Fox;Allison.Becker@lacity.org;Jacob.Haik@lacity.org Cc:diananave@gmail.com;jgreenwood@coro.org;jody.james@sbcglobal.net;det310@juno.com; MrEnvirlaw@sbcglobal.net;connie@rutter.us;igornla@cox.net Subject:Re:Possible Grant Funding related to Rancho LPG Facility Thank you Kit.Yes...we should definitely go for this.There are multiple ways in which to approach this....and I believe that it should not just be the San Pedro residents ....but,all potentially affected.I think there should be a multifaceted approach to this.Certainly,the "risk analysis"as per a University and/or Cal Tech ...but,also a professional appraisal of property values when disclosure of hazard (as warranted) is given due to elevated risk potential That appraisal is critical to showing damages to those within the blast radius of the facility.Remember that we have the actual calculation for establishing risk/blast radius with the EPA's set formula.That formula gives a result from a single tank rupture at Rancho at 3 miles. So,the base line for impact starts there. Thanks for passing along the message ...but,I think that multiple municipalities should form a coalition in applying for the,grant.I've never applied for a grant before,but,Ms.Rutter has.So,perhaps Connie could advise? JG -----Original Message----- From:Kit Fox <KitF@rpv.com> To:Allison.Becker <Allison.Becker@lacity.org>;Jacob.Haik <Jacob.Haik@lacity,org> Cc:Diana Nave <diananave@gmail.com>;John Greenwood <jgreenwood@coro.org>;Jody James <jody.james@sbcglobal.net>;Janet Gunter <arriane5@aol.com> Sent:Tue,Sep 4,2012 10:21 am Subject:Possible Grant Funding related to Rancho LPG Facility All: The City of Rancho Palos Verdes'grant consultant has recently brought to our attention an opportunity for CalEMA Hazardpus Materials Emergency Preparedness (HMEP)grants for "public sector planning and training in support of the emergency planning and training efforts of...Iocal communities to deal with hazardous materials emergencies,particularly those involving transportation."Funding is provided by the U.S.Department of Transportation Pipeline &Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA).The attached fact sheet prepared by our grant consultant includes more details and contact information about this grant opportunity. It occurs to us that these grant funds might be of some value in dealing with community concerns regarding the Rancho LPG facility on North Gaffey Street in San Pedro.The application deadline is November 15,2012.If you have questions,please refer to the contact information on the third page of the attached fact sheet.Please do not contact the City of Rancho Palos Verdes'grant consultant with questions about this grant opportunity. Sincerely, Kit Fox,AIcr Senior Administrative AnallJst City Manager's Office City o£Rancho Palos Verdes 30940 Iiawthorne Blvd. Rancho Palos Verdes,CA 90'275 T:(310)544-5226 f:(310)544-5291 1::ka£@rpv.com 10/8/2012 Page 1 of 1 3-51 E-mail from Janet Gunter with attached Contra Costa County Risk Management ordinance and SEC filing information for Plains All-American (dated 9/8/12) 3-52 Page 1 of 1 Kit Fox From: Sent: To: Janet Gunter [arriane5@aol.com] Saturday,September 08,20125:00 PM susanbrooks01 @yahoo.com;Jim Knight;Jerry Duhovic;Brian Campbell;Kit Fox;Anthony Misetich Subject:Risk Management Model....and SEC filing of Rancho Plains relative to liability .etc... Attachments:Contra_Costa_County-Risk_Management_Ordinance.pdf Hi Councilmembers- We just received excerpts from the Security &Exchange Commission from Plains/Rancho filings.I will be forwarding those to you in increments.Attached in this email is the Risk Management Ordinance from Contra Costa county.This is a great model for us to follow....and an effort should be started with the LA County Board of Supervisors to impose such an ordinance.With other municipalities within the County pushing forward with this ...it would create a dual track that would push LA City to get moving. Meanwhile,the Harbor Dept.should revoke the rail spur permit until Rancho (All Plains)comes up with an appropriate-level of insurance to adequately compensate the City,and the sur:rounding property owners &municipalities from any damages occasioned by an accident at the facility.The 1O-K from Plains All-American (excerpts enclosed or to follow)indicates that there is insufficient insurance to cover any loss ....They say they are self-insured;however,the structure of the company is such that it appears they are over-leveraged,with the assets of each operating unit pledged as collateral for what appears to be a seriously overleveraged company.Worse still,the various operating entities are not self- contained ...So a serious problem anywhere in the system equates to a serious problem everywhere. We hope that the cumulative approach to this problem results in an action that will substantially reduce our risk exposure.There are a lot of people counting on us.People are largely in the dark about this ...but,since we know...it is our obligation to take care of this before the catastrophe.At least that is how we see it.We hope you do too. Best to you all, Janet G ps.I will send the files in increments. 10/8/2012 3-53 CONTRA COSTA COUNTY CODE Chapter 450-8 - RISK MANAGEMENT Sections: 450-8.002 - Background and findings. 450-8.004 - Purpose and goals. 450-8.006 - Authority. 450-8.008 - Administration. 450-8.010 - Applicability. 450-8.012 - Inspection. 450-8.014 - Definitions. 450-8.016 - Stationary source safety requirements. 450-8.018 - Review, audit and inspection. 450-8.020 - Trade secret. 450-8.022 - Hazardous materials ombudsperson. 450-8.024 - Public information bank. 450-8.026 - Fees. 450-8.028 - Penalties. 450-8.030 - Annual performance review and evaluation. 450-8.032 - Construction. 450-8.002 - Background and findings. The board of supervisors of Contra Costa County finds as follows: (a) Recent incidents in Contra Costa County at industrial chemical, petrochemical, and oil industry facilities have prompted the consideration of reviews, inspections, and audits that supplement existing federal and state safety programs and the imposition of additional safety measures to protect public health and safety from accidental releases. (b) Section 112(r)(7) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C.A. Section 7412(4)) required the Federal Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to promulgate the rule known as the "Risk Management Program," which is intended to prevent accidental releases of 3-54 regulated substances, as defined in the federal program, and reduce the severity of those releases that do occur. All facilities subject to this federal regulation must prepare a risk management plan (RMP) based on a risk management program established at the facility, that includes a hazard assessment of the facility, an accidental release prevention program, and an emergency response program (40 CFR Section 68). The facility must submit the Federal RMP to the EPA by June 21, 1999 (40 CFR Section 68-150-68.185). The federal RMP will be available to state and local government and the public. (c) The California Health and Safety Code Article 2 (Section 25531 et seq.) of Chapter 6.95 was amended effective January 1, 1997 to implement the federal EPA's risk management program rule with certain state-specific amendments. The state's risk management program is known as the California Accidental Release Prevention (CalARP) Program. (d) The county recognizes that regulatory requirements alone will not guarantee public health and safety, and that the public is a key stakeholder in chemical accident prevention, preparedness, and response at the local level. Preventing accidental releases of regulated substances is the shared responsibility of industry, government and the public. TThhee ffiirrsstt sstteeppss ttoowwaarrdd aacccciiddeenntt pprreevveennttiioonn aarree iiddeennttiiffyyiinngg tthhee hhaazzaarrddss aanndd aasssseessssiinngg tthhee rriisskkss.. OOnnccee iinnffoorrmmaattiioonn aabboouutt cchheemmiiccaall hhaazzaarrddss iinn tthhee ccoommmmuunniittyy iiss ooppeennllyy sshhaarreedd,, iinndduussttrryy,, ggoovveerrnnmmeenntt,, aanndd tthhee ccoommmmuunniittyy ccaann wwoorrkk ttooggeetthheerr ttoowwaarrddss rreedduucciinngg tthhee rriisskk ttoo ppuubblliicc hheeaalltthh aanndd ssaaffeettyy. (e) The success of a safety program is dependent upon the cooperation of industrial chemical and oil refining facilities within Contra Costa County. The public must be assured that measures necessary to prevent incidents are being implemented, including changes or actions required by the department or the stationary source that are necessary to comply with this chapter. (Ord. 98-48 § 2). 450-8.004 - Purpose and goals. (a) The purpose of this chapter is to impose regulations which improve industrial safety by: (1) Requiring the conduct of process hazard analyses for covered processes handling hazardous materials not covered by the federal or state accidental release prevention programs; (2) Requiring the review of action items resulting from process hazard analyses and requiring completion of those action items selected by the stationary source for implementation within a reasonable time frame; (3) Requiring the review of accidental release prevention efforts of stationary sources and providing for the conduct of investigations and analyses for the determination of the root cause for certain incidents; 3-55 (4) Providing review, inspection, auditing and safety requirements that are more stringent than those required in existing law and regulations; (5) Providing for public input into the safety plan and safety program and public review of any inspection and audit results; (6) Facilitating cooperation between industry, the county, and the public in the prevention and reduction of incidents at stationary sources; (7) Expanding the application of certain provisions of the federal and state accidental release prevention programs to processes not covered by the federal or state accidental release prevention programs; (8) Verifying that an approved security and vulnerability study is performed, and that the recommendations are addressed within a reasonable time frame; (9) Requiring the development and implementation of a written human factors program; and (10) Preventing and reducing the number, frequency, and severity of accidental releases in the county. (Ords. 2006-22 § 2, 98-48 § 2). 450-8.006 - Authority. The ordinance codified in this chapter is adopted by the county pursuant to its police power for the purposes of protecting public health and safety by prevention of accidental releases of hazardous materials and to assure protection of the environment. (Ord. 98-48 § 2). 450-8.008 - Administration. The department is charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing this chapter. (Ord. 98-48 § 2). 450-8.010 - Applicability. (a) This chapter shall apply to stationary sources except that: (b) The following are exempt from the provisions of this chapter except Sections 450- 8.016(c) and (e), and 450-8.018(f) and (g): (1) Storage tanks containing a nonregulated substance, except for storage tanks that contain a material that has a flashpoint above one hundred forty-one degrees Fahrenheit and below two hundred degrees Fahrenheit in accordance with the definition of combustible liquid in 49 CFR 173.120(b); 3-56 (2) Drum storage of: (A) a nonregulated substance; (B) less than ten thousand pounds of a hazard category B material located such that the drums could reasonably be expected to be involved in a single release; and (C) a hazard category A material, located such that the drums could reasonably be expected to be involved in a single release, at less than the quantity specified as the threshold planning quantity on the extremely hazardous substances list (Appendix A to 40 CFR Chapter I, Subchapter J, Part 355, as amended from time to time) or five hundred pounds, whichever is less; (3) Activities in process plant laboratories or laboratories that are under the supervision of a technically qualified individual as defined in Section 720.3(ee) of 40 CFR. This exemption does not apply to specialty chemical production; manufacture, processing or use of substances in pilot plant scale operations; and activities conducted outside the laboratory; (4) Utilities, except for fuel gas and natural gas systems to the battery limits of a process unit; and (5) Any waste tanks, containers or other devices subject to the federal and state hazardous waste laws, including the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 40 CFR Chapter I, Subchapter I, commencing with Part 260, the California Hazardous Waste Control Law, California Health and Safety Code, commencing with Section 25100 and the California Code of Regulations, Title 22 Division 4.5 Environmental Health Standards for the Management of Hazardous Waste. (Ords. 2006-22 § 3, 98-48 § 2). 450-8.012 - Inspection. The department shall be allowed reasonable access to any part of the stationary source subject to the requirements of this chapter, Sections 450-8.016 and 450-8.018 and to supporting documentation retained by the source for the purpose of determining compliance with this chapter. (Ord. 98-48 § 2). 450-8.014 - Definitions. For purposes of this chapter, the definitions set forth in this section shall apply. Words used in this chapter not defined in this section shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Clean Air Act Regulations (40 CFR Section 68.3) and in California Health and Safety Code Article 2 (Section 25531 et seq.) of Chapter 6.95, unless the context indicates otherwise. (a) "Covered process" means any process at a stationary source. (b) "Department" means the Contra Costa County health services director and any director authorized deputies. 3-57 (c) "Feasible" means capable of being accomplished in a successful manner within a reasonable period of time, taking into account economic, environmental, legal, social, and technological factors. (d) "Hazard category A materials" are substances which meet the hazard category A material definition as set forth in Section 84-63.1016 of this code. (e) "Hazard category B materials" are substances which meet the hazard category B material definition as set forth in Section 84-63.1016 of this code. (f) "Industry codes, standards, and guidelines" means the edition of the codes, standards, and guidelines in effect at the time of original design or construction for the design, construction, alteration, maintenance or repair of process units, industrial equipment, or other industrial facilities, structures or buildings published by, but not limited to, the American Petroleum Institute (API), the American Chemistry Council (ACC), the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) or the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), and meets recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP). (g) "Inherently safer systems" means "inherently safer design strategies" as discussed in the latest edition of the Center for Chemical Process Safety Publication "Inherently Safer Chemical Processes," and means feasible alternative equipment, processes, materials, lay- outs, and procedures meant to eliminate, minimize, or reduce the risk of a major chemical accident or release by modifying a process rather than adding external layers of protection. Examples include, but are not limited to, substitution of materials with lower vapor pressure, lower flammability, or lower toxicity; isolation of hazardous processes; and use of processes which operate at lower temperatures and/or pressures. (h) "Major chemical accident or release" means an incident that meets the definition of a level 3 or level 2 incident in the community warning system incident level classification system defined in the hazardous materials incident notification policy, as determined by the department; or results in the release of a regulated substance and meets one or more of the following criteria: (1) Results in one or more fatalities; (2) Results in greater than twenty-four hours of hospital treatment of three or more persons; (3) Causes on- and/or off-site property damage (including clean-up and restoration activities) initially estimated at five hundred thousand dollars or more. On-site estimates shall be performed by the stationary source. Off-site estimates shall be performed by appropriate agencies and compiled by the department; (4) Results in a vapor cloud of flammables and/or combustibles that is more than five thousand pounds. (i) "Regulated substance" means (1) any chemical substance which satisfies the provisions of California Health and Safety Code Section 25532(g), as amended from time 3-58 to time, or (2) a substance which satisfies the provisions of hazard categories A or B in Section 84-63.1016 of this code. Mixtures containing less than one percent of a regulated substance shall not be considered in the determination of the presence of a regulated material. (j) "Risk management program" means the documentation, development, implementation, and integration of management systems by the facility to comply with the regulations set forth in 40 CFR, Part 68 and the California Health and Safety Code, Article 2, commencing with Section 25531. (k) "RMP" means the risk management plan required to be submitted pursuant to the requirements of the 40 CFR Section 68.150-68.185 and the California Health and Safety Code Article 2 (Section 25531 et seq.) of Chapter 6.95. (l) "Root cause" means prime reasons, such as failures of some management systems, that allow faulty design, inadequate training, or improper changes, which lead to an unsafe act or condition, and result in an incident. If root causes were removed, the particular incident would not have occurred. (m) "Safety plan" means the safety plan required to be submitted to the department pursuant to the requirements of Section 450-8.016 of this chapter. (n) "Safety program" means the documentation, development, implementation, and integration of management systems by the stationary source to comply with the safety requirements set forth in Section 450-8.016 of this chapter. (o) "Stationary source" or "source" means a facility which includes at least one process as defined in 40 CFR 68.10 that is subject to federal risk management program level 3 requirements and whose primary North American Industry Classification System code (NAICS) is 324 (Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing) or 325 (Chemical Manufacturing). (p) "California accidental release prevention program" means the documentation, development, implementation, and integration of management systems by a facility to comply with the regulations set forth in California Code of Regulations, Title 19, Division 2, Chapter 4.5. (q) "Catastrophic release" means a major uncontrolled emission, fire, or explosion, involving one or more highly hazardous chemicals, that presents serious danger to employees in the workplace and/or the public. As used in this section, "highly hazardous chemical" has the meaning ascribed to it in 29 CFR 1910.119(b) as of May 21, 2003. (r) "Human factors" means a discipline concerned with designing machines, operations, and work environments so that they match human capabilities, limitations, and needs. "Human factors" can be further referred to as environmental, organizational, and job factors, and human and individual characteristics that influence behavior at work in a way that can affect health and safety. 3-59 (s) "Human systems" means the systems, such as written and unwritten policies, procedures, and practices, in effect to minimize the existence/persistence of latent conditions at the stationary source. It also includes the broad area of safety culture of a stationary source to the extent that it influences the actions of individuals or groups of individuals. (Ords. 2006-22 § 4, 98-48 § 2). 450-8.016 - Stationary source safety requirements. The stationary source shall submit a safety plan to the department within one year of the effective date of the ordinance codified in this chapter or within three years of the date a facility becomes a stationary source, that complies with the provisions of this section and that includes the safety elements listed in subsection (a) of this section. In addition, the stationary source shall comply with the safety requirements set forth in subsections (a) through (e) of this section and shall include a description of the manner of compliance with these subsections in the safety plan. A new covered process at an existing stationary source shall comply with subsections (a) through (e) of this section prior to initial startup. (a) Safety Program Elements. All covered processes shall be subject to the safety program elements listed below. The safety plan shall include a description of the manner in which these safety program elements listed below shall be applied to the covered process. These safety program elements shall be implemented in conformance with the California accidental release prevention program and the safety plan shall follow Chapters 5, 7, 8 and 9 of the Contra Costa County health services department CalARP program guidance document. (1) Process Safety Information. (A) The stationary source shall complete a compilation of written process safety information before conducting any process hazard analysis as required by this chapter. The compilation of written process safety information is to enable the stationary source and the employees involved in operating the covered process to identify and understand the hazards posed by the covered process. This process safety information shall include information pertaining to the hazards of the regulated substances used or produced by the process, information pertaining to the technology of the process, information pertaining to the equipment in the process, and information pertaining to the hazards of the regulated substances in the process. (i) This information shall consist of at least the following: toxicity information; permissible exposure limits; physical data; reactivity data; corrosivity data; thermal and chemical stability data; and hazardous effects of inadvertent mixing of different materials that could foreseeably occur. 3-60 (ii) Material safety data sheets meeting the requirements of Section 5189, Title 8 of California Code of Regulations may be used to comply with this requirement to the extent they contain the information required by this subsection. (iii) Information pertaining to the technology of the process shall include at least the following: a block flow diagram or simplified process flow diagram; process chemistry; maximum intended inventory; safe upper and lower limits for such items as temperatures, pressures, flows or compositions; and, an evaluation of the consequences of deviations. Where the original technical information no longer exists, such information may be developed in conjunction with the process hazard analysis in sufficient detail to support the analysis. (iv) Information pertaining to the equipment in the process shall include: materials of construction; piping and instrument diagrams (P&ID's); electrical classification; relief system design and design basis; ventilation system design; design codes and standards employed; material and energy balances for processes built after the compliance date of the ordinance codified in this chapter; and safety systems (e.g., interlocks, detection or suppression systems). (B) The stationary source shall document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices. (C) For existing equipment designed and constructed in accordance with codes, standards, or practices that are no longer in general use, the stationary source shall determine and document that the equipment is designed, maintained, inspected, tested, and operating in a safe manner. (2) Operating Procedures. (A) The stationary source shall develop and implement written operating procedures that provide clear instructions for safely conducting activities involved in each covered process consistent with the process safety information and shall address at least the following elements: (i) Steps for each operating phase: initial startup; normal operations; temporary operations; emergency shutdown, including the conditions under which emergency shutdown is required, and the assignment of shutdown responsibility to qualified operators to ensure that emergency shutdown is executed in a safe and timely manner; emergency operations; normal shutdown; and, startup following a turnaround, or after an emergency shutdown. (ii) Operating limits: consequences of deviation; and steps required to correct or avoid deviation. (B) Safety and Health Considerations. Properties of, and hazards presented by, the chemicals used in the process; precautions necessary to prevent exposure, including engineering controls, administrative controls, and personal protective equipment; control measures to be taken if physical contact or airborne exposure occurs; quality control for 3-61 raw materials and control of hazardous chemical inventory levels; and, any special or unique hazards. (C) Safety systems and their functions. (D) Operating procedures shall be readily accessible to employees who work in or maintain a process. (E) The operating procedures shall be reviewed as often as necessary to assure that they reflect current operating practice, including changes that result from changes in process chemicals, technology, and equipment, and changes to stationary sources. The stationary source shall certify annually that these operating procedures are current and accurate. (F) The stationary source shall develop and implement safe work practices to provide for the control of hazards during operations such as lockout/tagout; confined space entry; opening process equipment or piping; and control over entrance into a stationary source by maintenance, contractor, laboratory, or other support personnel. These safe work practices shall apply to employees and contractor employees. (3) Employee Participation. (A) The stationary source shall develop a written plan of action regarding the implementation of the employee participation required by this chapter. (B) The stationary source shall consult with employees and their representatives on the conduct and development of process hazards analyses and on the development of the other elements of the safety program in this chapter. (C) The stationary source shall provide to employees and their representatives access to process hazard analyses and to all other information required to be developed under this chapter. (4) Training. For each employee in such covered process: (A) Initial Training. Each employee presently involved in operating a covered process, and each employee before being involved in operating a newly assigned covered process, shall be trained in an overview of the process and in the operating procedures as specified in subsection (a)(2)(A) of this section. The training shall include emphasis on the specific safety and health hazards, emergency operations including shutdown, and safe work practices applicable to the employee's job tasks. In lieu of initial training for those employees already involved in operating a process, an owner or operator may certify in writing that the employee has the required knowledge, skills, and abilities to safely carry out the duties and responsibilities as specified in the operating procedures. (B) Refresher Training. Refresher training shall be provided at least every three years, and more often if necessary, to each employee involved in operating a covered process to assure that the employee understands and adheres to the current operating procedures of the covered process. The stationary source, in consultation with the employees involved in operating the process, shall determine the appropriate frequency of refresher training. 3-62 (C) Training Documentation. The stationary source shall ascertain that each employee involved in operating a process has received and understood the training required by this section. The stationary source shall prepare a record which contains the identity of the employee, the date of training, and the means used to verify that the employee understood the training. (5) Mechanical Integrity, Including the Use of Industry Codes, Standards, and Guidelines. (A) Application. Subsections (a)(5)(B) through (a)(5)(F) of this section apply to the following process equipment: pressure vessels and storage tanks; piping subsystems (including piping components such as valves); relief and vent systems and devices; emergency shutdown systems; controls (including monitoring devices and sensors, alarms, and interlocks) and pumps. (B) Written Procedures. The stationary source shall establish and implement written procedures to maintain the on-going integrity of process equipment. (C) Training for Process Maintenance Activities. The stationary source shall train each employee involved in maintaining the on-going integrity of process equipment in an overview of that process and its hazards and in the procedures applicable to the employee's job tasks to assure that the employee can perform the job tasks in a safe manner. (D) Inspection and Testing. (1) Inspections and tests shall be performed on process equipment. Inspection and testing procedures shall follow recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices. The frequency of inspections and tests of process equipment shall be consistent with applicable manufacturers' recommendations and good engineering practices, and more frequently if determined to be necessary by prior operating experience. The stationary source shall document each inspection and test that has been performed on process equipment. The documentation shall identify the date of the inspection or test, the name of the person who performed the inspection or test, the serial number or other identifier of the equipment on which the inspection or test was performed, a description of the inspection or test performed, and the results of the inspection or test. (E) Equipment Deficiencies. The stationary source shall correct deficiencies in equipment that are outside acceptable limits (defined by the process safety information in subsection (a)(1) of this section) before further use or in a safe and timely manner when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation. (F) Quality Assurance. In the construction of new plants and equipment, the stationary source shall assure that equipment as it is fabricated is suitable for the process application for which they will be used. Appropriate checks and inspections shall be performed to assure that equipment is installed properly and consistent with design specifications and the manufacturer's instructions. The stationary source shall assure that maintenance materials, spare parts and equipment are suitable for the process application for which they will be used. 3-63 (6) Management of Change. (A) The stationary source shall establish and implement written procedures to manage changes (except for "replacements in kind") to process chemicals, technology, equipment, and procedures; and changes to stationary sources that affect a covered process. (B) The procedures shall assure that the following considerations are addressed prior to any change: the technical basis for the proposed change; impact of change on safety and health; modifications to operating procedures; necessary time period for the change; and authorization requirements for the proposed change. (C) Employees involved in operating a process and maintenance and contract employees whose job tasks will be affected by a change in the process shall be informed of, and trained in, the change prior to startup of the process or affected part of the process. (D) If a change covered by this section results in a change in the process safety information required by subsection (a)(1) of this section, such information shall be updated accordingly. (E) If a change covered by this section results in a change in the operating procedures or practices required by subsection (a)(2) of this section, such procedures or practices shall be updated accordingly. (7) Pre-Startup Reviews. (A) The stationary source shall perform a pre-startup safety review for new stationary sources and for modified stationary sources when the modification is significant enough to require a change in the process safety information. (B) The pre-startup safety review shall confirm that prior to the introduction of regulated substances to a covered process: construction and equipment is in accordance with design specifications; safety, operating, maintenance, and emergency procedures are in place and are adequate; for new covered processes, a process hazard analysis has been performed and recommendations have been resolved or implemented before startup; and modified covered processes meet the requirements contained in management of change, subsection (a)(6) of this section; and training of each employee involved in operating a process has been completed. (8) Compliance Audits. (A) The stationary source shall certify that they have evaluated compliance with the provisions of this section at least every three years to verify that the procedures and practices developed under this chapter are adequate and are being followed. (B) The compliance audit shall be conducted by at least one person knowledgeable in the process. (C) A report of the findings of the audit shall be developed. 3-64 (D) The stationary source shall promptly determine and document an appropriate response to each of the findings of the compliance audit, and document that deficiencies have been corrected. (E) The stationary source shall retain the two most recent compliance audit reports. (9) Incident Investigation. (A) The stationary source shall investigate each incident which resulted in, or could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release of a regulated substance. (B) An incident investigation shall be initiated as promptly as possible, but not later than forty-eight hours following the incident. (C) An incident investigation team shall be established and consist of at least one person knowledgeable in the covered process involved, including a contract employee if the incident involved work of the contractor, and other persons with appropriate knowledge and experience to thoroughly investigate and analyze the incident. (D) A report shall be prepared at the conclusion of the investigation which includes at a minimum: date of incident; date investigation began; a description of the incident; the factors that contributed to the incident; and recommendations resulting from the investigation. The written summary shall indicate whether the cause of the incident and/or recommendations resulting from the investigation are specific only to the process or equipment involved in the incident, or are applicable to other processes or equipment at the stationary source. The incident investigation report shall be made available to the department upon request. (E) The stationary source shall establish a system to promptly address and resolve the incident report findings and recommendations. Resolutions and corrective actions shall be documented. (F) The report shall be reviewed with all affected personnel whose job tasks are relevant to the incident findings including contract employees where applicable. (G) Incident investigation reports shall be retained for five years. (10) Hot Work. (A) The stationary source shall issue a hot work permit for hot work operations conducted on or near a covered process. (B) The permit shall document that the fire prevention and protection requirements in Section 5189 of Title 8 of California Code Regulations have been implemented prior to beginning the hot work operations; it shall indicate the date(s) authorized for hot work; and identify the object on which hot work is to be performed. The permit shall be kept on file until completion of the hot work operations. (11) Contractors. 3-65 (A) Application. This section applies to contractors performing maintenance or repair, turnaround, major renovation, or specialty work on or adjacent to a covered process. It does not apply to contractors providing incidental services which do not influence process safety, such as janitorial work, food and drink services, laundry, delivery or other supply services. (B) Stationary Source Responsibilities. (i) The stationary source, when selecting a contractor, shall obtain and evaluate information regarding the contract owner or operator's safety performance and programs. (ii) The stationary source shall inform contract owner or operator of the known potential fire, explosion, or toxic release hazards related to the contractor's work and the process. (iii) The stationary source shall explain to the contract owner or operator the applicable provisions of the emergency response program subsection (a)(12) of this section. (iv) The stationary source shall develop and implement safe work practices consistent with subsection (a)(2) of this section to control the entrance, presence, and exit of the contract owner or operator and contract employees in covered process areas. (v) The stationary source shall periodically evaluate the performance of the contract owner or operator in fulfilling their obligations as specified in subsection (a)(11)(C) of this section. (C) Contract Owner or Operator Responsibilities. (i) The contract owner or operator shall assure that each contract employee is trained in the work practices necessary to safely perform his/her job. (ii) The contract owner or operator shall assure that each contract employee is instructed in the known potential fire, explosion, or toxic release hazards related to his/her job and the process, and the applicable provisions of the emergency action plan. (iii) The contract owner or operator shall document that each contract employee has received and understood the training required by this section. The contract owner or operator shall prepare a record which contains the identity of the contract employee, the date of training, and the means used to verify that the employee understood the training. (iv) The contract owner or operator shall assure that each contract employee follows the safety rules of the stationary source including the safe work practices required by subsection (a)(2) of this section. (v) The contract owner or operator shall advise the stationary source of any unique hazards presented by the contract owner or operator's work, or of any hazards found by the contract owner or operator's work. (12) Emergency Response Program. 3-66 (A) The stationary source shall develop and implement an emergency response program for the purpose of protecting public health and the environment. Such program shall include the following elements: (i) An emergency response plan, which shall be maintained at the stationary source and contain at least the following elements: procedures for informing the public and local emergency response agencies about accidental releases, emergency planning, and emergency response; documentation of proper first-aid and emergency medical treatment necessary to treat accidental human exposures; and procedures and measures for emergency response after an accidental release of a regulated substance; (ii) Procedures for the use of emergency response equipment and for its inspection, testing, and maintenance, including documentation of inspection, testing, and maintenance; (iii) Training for all employees in relevant procedures and the incident command system; and (iv) Procedures to review and update, as appropriate, the emergency response plan to reflect changes at the stationary source and ensure that employees are informed of changes. (B) A written plan that complies with other federal contingency plan regulations or is consistent with the approach in the National Response Team's Integrated Contingency Plan Guidance ("One Plan") and that, among other matters, includes the elements provided in subsection (a)(12)(A) of this section, shall satisfy the requirements of this section if the stationary source also complies with subsection (a)(12)(C) of this section. (C) The emergency response plan developed under this section shall be coordinated with the community emergency response plan developed under 42 U.S.C. Section 11003. Upon request of the local emergency planning committee or emergency response officials, the stationary source shall promptly provide to the local emergency response officials information necessary for developing and implementing the community emergency response plan. (D) The stationary source whose employees will not respond to accidental releases of regulated substances need not comply with subsections (a)(12)(A) through (a)(12)(C) of this section provided that they meet the following: (i) For stationary sources with any regulated toxic substance held in a process above the threshold quantity, the stationary source is included in the community emergency response plan developed under Section 11003 of Title 42 of the United States Code (USC); or (ii) For stationary sources with only regulated flammable substances held in a process above the threshold quantity the stationary source has coordinated response actions with the local fire department; and 3-67 (iii) Appropriate mechanisms are in place to notify emergency responders when there is a need for a response. (13) Safety Program Management. (A) The owner or operator of a stationary source subject to this chapter shall develop a management system to oversee the implementation of the safety program elements. (B) The owner or operator shall assign a qualified person or position that has the overall responsibility for the development, implementation, and integration of the safety program elements. (C) When responsibility for implementing individual requirements of this chapter is assigned to persons other than the person identified under subsection (a)(13)(B) of this section, the names or positions of these people shall be documented and the lines of authority defined through an organization chart or similar document. (b) Human Factors Program. (1) Stationary sources shall develop a written human factors program that follows the human factors guidance document developed or adopted by the department. The program shall be developed within one year following the issuance of the Contra Costa County guidance documents, the effective date of the ordinance codified in this section, or as otherwise allowed by this chapter, whichever is later. The human factors program shall address: (A) The inclusion of human factors in the process hazards analysis process; (B) The consideration of human systems as causal factors in the incident investigation process for major chemical accidents or releases or for an incident that could reasonably have resulted in a major chemical accident or release; (C) The training of employees in the human factors program; (D) Operating procedures; (E) Maintenance safe work practice procedures and maintenance procedures for specialized equipment, piping, and instruments, no later than June 30, 2011; and (F) The requirement to conduct a management of change prior to staffing changes for changes in permanent staffing levels/reorganization in operations, maintenance, health and safety, or emergency response. This requirement shall also apply to stationary sources using contractors in permanent positions in operations and maintenance. Prior to conducting the management of change, the stationary source shall ensure that the job function descriptions are current and accurate for the positions under consideration. Staffing changes that last longer than ninety days are considered permanent. Temporary 3-68 changes associated with strike preparations shall also be subject to this requirement. Employees and their representatives shall be consulted in the management of change. (2) Employees and their representatives shall participate in the development of the written human factors program. (3) The program shall include, but not be limited to, issues such as staffing, shiftwork and overtime. (4) A description of the human factors program subsections (b)(1) through (b)(3) of this section shall be included in the safety plan prepared by the stationary source. (c) Root Cause Analysis and Incident Investigation. (1) Stationary sources shall conduct a root cause analysis for each major chemical accident or release which occurs after the effective date of the ordinance codified in this chapter. Stationary sources shall periodically update the department on facts related to the release or incident, and the status of a root cause analysis conducted pursuant to this section, at meetings scheduled by the department in cooperation with the stationary source. To the maximum extent feasible, the department and the stationary source shall coordinate these meetings with other agencies with jurisdiction over the stationary source. Within thirty days of completing a root cause analysis performed pursuant to this section, the stationary source shall submit to the department a final report containing that analysis, including recommendations to be implemented to mitigate against the release or incident reoccurring, if any, and a schedule for completion of resulting recommendations. The department may require the stationary source to submit written, periodic update reports at a frequency not to exceed every thirty days until the final report is submitted. The methodology of the root cause analysis shall be one of the methodologies recognized by the Center for Chemical Process Safety or shall be reviewed by the department to determine substantial equivalency. (2) The department may elect to do its own independent root cause analysis or incident investigation for a major chemical accident or release. If the department elects to conduct a root cause analysis or incident investigation the stationary source shall cooperate with the department by providing the following access and information in a manner consistent with the safety of department and stationary source personnel and without placing undue burdens on the operation of the stationary source: (i) Allow the department to investigate the accident site and directly related facilities such as control rooms, physical evidence and where practicable the external and internal inspection of equipment; (ii) Provide the department with pertinent documentation; and (iii) Allow the department to conduct independent interviews of stationary source employees, subject to all rights of the stationary source and employees to be represented by legal counsel and/or management and union representatives during such interviews. If in the course of the department's root cause analysis or incident investigation access is required to areas of the stationary source which in the judgment of the stationary source 3-69 requires personnel entering the area to use protective equipment and/or have specialized training the department shall provide its personnel with such equipment and training. To the maximum extent feasible, the department shall coordinate any root cause analysis or incident investigation it conducts with investigations conducted by other agencies with jurisdiction over the stationary source to minimize the adverse impacts on the stationary source and/or its employees. (3) No part of the conclusions, findings or recommendations of the root cause analysis conducted by the department or stationary source, or incident investigation conducted by the department, relating to any major chemical accident or release or the investigation thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used in any action or suit for damages arising out of any matter mentioned in such report. (d) Process Hazard Analysis/Action Items. (1) Process hazard analyses will be conducted for each of the covered processes according to one of the following methods: What-If, Checklist, What-If/Checklist, Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), fault tree analysis or an appropriate equivalent methodology approved by the department prior to conducting the process hazard analysis. The process hazard analysis shall be appropriate to the complexity of the covered process and shall identify, evaluate, and control the hazards involved in the covered process. The process hazard analysis shall address: the hazards of the process; the identification of any previous incident which had a likely potential for catastrophic consequences; engineering and administrative control applicable to the hazards and their interrelationships such as appropriate application of detection methodologies to provide early warning of releases (acceptable detection methods might include process monitoring and control instrumentation with alarms, and detection hardware such as hydrocarbon sensors); consequences of failure of engineering and administrative controls; covered process and stationary source siting; human factors; and a qualitative evaluation of a range of the possible safety and health effects of failure of controls. PHAs should also include consideration of external events except for seismic analyses, which are only required when criteria listed in subsection (d)(2) of this section are satisfied. All process hazard analyses shall be performed by a team with expertise in engineering and process operations, and the team shall include at least one employee who has experience and knowledge specific to the process being evaluated. Also, one member of the team must be knowledgeable in the specific process hazard analysis methodology being used. (2) The process hazard analyses shall be conducted within one year of the effective date of the ordinance codified in this chapter and no later than the submittal date of the safety plan. Previously completed process hazard analyses that comply with the California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Section 5189, and/or the California Code of Regulations, Title 19, Section 2760.2 are acceptable for the purposes of this chapter. Process hazard analyses shall be updated and revalidated at least once every five years after completion of the initial process hazard analysis. Updated and revalidated process hazard analyses completed to comply with the California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Section 5189, and/or the California Code of Regulations, Title 19, Section 2760 are acceptable for meeting the update and revalidation requirement. Seismic events shall be considered for 3-70 processes containing a substance defined in the California Code of Regulations, Title 19, Chapter 4.51, Section 2770.5, if the distance to the nearest public receptor for a worst case release scenario specified by the California Code of Regulations, Title 19, Chapter 4.5, Section 2750.3 is within the distance to a toxic or flammable endpoint as defined in California Code of Regulations, Title 19, Chapter 4.5, Section 2750.2(a). (3) For all covered processes, the stationary source shall consider the use of inherently safer systems in the development and analysis of mitigation items resulting from a process hazard analysis and in the design and review of new processes and facilities. The stationary source shall select and implement inherently safer systems to the greatest extent feasible. If a stationary source concludes that an inherently safer system is not feasible, the basis for this conclusion shall be documented in meaningful detail. (4) For all covered processes, the stationary source shall document the decision made to implement or not implement all process hazard analysis recommended action items and the results of recommendations for additional study. The stationary source shall complete recommended actions from the initial PHA's and from PHA revalidations, identified by the process hazard analysis and selected for implementation by the stationary source as follows: all actions not requiring a process shutdown shall be completed within one year after submittal of the safety plan; all actions requiring a process shutdown shall be completed during the first regularly scheduled turnaround of the applicable process subsequent to one year after submittal of the safety plan unless the stationary source demonstrates to the satisfaction of the department that such a schedule is infeasible. For recommended actions not selected for implementation, the stationary source shall include the justification for not implementing the recommended action. For all covered processes, the stationary source shall retain documentation of closure, and any associated justifications, of actions identified by the process hazard analysis. The stationary source shall communicate the actions to operating, maintenance, and other employees whose work assignments are in the process and who may be affected by the recommendations or actions. (e) Accident History. (1) The stationary source shall include an accident history in the safety plan of all major chemical accidents or releases from June 1, 1992, through the date of safety plan submittal to the department. For each major chemical accident or release the stationary source shall report the following information, to the extent known: Date, time and approximate duration of the release; Chemicals released; Estimated quantity released in pounds; Type of release event and its source; Weather conditions at the time of the release; On-site impacts; 3-71 Known off-site impacts; Initiating event and contributing factors; Root cause(s); Whether off-site responders were notified; and Operational or process changes that resulted from the investigation of the release. (2) The stationary source shall annually submit a report of the accident history to the department. The first report shall be due two years after the effective date of the ordinance codified in this chapter, and subsequent reports shall be due by June 30th of each year. (f) Certification. The owner or operator shall submit in the safety plan a single certification that, to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, the information submitted is true, accurate, and complete. (g) Security and Vulnerability Assessment. Each stationary source shall perform and document a security and vulnerability assessment as defined in the Contra Costa County CalARP program guidance document, by June 30, 2007, and at least once every five years after the initial assessment, or as prescribed by federal regulation. The stationary source shall document its process for assuring that recommendations are addressed. (h) Safety Culture Assessment. The stationary source shall conduct a safety culture assessment. The assessment shall be based upon a method listed in the Contra Costa County CalARP program guidance document or shall be reviewed by the department to determine substantial equivalency. The initial assessment shall be performed by one year following the revisions to the Industrial Safety Ordinance guidance document that addresses the safety culture assessment, and at least once every five years thereafter. The safety culture assessment will be reviewed during the audit and inspection of the stationary source. The department may perform its own safety culture assessment after a major chemical accident or release or the occurrence of any incident that could reasonably have led to a major chemical accident or release, or based on department audit results of the stationary source. (Ords. 2006-22 § 5, 2000-20 § 1, 98-48 § 2). 450-8.018 - Review, audit and inspection. (a) Upon submission of a safety plan by the stationary source, the department shall review the safety plan to determine if all the elements required by Section 450-8.016 of this chapter are included and complete. The department shall provide to the stationary source a written notice of deficiencies, if any. The stationary source shall have sixty calendar days from receipt of the notice of deficiencies to make any corrections. The stationary source may request, in writing, a one-time thirty-day calendar day extension to correct deficiencies. By the end of the sixty calendar days or any extension period, the 3-72 stationary source shall resubmit the revised safety plan to the department. After the department determines that the safety plan is complete, the department shall schedule a public meeting on the stationary source's safety plan to explain its contents to the public and take public comments. Public comments on the safety plan shall be taken by the department for a period of forty-five days after the safety plan is made available to the public. The department shall schedule a public meeting on the stationary source's safety plan during the forty-five day comment period. The public meetings shall be held in the affected community on evenings or weekends. The department shall respond in writing to all written comments received during the forty-five day comment period and to all oral comments received and not addressed at the public meeting. The department shall make portions of the safety plan, which are not protected trade secret information, available to the public for the public meeting. (b) (1) The department shall, within one year of the submission of the stationary source's safety plan, conduct an initial audit and inspection of the stationary source's safety program to determine compliance with this chapter. Based upon the department's review of the safety plan and the audit and inspection of the stationary source, the department may require modifications or additions to the safety plan submitted by the stationary source, or safety program to bring the safety plan or safety program into compliance with the requirements of this chapter. Any determination that modifications or additions to the safety plan or safety program are required shall be in writing, collectively referred to as the "preliminary determination." The preliminary determination shall explain the basis for the modifications or additions required to bring the safety plan or safety program into compliance with the requirements of this chapter and provide a timetable for resolution of the recommendations. The preliminary determination shall be mailed to the stationary source. (2) The stationary source shall respond in writing to the preliminary determination issued by the department. The response shall state that the stationary source will incorporate into the safety plan or safety program the revisions contained in the preliminary determination or shall state that the stationary source rejects the revisions; in whole or in part. For each rejected revision, the stationary source shall explain the basis for rejecting such revision. Such explanation may include substitute revisions. (3) The stationary source's written response to the department's preliminary determination shall be received by the department within ninety days of the issuance of the preliminary determination or such shorter time as the department specifies in the preliminary determination as being necessary to protect public health and safety. Prior to the written response being due and upon written request from the stationary source, the department may provide, in writing, additional time for the response to be received. (4) After receiving the written response from the stationary source, the department shall issue a public notice pursuant to the department's public participation policy and make portions of the safety plan, the preliminary determination and the stationary source's responses, which are not protected trade secret information, available for public review. Public comments on the safety plan shall be taken by the department for a period of forty- five days after the safety plan, the preliminary determination and the stationary source's responses are made available to the public. The department shall schedule a public 3-73 meeting on the stationary source's safety plan during the forty-five day comment period. The public meetings shall be held in the affected community on evenings or weekends. The department shall respond in writing to all written comments received during the forty-five day comment period and to all oral comments received and not addressed at the public meeting. (c) Based upon the department's preliminary determination, review of the stationary source's responses and review of public comments on the safety plan, the preliminary determination and the stationary source's responses, the department may require modifications or additions to the safety plan submitted by the stationary source or safety program to bring the safety plan or safety program into compliance with the requirements of this chapter. Any determination that modifications or additions to the safety plan or safety program are required, and any determination that no modifications or additions to the safety plan or safety program are required shall be in writing (collectively referred to as "final determination"), shall be mailed to the stationary source and shall be made available to the public. The department may not include in a final determination any requirements to a safety plan or safety program that would cause a violation of, or conflict with, any state or federal law or regulation or a violation of any permit or order issued by any state or federal agency. (d) Within thirty days of the department's final determination, the stationary source and/or any person may appeal the final determination to the board of supervisors pursuant to Chapter 14-4 of this code by a verified written notice of appeal filed with the clerk of the board of supervisors and payment of the applicable appeal fee. The appeal must be limited to issues raised during the public comment period. The notice shall state the grounds for any such appeal, including (i) the reasoning that the appeal is necessary because the stationary source is in compliance with this chapter, or (ii) the reasoning that the appeal is necessary to bring the stationary source into compliance with this chapter. In acting on the appeal, the board shall have the same authority over the final determination as the department. The board may require modifications or additions to the safety plan or safety program to bring the safety plan or safety program into compliance with the requirements of this chapter. The board may not include in its decision on the final determination any requirements to a safety plan or safety program that would cause a violation of, or conflict with, any state or federal law or regulation or a violation of any permit or order issued by any state or federal agency. The decision of the board of supervisors shall be final with respect to the final determination. (e) The safety plan shall be valid for a period of three years from the date of receipt by the department and shall be reviewed and updated by the stationary source every three years pursuant to the requirements of this chapter. Any revisions to the safety plan as a result of the review and update shall be submitted to the department and shall be subject to the provisions of this section. (f) The department may, within thirty days of a major chemical accident or release, initiate a safety inspection to review and audit the stationary source's compliance with the provisions of Section 450-8.016 of this chapter. The department shall review and audit the stationary source's compliance with the provisions of Section 450-8.016 of this chapter at least once every three years. The department may audit the stationary source 3-74 based upon any of the following criteria: accident history of the stationary source, accident history of other stationary sources in the same industry, quantity of regulated substances present at the stationary source, location of the stationary source and its proximity to the public and environmental receptors, the presence of specific regulated substances, the hazards identified in the safety plan, a plan for providing neutral and random oversight, or a complaint from the stationary source's employee(s) or their representative. The stationary source shall allow the department to conduct these inspections and audits. The department, at its option, may select an outside consultant to assist in conducting such inspection. (g) Within thirty days of a major chemical accident or release the department may commence an incident safety inspection with respect to the process involved in the incident pursuant to the provisions of Section 450-8.016(c) of this chapter. (h) (1) Based upon the department's audit, safety inspection or an incident inspection, the department may require modifications or additions to the safety plan submitted by the stationary source or safety program to bring the safety plan or safety program into compliance with the requirements of this chapter. Any determination by the department shall be in writing and shall be mailed to the stationary source (referred to as the "notice of findings"). The stationary source shall have sixty calendar days from receipt of the notice of findings to make any corrections. The stationary source may request, in writing, a one-time thirty-day calendar day extension to make corrections. The department may not include in its notice of findings requirements to a safety plan or safety program that would cause a violation of, or conflict with, any state or federal law or regulation or a violation of any permit or order issued by any state or federal agency. The notice of findings made by the department will be available to the public. (2) Within thirty days of the department's notice of findings, the stationary source and/or any person may appeal the notice of findings to the board of supervisors pursuant to Chapter 14-4 of this code by a verified written notice of appeal filed with the clerk of the board of supervisors and payment of the applicable appeal fee. The appeal must state the grounds for any such appeal, including (i) the reasoning that the appeal is necessary because the stationary source is in compliance with this chapter, or (ii) the reasoning that the appeal is necessary to bring the stationary source into compliance with this chapter. In acting on the appeal, the board shall have the same authority over the notice of findings as the department. The board may require modifications or additions to the safety plan or safety program to bring the safety plan or safety program into compliance with the requirements of this chapter. The board may not include in its decision on the notice of findings any requirements to a safety plan or safety program that would cause a violation of, or conflict with, any state or federal law or regulation or a violation of any permit or order issued by any state or federal agency. The decision of the board of supervisors shall be final with respect to the notice of findings. (i) Nothing in this section shall preclude, limit, or interfere in any way with the authority of the county to exercise its enforcement, investigatory, and information gathering authorities under any other provision of law nor shall anything in the chapter effect or diminish the rights of the stationary source to claim legal privileges such as attorney 3-75 client privilege and/or work product with respect to information and/or documents required to be submitted to or reviewed by the department. (Ords. 2006-22 § 6, 98-48 § 2). 450-8.020 - Trade secret. The disclosure of any trade secret information required by this chapter shall be governed by California Health and Safety Code Section 25538, as amended from time to time, or as otherwise protected or required by law. (Ord. 98-48 § 2). 450-8.022 - Hazardous materials ombudsperson. The department shall continue to employ an ombudsperson for hazardous materials programs. The ombudsperson will serve as a single point of contact for people who live or work in Contra Costa County regarding environmental health concerns, questions, and complaints about hazardous materials programs. The ombudsperson will be empowered to identify and solve problems and make recommendations to the department. The ombudsperson's role will be one of investigating concerns and complaints, facilitating their resolution and assisting people in gathering information about programs, procedures, or issues. The ombudsperson may retain appropriate technical experts in order to fulfill technical assistance requests from members of the public. The cost of experts may be funded through programs established by the U.S. EPA or other appropriate entities. (Ords. 2000-20 § 2, 98-48 § 2). 450-8.024 - Public information bank. The department shall collect and provide ready access, including the use of electronic accessibility as reasonably available, to public documents which are relevant to the goals of this chapter, including at a minimum, business plan inventories and emergency response plans, risk management plans, safety plans, and department incident reports. This section shall not apply to trade secret information or other information protected from disclosure under federal or state law. The public information bank shall be completed by December 31, 2000. (Ord. 98-48 § 2). 450-8.026 - Fees. The department may, upon a majority vote of the board of supervisors, adopt a schedule of fees to be collected from each stationary source subject to the requirements of this chapter. Any review, inspection, audit fee schedule shall be set in an amount sufficient to pay only those costs reasonably necessary to carry out the requirements of this chapter, including costs of staff and/or consultant time or public hearings and 3-76 administrative overhead. The fee schedule shall include the cost of the ombudsperson position. (Ord. 98-48 § 2). 450-8.028 - Penalties. Regardless of the availability of other civil or administrative remedies and procedures for enforcing this chapter, every act or condition prohibited or declared unlawful by this chapter, and every knowing or wilful failure or omission to act as required herein, is a violation of this code and shall be punishable and/or subject to enforcement pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 14-67 of the County Ordinance Code specifically including but not limited to Article 14-6.4 (public nuisance), and Article 14-8 (criminal enforcement), as misdemeanors or infractions. (Ord. 98-48 § 2). 450-8.030 - Annual performance review and evaluation. (a) The department shall annually: (1) review its activities to implement this chapter, and (2) evaluate the effectiveness of this chapter in achieving its purpose and goals pursuant to Section 450-8.004 of this chapter. (b) An annual performance review and evaluation report shall be prepared by the department based upon the previous fiscal year's activities and shall be submitted to the board of supervisors on or before October 31, 2000 and each year thereafter. The report shall contain: (1) A brief description of how the department is meeting the requirements of this chapter as follows: (i) effectiveness of the department's program to ensure stationary source compliance with this chapter; (ii) effectiveness of the procedures for records management; (iii) number and type of audits and inspections conducted by the department pursuant to this chapter; (iv) number of root cause analyses and/or incident investigations conducted by the department; (v) the department's process for public participation; (vi) effectiveness of the public information bank, including status of electronic accessibility; (vii) effectiveness of the hazardous materials ombudsperson; (viii) other required program elements necessary to implement and manage this chapter. (2) A listing of all stationary sources covered by this chapter, including for each: (i) the status of the stationary source's safety plan and program; (ii) a summary of all stationary source safety plan updates and a listing of where the safety plans are publicly available; (iii) the annual accident history report submitted by the stationary source pursuant to Section 450-8.016(e)(2) of this chapter; (iv) a summary, including the status, of any root cause analyses conducted or being conducted by the stationary source and required by this chapter, including the status of implementation of recommendations; (v) a summary, including the status, of any audits, inspections, root cause analyses and/or incident investigations conducted or being conducted by the department pursuant to this chapter, including the status of implementation of recommendations; (vi) description of inherently safer systems implemented by the stationary source; and (vii) legal enforcement actions 3-77 initiated by the department, including administrative, civil, and criminal actions pursuant to this chapter. (3) Total penalties assessed as a result of enforcement of this chapter. (4) Total fees, service charges, and other assessments collected specifically for the support of this chapter. (5) Total personnel and personnel years utilized by the jurisdiction to directly implement or administer this chapter. (6) Comments from interested parties regarding the effectiveness of the local program that raise public safety issues. (7) The impact of the chapter in improving industrial safety. (c) The department shall provide a copy of the annual performance audit submission required by Title 19 Chapter 4.5 Section 2780.5 of the California Code of Regulations to the board of supervisors on or before October 31st of each year. (Ords. 2006-22 § 7, 98-48 § 2). 450-8.032 - Construction. Notwithstanding any other provision of this code and for the purposes of this chapter wherever it provides that the department shall act, such direction in all instances shall be deemed and is directory, discretionary and permissive and not mandatory. ************ **************** ************** ************** NOTE: County Ordinance Chapter 450-8 expands on the California Accidental Release Prevention (CalARP) Program for facilities meeting the following: • The facility is within an unincorporated area of the County • The facility is either a petroleum refinery or chemical plant • The facility is required to submit a Risk Management Plan (RMP) to the U.S. EPA and Contra Costa County Health Service (CCHS) • The facility has at least one Program 3 process The seven facilities currently subject to the County's Industrial Safety Ordinance (ISO) include: Air Products (within the Shell Refinery), Air Products (within the Tesoro Refinery), ConocoPhillips Rodeo Refinery, Air Liquide-Rodeo Hydrogen Plant, General Chemical West: Bay Point Works, Shell Oil Martinez Refinery and Tesoro Golden Eagle Refinery. The City of Richmond has adopted an Industrial Safety Ordinance (Municipal Code Chapter 6.43, RISO) that is almost identical (except for the 2006 amendment) to the County's Industrial Safety Ordinance. The two facilities located in the City of Richmond that are subject to this ordinance include: Chevron Richmond Refinery and General Chemical West: Richmond Works. 3-78 FROM PLAINS ALL-AMERICAN -10K -DECEMBER 31,2011 Operational Hazards and Insurance Pipelines,terminals,trucks or other facilities or equipment may experience"damage as a result of an accident or natural disaster.These hazards can cause personal injury and loss of life,severe damage to and destruction of property and equipment,pollution or environmental damage and suspension of operations.Since the time we and our predecessors commenced midstream crude oil activities in the early 1990s,we have maintained insurance ofvarious types and varying levels ofcoverage that we consider adequate under the circumstances to cover our operations and properties.The insurance policies are subject to deductibles and retention levels that we consider reasonable and not excessive.However.such insurance does not cover every potential risk associated with operating pipelines.terminals and other facilities.including the potential loss ofsignificant revenues.Consistent with insurance coverage generally available to the industry,in certain circumstances our insurance policies provide limited coverage for losses or liabilities relating to gradual pollution,with broader coverage for sudden and accidental occurrences.Over the last several years.our operations have expanded significantlY.with total assets increasing over 1.500%since the end of1998. At the same time that the scale and scope ofour business activities have expanded.the breadth and depth ofthe available insurance markets have contracted.The overall cost ofsuch insurance as well as the deductibles and overall retention levels that we maintain have increased.As a result.we have elected to self-insure more activities against certain ofthese operating hazards and expect this trend will continue in the future.Due to the events of September 11,2001,insurers have excluded acts of terrorism and sabotage from our insurance policies.We have elected to purchase a separate insurance policy for acts of terrorism and sabotage. Since the terrorist attacks,the United States Government has issued numerous warnings that energy assets,including our nation's pipeline infrastructure,may be future targets of terrorist organizations.These developments expose our operations and assets to increased risks.We have instituted security measures and procedures in conformity with DOT guidance.We will institute,as appropriate,additional security measures or procedures indicated by the DOT or the Transportation Safety Administration.However, we cannot assure you that these or any other security measures would protect our facilities from a concentrated attack.Any future terrorist attacks on our facilities,those of our customers and,in some cases,those of our competitors,could have a material adverse effect on our business,whether insured or not. The occurrence of a significant event not fully insured,indemnified or reserved against,or the failure of a party to meet its indemnification obligations,could materially and adversely affect our operations and financial condition.We believe we are adequately insured for public liability and property damage to others with respect to our operations.We believe that our levels ofcoverage and retention are generallY consistent with those ofsimilarly situated companies in our industry.With respect to all ofour coverage.no assurance can be given that we will be able to maintain adequate insurance in the future at rates we consider reasonable.or that we have established adequate reserves to the extent that such risks are not insured. 3-79 FROM MARCH 16,2006 REPORT FROM CAO (WILLIAM FUJIOKA)TO CITY COUNCIL -PAGES 10-11 Pier 400:In the report the Harbor Department recommended that . AmeriGas consider relocating to the west side of Pier 400 site on Port property.The new remote storage location would provide product transfer via a pipeline that would connect the new site within the property of the refineries or at another private site between the refineries and waterfront activity.The Port has met several times with AmeriGas to discuss potential relocation sites and other operational solutions.However.AmeriGas stated that Pier 400 did not meet its minimum requirements for a storage facility operation due to its irregular shape.limited opportunity to provide rail access to the site and expense of construction to make the Pier 400 a usable site.For example,AmeriGas said that the distance from the tip of Pier 400 to Berth 120 i~approximately 3.5 miles,whereas Berth 120 is only one mile from its facility.The Port responded that a berthing operation on the west of Pier 400 could potentially accommodate a pipeline to transport the butane.So far,the Port and AmeriGas have had no success in identifying a suitable relocation site.The Port states that it is prepared to discuss the potential of developing.a berthing operation at Pier 400 and an associated pipeline to remote storage facility.Port staff also surveyed the surrounding area and determined that no other sufficient alternative locations are available to accommodate the AmeriGas facility.The Port and AmeriGas are having ongoing discussions to identify and develop a suitable storage facility site. From Page 2 of the CLA Report: AmeriGas had asked the Port to extend or renew its lease to continue using the pipeline and Berth 120 with no success.AmeriGas informed the Port that,although it prefers to export butane through the underground pipeline,it would continue to operate by loading and transporting the butane on rail cars and tanker trucks to another port for shipment overseas if the pipeline right-of-way or Berth 120 rights were cancelled.AmeriGas stated that the elimination of export capability and pipeline for the butane would increase the risk of an accident occurring in the San Pedro area.AmeriGas stated that tr~nsporting the butane by pipeline is safer and exudes fewer 3-80 polluting emissions.AmeriGas stated that,since September 2004,it has loaded more than 19 million gallons of butane onto truck and rail cars that would have otherwise been loaded on export ships. According to AmeriGas,this is an equivalent volume of 2,230 trucks or 633 rail cars. As an alternative,the Port recommended a container terminal site on Pier 400.AmeriGas stated the Pier 400 site was too small and the construction costs for the terminal and pipeline between the Pier 400 berth and tie-in to the existing pipeline grid serving AmeriGas and its clients would be too high.(See Attachment i:Map showing the location of Berth 120;AmeriGas Pipeline;and Pier 400.)Port staff also surveyed the surrounding area and determined that no other sufficient alternative locations are available to accommodate the AmeriGas facility. POSITIONS OF AMERIGAS,BP AND VALERO REFINERIES AmeriGas:In 2003,the Port notified AmeriGas that the 30-year permit/agreement slated to expire in May 2004 would not be renewed.10 December 2003,AmeriGas proposed renegotiating a request to the Board of Harbor Commissioners (Board)to extend or renew the contract to continue operation of the pipeline and berthing facility at Berth 120 or until an alternative is completely worked out. The Board rejected the request,but granted AmeriGas a conditional month-to-month hold over status for approximately 60 days.The Port allowed AmeriGas to handle additional shipment calls to export the stored liquid butane,time to remove the pipeline facility and restore the property as required by the lease.The Board stated that the contract renewal would not be in compliance with the Port Master Plan and its plan to build a container cargo site at the berth. AmeriGas stated that ending the pipeline lease and access to Berth 120 would create a need to find another way to transport the excess butane from the facility.AmeriGas said that to manage the excess inventory at the terminal it would have to maximize truck and rail loading at its terminaL.The historical annual export volume of six s~ips is equivalent to 1,200 rail cars or 4,200 trucks per season.The 3-81 last AmeriGas export ship departed from the Berth in September 2004.According to AmeriGas,since that time,it has loaded 19 milion gallons onto approximately 2,230 trucks or 633 rail cars.AmeriGas states that this will increase traffic on local streets in North San Pedro,Wilmington and Harbor City and possibly increase the risk of accidents and pollution.AmeriGas states that its storage customers make all arrangements to load trucks.rail cars and ships.because the butane is only stored.not owned.by AmeriGas. AmeriGas determined that it would require approximately 15 to 18 acres,in addition to storage tanks,vessel berthing,highway,rail and pipeline access at a potential relocation site. AmeriGas informed the Port that it could not find a suitable relocation site with sufficient space either on or near Port property.AmeriGas said that the Port of Long Beach also did not have suitable space available,a pipeline to send the butane from its terminal nor storage or loading facilties. The following positions were communicated bv BP and/or Valero in support of maintaining AmeriGas at its current location: ·Investigated the possibility of relocating the storage terminal and does not have sufficient space within their refineries to accommodate the relocation of storage tanks operations; ·AmeriGas site includes rail capacity to load sufficient rail cars to manage the daily butane production and the infrastructure to load normal butane trucks; ·Since early 1980's Valero refinery has been dependent on AmeriGas facility; ·BP Carson refinery is connected by pipeline to the AmeriGas storage facility; ·AmeriGas said that,if it can no longer store the butane,BP and Valero may have to divert gasoline storage space to storing butane a,nd other logistical modes; 3-82 ---------------------- ·Could have an adverse impact on gasoline supplies in California since BP and Valero refineries meet State environmental requirements; ·Valero states that it produces three million gallons of gasoline per day,approximately 15%of the Southern California market; ·Valero does not have adequate property to store butane inventory required to support the production of gasoline and fuel blending; ·Valero and BP refine gasoline that meet California environmental requirements;and, ·Transport of the butane by truck or rail may create operational interruptions that could impact the refinery process and result in a reduction of gasoline production. In conclusion,AmeriGas identified the following key points:1)San Pedro storage terminal is on private land;2)AmeriGas does not own butane but charges a fee to its customers,BP and Valero,to store the butane~3)AmeriGas exports the butane and does not import it;4) rail and truck transport may produce a higher risk for employees;and, 5)rail and truck transport may increase emissions and traffic. Attachment IV includes the results of an AmeriGas-sponsored petition and mailer sent to local residents. 3-83 FROM THE PLAINS ALL-AMERICAN 10-K FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31,2011-FILED FEBRUARY 26,2012 Pier 400.This is a project to develop a deepwater petroleum import terminal at Pier 400 and Terminal Island in the Port of Los Angeles to handle marine receipts of crude oil and refinery feedstocks.As currently envisioned,the project would include a deep water berth, high capacity transfer infrastructure and storage tanks,with a pipeline distribution system that will connect to various customers. The Environmental Impact Report ("EIR'j on this project was approved by the Board of Harbor Commissioners of the Port of Los Angeles on November 20,2008.The EIR was challenged and on January 19,2010,a final court ruling was issued in our favor.The California South Coast Air Quality Management District issued the Title V permits to construct and operate the facilities on October 6, 2011.Construction of the Pier 400 project is still subject to the completion and execution of a land lease with the Port of Los Angeles and the receipt of certain other regulatory approvals.as well as the completion of commercial arrangements with potential customers.We have approximately $95 million of capitalized project costs on our balance sheet as of December 31,2011.We expect to be in a position in 2012 to determine whether or not we will develop this project. Internal Growth Projects Our 2011 projects included the construction and expansion of pipeline systems and storage and terminal facilities.The following table summarizes our 20 II,20 I0 and 2009 projects (in millions): Projects 2011 2010 2009 PAA Natural Gas Storage (multiple projects)(1) (2)$89 $85 $26 Rainbow II Pipeline (1)44 3 Cushing -Phases VII and VIII .3 25 25 Cushing -Phases IX through XI 38 21 Basile Gas Processing Facility 37 14 2 Ross Rail Project (1)27 Bumstead Facility 14 2 Bone Spring Project (1)15 Patoka -Phases I through IV (1)15 20 22 Eagle Ford Project (1)18 Edmonton Land 17 West Texas Gathering Lines 15 Pier 400 (1)13 11 18 Nipisi Storage and Truck Terminal (1)9 6 18 Kerrobert Pumping Project 1 33 3-84 Rangeland Tankage St.James -Phases I through III Other projects (3) Total $ 209 531 $ 21 114 355 $ 36 73 111 364 (1)These projects will continue into 2012.See "-Liquidity and Capital Resources-Acquisitions, Capital Expenditures and Distributions Paid to Our Unitholders,General Partner and Noncontrolling Interests-20l2 Capital Expansion Projects." (2)Expenditures shown for 2009 for PNGS include onJy those expenditures made subsequent to the acquisition in September 2009 of the remaining 50%interest in PNGS. (3)Primarily consists of pipeline connections,upgrades and truck stations and new tank construction and refurbishing. 3-85 PAml!U.MnllE II IIUlll( Pier 400 .project.Berth 408 August 21 2012 Distribution of Petroleum Products Crude delivered into Berth 408 will be transported via pipeline to the storage facility.Pacific's customers will then instruct Pacific to deliver it to their refinery. The refinery will manufacture feed stocks,jet fuel,diesel and gasoline.The products will then be transported to product storage area via pipeline.From the product storage areas,the products will be distributed to local filling stations and airports. Distribution of Petroleum Products dick to enlarge Rancho's Gaffey facility can act as a product storage area for Butane ....refined from the oil. 3-86 EXERPTS FROM PLAINS ALL AMERICAN -10K FOR PERIOD ENDED DECEMBER 31,2008 (FILED FEBRUARY,2009)-PAGES 25-27 Description of Segments and Associated Assets Our business activities are conducted through three segments-Transportation,Facilities and Marketing.We have an extensive network of transportation,terminalling and storage facilities at major market hubs and in key oil producing basins and crude oil, refined product and LPG transportation corridors in the United States and Canada. Facilities Segment Our facilities segment operations generally consist of fee-based activities associated with providing storage,terminalling and throughput services for crude oil,refined products and LPG,as well as LPG fractionation and isomerization services.We generate revenue through a combination of month-to-month and multi- year leases and processing arrangements.Revenues generated in this segment include (i)storage fees that are generated when we lease tank capacity,(ii)terminalling fees,or throughput fees,that are generated when we receive crude oil from one connecting pipeline and redeliver crude oil to another connecting carrier and (iii)fees from LPG fractionation and isomerization services. Our facilities segment also includes our equity earnings from our investment in PAANulcan.At December 31,2008,PAANulcan owned and operated approximately31 billion cubic feet of underground natural gas storage capacity,which includes 5 billion cubic feet that was placed in service during October 2008,and another 2 Bet of storage capacity leased from third parties.We are developing an additional 19 billion cubic feet of underground storage capacity,which is expected to be placed into service in phases over the next several years. As of December 31,2008,'we owned and employed a variety of long-term physical assets throughout the United States and Canada in this segment,including: •approximately 55 million barrels of crude oil and refined products capacity primarily at our terminalling and storage locations; 3-87 •approximately 6 million barrels of LPG storage capacity;and • a fractionation plant in Canada with a processing capacity of 4,400 barrels per day,and a fractionation and isomerization facility in California with an aggregate processing capacity of 22,500 barrels per day. At year-end 2008,we were in the process of constructing approximately 5 million barrels of additional above-ground crude oil and refined product terminalling and storage facilities. Below is a detailed description of our more significant facilities segment assets. Major Facilities Assets New Crude Oil Storage Facilities Under Construction and Under Development Pier 400.For a number of years,we or our predecessors have been involved in an effort to develop a deepwater petroleum import terminal at Pier 400 and Terminal Island in the Port of Los Angeles to handle marine receipts of crude oil and refinery feedstocks. As currently envisioned,the project would include a deep water berth, high capacity transfer infrastructure and storage tanks,with a pipeline distribution system that will connect to various customers. In 2004,2005 and 2007,we entered into or modified agreements with refiners in the Los Angeles Basin that provide long- term customer commitments to off-load a total of 200,000 barrels per day of crude oil at the Pier 400 dock.The agreements are subject to satisfaction of various conditions,such as the achievement of various progress milestones,financing,continued economic viability and completion of other ancillary agreements related to the project. Due primarily to regulatory processes and delays,we have failed to meet certain project milestone dates and other economic conditions set forth in our agreements with our customers,and we are likely to miss other project objectives that are key conditions in each of our agreements. 3-88 The project involves a number of state,local and federal agencies and regulatory bodies and,accordingly,the regulatory processes are complex and interrelated with our customer negotiations.These regulatory bodies include the Board of Harbor Commissioners,the South Coast Air Quality Management District, various agencies of the City of Los Angeles,the Los Angeles City Council and the U.S.Army Corps of Engineers.In addition.final construction of the Pier 400 project is subject to the completion of a land lease (that will include a dock construction agreement) with the Port of Los Angeles and receipt of environmental and other approvals. The estimated cost of the project has increased significantly during the regulatory approval process due to increased service and supply costs of the original project,changes in scope of the project to meet long-term objectives of the various regulatory bodies and incremental costs associated with adapting to environmental safeguards and protections required by the governing bodies.We are in the process of completing an updated cost estimate for the Pier 400 project.but based on conditions existing in early 2009 we estimate that the project will cost approximately $575 to $600 million to complete.including $47 million of costs associated with emission reduction credits and development and engineering costs incurred to date and $41 million of estimated capitalized interest to be incurred during the construction period.This estimate is subject to change depending on various factors,including the final scope of the project and the requirements imposed through the permitting process.This cost estimate assumes the construction of 4 million barrels of storage. Although we continue to work together with customers and regulatory bodies in an attempt to advance the project,due to the aforementioned factors as well as the impact of a weakening economic environment,we can provide no assurance that (i)the project will receive all the necessary regulatory approvals (although we know of no reason that it should not receive regulatory approvals); (ii)even if approved,the project will be constructed;or (iii)if constructed,the project will generate satisfactory economic returns. 3-89 Items 1 and 2.Business and Properties General Plains All American Pipeline,L.P.is a Delaware limited partnership formed in 1998. Our operations are conducted directly and indirectly through our primary operating subsidiaries.As used in this Form 10-K and unless the context indicates otherwise,the terms "Partnership,""Plains,""we,""us,""our,""ours"and similar terms refer to Plains All American Pipeline,L.P.and its subsidiaries. We are engaged in the transportation,storage,terminalling and marketing of crude oil, refined products and liquefied petroleum gas and other natural gas-related petroleum products.We refer to liquefied petroleum gas and other natural gas-related petroleum products collectively as "LPG."We are also engaged in the development and operation of natural gas storage facilities. Our business activities are conducted through three segments:Transportation,Facilities and Supply and Logistics.We previously referred to the Supply and Logistics segment as the Marketing segment.We revised the segment name to better describe the business activities conducted within that segment. Organizational History We were formed as a master limited partnership to acquire and operate the midstream crude oil businesses and assets of a predecessor entity and completed our initial public offering in 199-8.Our 2%general partner interest is held by PAA GP LLC,a Delaware limited liability company,whose sole member is Plains AAP,L.P.,a Delaware limited partnership.Plains All American GP LLC,a Delaware limited liability company,is Plains AAP,L.P.'s general partner.References to our "general partner,"as the context requires,include any or all of PAA GP LLC,Plains AAP,L.P.and Plains All American GP LLC.Plains AAP,L.P.and Plains All American GP LLC are owned by 13 holders,with four of these holders owning an aggregate interest of95%.See Item 12. "Security Ownership ofCertain Beneficial Owners and Management and Related Unitholder Matters-Beneficial Ownership ofGeneral Partner Interest." Partnership Structure and Management Our operations are conducted through,and our operating assets are owned by,our subsidiaries.Plains All American GP LLC has ultimate responsibility for conducting our business and managing our operations.See Item 10."Directors and Executive Officers ofour General Partner and Corporate Governance."Our general partner does not receive a management fee or other compensation in connection with its management of our business,but it is reimbursed for substantially all direct and indirect expenses incurred on our behalf (other than expenses related to the Class B units of Plains AAP, L.P.). 3-90 Business Strategy Our principal business strategy is to provide competitive and efficient midstream transportation, terminalling,storage and supply and logistics services to our producer,refiner and other customers. Toward this end,we endeavor to address regional supply and demand imbalances for crude oil,refined products,LPG and natural gas storage in the United States and Canada by combining the strategic location and capabilities of our transportation,terminalling and storage assets with our extensive supply,logistics and distribution expertise. We believe successful execution of this strategy will enable us to generate sustainable earnings and cash flow.We intend to manage and grow our business by: •optimizing our existing assets and realizing cost efficiencies through operational improvements; •developing and implementing internal growth projects that (i)address evolving crude oil,refmed products and LPG needs in the midstream transportation and infrastructure sector and (ii)are well positioned to benefit from long-term industry trends and opportunities; •utilizing our assets along the Gulf,West and East Coasts along with our terminals and leased assets to optimize our presence in the waterborne importation of foreign crude oil; •capitalizing on the anticipated long-term growth in demand for natural gas storage services in North America by owning and operating high-qualifY natural gas storage facilities and providing our current and future customers reliable,competitive and flexible natural gas storage and related services; •selectively pursuing strategic and accretive acquisitions of crude oil,refmed products and LPG transportation,terminalling,storage and supply and logistics assets and businesses that complement our existing asset base and distribution capabilities;and •using our terminaLling and storage assets in conjunction with our supplY and logistics activities to capitalize on inefficient energy markets and to address physical market imbalances.mitigate inherent risks and increase margin. We believe PNGS's natural gas storage assets are also well-positioned to benefit from long-term industry trends and opportunities.PNGS's growth strategies are to develop and implement internal growth projects and to selectively pursue strategic and accretive natural gas storage projects and facilities.Through execution of such growth strategies,we intend to expand the scale and scope ofour natural gas storage business.We may also prudently and economically leverage our asset base,knowledge base and skill sets to participate in other energy-related businesses that have characteristics and opportunities similar to,or that otherwise complement,our existing activities. Credit Rating As of February 2010,our senior unsecured ratings with Standard &Poor's Ratings Services and Moody's Investors Service were BBB-.stahle outlook.and Baa3,stable outlook,respectively,both of which are considered "investment grade"ratings.We have targeted the attainment of stronger investment grade ratings of mid to high-BBB and Baa 3-91 categories for Standard &Poor's and Moody's,respectively.However,our current ratings might not remain in effect for any given period of time,we might not be able to attain the higher ratings we have targeted and one or both of these ratings might be lowered or withdrawn entirely by the rating agencies.Note that a credit rating is not a recommendation to buy,sell or hold securities,and may be revised or withdrawn at any time.See Item 1A."Risk Factors-Risks Related to Our Business-Loss ofcredit rating or the ability to receive open credit could negatively affect our ability to use the counter- cyclical aspects ofour asset base or to capitalize on a volatile market"for discussion of the potential impacts of a downgrade in our credit ratings. Competitive Strengths We believe that the following competitive strengths position us to successfully execute our principal business strategy: Many ofour transportation segment andfacilities segment assets are strategically located and operationally flexible.The majority of our primary transportation segment assets are in crude oil service,are located in well-established oil producing regions and transportation corridors,and are connected,directly or indirectly, with our facilities segment assets located at major trading locations and premium markets that serve as gateways to major North American refInery and distribution markets where we have strong business relationships. We possess specialized crude oil market knowledge.We believe our business relationships with participants in various phases of the crude oil distribution chain,from crude oil producers to refIners,as well as our own industry expertise,provide us with an extensive understanding ofthe North American physical crude oil markets. Our crude oil supply and logistics activities are counter-cyclically balanced We believe the variety of activities executed within our supply and logistics segment provides us with a counter-cyclical balance that generally affords us the flexibility (i)to maintain a base level of margin irrespective of crude oil market conditions and (ii),in certain circumstances,to realize incremental margin during volatile market conditions. Natural gas storage provides diversifying growth to fee-based business. This business is underpinned by long term capacity contracts serviced by two facilities including the Pine Prairie facility.Expansion activity at the Pine Prairie facility will enable us to benefit from anticipated long-term growth in demand for natural gas storage capacity in North America. We have the evaluation,integration and engineering skill sets and the financial flexibility to continue to pursue acquisition and expansion opportunities.Over the past twelve years,we have completed and integrated 59 acquisitions with an aggregate purchase price of approximately $6.4 billion.We have also implemented internal expansion capital projects totaling approximately $2.1 billion.In addition,we believe we have resources to [mance future strategic expansion and acquisition 3-92 opportunities.As of December 31,2009,we had approximately $950 million available under our committed credit facilities,subject to continued covenant compliance. We have an experienced management team whose interests are aligned with those ofour unitholders.Our executive management team has an average of 25 years industry experience,and an average of 16 years with us or our predecessors and affiliates. In addition,through their ownership of common units,indirect interests in our general partner,grants of phantom units and the Class B units in Plains AAP,L.P.,our management team has a vested interest in our continued success. 3-93 Plains All AIlll'riean GfLLC I"'. (kllL""I!';"lnc,1"le'·",1 I PAAGPLLC 100% Mc,nl~f 1",<;."'~1 1%Gcn<''l'a.1 I'·,ulnl.'"'IniaC's! Plains AU American Pil)eline.L.P. (Pal1l1cn,hip and th .registrant) Optrali/lg Subsidiaric'it (3) Finance Cn·[s!ciuel:" (PAA FinauC'l'Cmll.) (1)Based on Form 4 filings for executive officers and directors,13D filings for Paul G. Allen and Richard Kayne and other information believed to be reliable for the remaining investors,this group,or affiliates of such investors,owns approximately 25 rrtillion limited partner units,representing approximately 18%of all outstanding units. (2)Incentive Distribution Rights ("IDRs").See Item 5."Marketfor Registrant's Common Units,Related Unitholder Matters and Issuer Purchases ofEquity Securities"for discussion of our general partner's incentive distribution rights. (3)The Partnership holds direct and indirect ownership interests in consolidated operating subsidiaries including,but not limited to,Plains Pipeline,L.P.,Plains Marketing,L.P.,Plains LPG Services,L.P.,Pacific Energy Group LLC,PMC (Nova Scotia)Company,Plains Marketing Canada,L.P., PAA Natural Gas Storage,LLC ("PNGS")and Plains Midstream Canada VLC. (4)The Partnership holds direct and indirect equity interests in unconsolidated entities including Settoon Towing,LLC ("Settoon Towing"),Butte Pipe Line Company ("Butte")and Frontier Pipeline Company ("Frontier "). 3-94 Page 61 of Form 10-K for PLAINS ALL AMERICAN,LP for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31,2009 filed February 26,2010. Acquisitions Acquisitions are financed using a combination of equity and debt,including borrowings under our credit facilities and the issuance of senior notes.Businesses acquired impact our results of operations commencing on the effective date of each acquisition.Our acquisition and capital expansion activities are discussed further in "-Liquidity and Capital Resources"and in Note 3 to our Consolidated Financial Statements.Information regarding acquisitions completed in 2009,2008 and 2007 is set forth in the table below (in millions): Effective Acquisition Acquisition Date Price Operating Segment PNGS 09/03/2009 $215 Facilities Other (l)Various 178 Transportation &Facilities 2009 Total $393 Rainbow 0510112008 $687 Transportation San Pedro and other 11/13/2008 48 Facilities 2008 Total $735 Bumstead LPG Storage Facility 07/24/2007 $52 Facilities Tirzah LPG Storage Facility 10/2/2007 54 Facilities Other Various 19 Transportation and Supply &Logistics 2007 Total $125 (1 )Consists of six small acquisitions. 3-95 Page F -43 of Form 10-K for PLAINS ALL AMERICAN.LP for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31,2009 filed February 26,2010. Insurance A pipeline,terminal or other facility may experience damage as a result of an accident, natural disaster or terrorist activity.These hazards can cause personal injury and loss of life,severe damage to and destruction of property and equipment,pollution or environmental damage and suspension of operations.We maintain insurance ofvarious types that we consider adequate to cover our operations and properties.The insurance covers our assets in amounts considered reasonable.The insurance policies are subject to deductibles that we consider reasonable and not excessive.Our insurance does not cover everv potential risk associated with operating pipelines,terminals and other facilities,including the potential loss of significant revenues.The overall trend in the insurance industry appears to be a contraction in the breadth and depth ofavailable coverage.while costs.deductibles and retention levels have increased. Absent a material favorable change in the insurance markets,this trend is expected to continue as we continue to grow and 'expand.As a result.we anticipate that we will elect to self-insure more ofour environmental and wind damage exposures.incorporate higher retention in our insurance arrangements.pay higher premiums or some combination ofsuch actions. The occurrence of a significant event not fully insured,indemnified or reserved against, or the failure qf a party to meet its indemnification obligations,could materially and adversely affect our operations and financial condition.We believe we are adequately insured for public liability and property damage to others with respect to our operations. With respect to all of our coverage,we may not be able to maintain adequate insurance in the future at rates we consider reasonable.In addition,although we believe that we have established adequate reserves to the extent that such risks are not insured,costs incurred in excess of these reserves may be higher and may potentially have a material adverse effect on our financial conditions,results of operations or cash flows. Note 12-Environmental Remediation We currently own or lease,and in the past have owned and leased,properties where hazardous liquids,including hydrocarbons,are or have been handled.These properties and the hazardous liquids or associated wastes disposed thereon may be subject to CERCLA,RCRA and state and Canadian federal and provincial laws and regulations. Under such laws and regulations,we could be required to remove or remediate hazardous liquids or associated wastes (including wastes disposed of or released by prior owners or operators)and to clean up contaminated property (including contaminated groundwater). We maintain insurance of various types with varying levels of coverage that we consider adequate under the circumstances to cover our operations and properties.The insurance P?licies are subject to deductibles and retention levels that we consider reasonable and 3-96 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY -June 12,2000 -Risk Management Plan AmeriGas Propane L.P.(JlAmeriGas Jl )is the nation's largest distributor of propane in the United States,with over 600 retail locations,300 satellite locations,and 12 terminal locations.We operate in 45 states with over 5/500 employees.We are the industry leader in gallons distributed and customers served,and we continuously strive to be the industry leader in safety innovation and practices.We constantly endeavor to improve our safety performance as it relates to our employees,our customers,the environment and the general public with whom we work. AmeriGas staffs a professional Safety Department at our Corporate Headquarters in King of Prussia,Pennsylvania.AmeriGas also has six Regional Safety Managers,an Operations Safety Manager,a Safety &Technology Manager,and a Logistics &Supply Safety Manager strategically located throughout the United States.These safety professionals are able to immediately respond to a serious incident and provide technical expertise to emergency response agencies on the scene of the incident.AmeriGas also has a 24-hours-a -day Emergency Communications Center,which handles all after-hours and emergency calls from around the country.Located in Rocklin,California,the ECC has the ability to contact AmeriGas field personnel on any type of incident encountered at any AmeriGas loca~ion,or by AmeriGas customers. ACCIDENTAL RELEASE PROGRAM At this facility we store and distribute butane,which is considered a regulated flammable substance by the EPA.The same properties that make butane valuable as a fuel also make it necessary to observe certain safety precautions in handling propane to prevent unnecessary human exposure,to reduce potential hazards to our own personal health and safety as well as our coworkers,and to reduce the potential hazard to nearby members of the community.It is our Company's policy to adhere to all applicable Federal, state and local rules and regulations.Safe handling of butane is dependent upon a number of factors,including the safety devices inherent in the design of this facility,safe handling procedures,and the continuous training of our personnel. STATIONARY SOURCE AND REGUALTED SUBSTANCES HANDLED The primary purpose of this facility is to store and distribute butane to wholesale customers.Butane is used by our customers as a gasoline additive. Butane is received by pipeline,railcar,ship or transport truck and stored in 2 bulk storage tanks of 13 million gallon capacity each.Butane is distributed to customers by transport trucks.This facility has equipment for unloading transport trucks,railcars and ships.Access to the site is restricted to authorized facility employees,authorized management personnel and authorized contractors. The regulated substance handled at this facility is butane. The maximum amount of butane that can be stored at this facility is 115,310,647 pounds. 3-97 WORST CASE SCENARIO AND ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO Worst-case and Alternative Scenario Information is contained in the appropriate Sections of this Risk Management Plan. EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN,ACCIDENTAL RELEASE PROGRAM AND SPECIFIC PREVENTION STEPS This AmeriGas butane storage and distribution facility complies with the EPA's Accidental Release Prevention Rule and all applicable federal,state and local codes and regulations.This facility was designed and constructed in accordance with NFPA-58.All of our drivers have been thoroughly trained using the National Propane Gas Association's Certified Employee Training Program (CETP).The worst-case scenario and alternative scenario have an extremely small chance of occurring.Our butane storage tanks are designed for butane service and may remain in service indefinitely.Our preventative maintenance program ensures that our bulk storage tanks are structurally sound,are maintained regularly,and are inspected per industry standards and state law. FIVE YEAR ACCIDENT HISTORY This facility has had one reportable release of butane in the past five years. On 9/15/96,a vaLve faiLure led to the release of 9,720 pounds of butane to the atmosphere,which quickly evaporated and dissipated.The Los Angeles City Fire Department responded to the facility and directed the emergency response efforts.There were no injuries and no 'damage to public or environmental receptors as a result of this release. EMEREGNCY RESPONSE PROGRAM The emergency response plan for this AmeriGas facility includes procedures for notification of the local fire,law enforcement and medical authorities,as well as notification of any potentially affected neighbors. This facility's emergency response program is based upon the following publications and standards: National Propane Gas Association (NPGA)LP-Gas Safety Handbooks: "Guidelines for Developing Plant Emergency Procedures"and "How to Control LP-Gas Leaks and Fires." Occupational Safety &Health Administration (OSHA)Occupational Safety & Health Standards for General Industry (29 CFR 1910): Section 38,"Employee Emergency Plan and Fire Prevention Plans"and Section 120,"Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response" National Fire Protection Association (NFPA): NFPA-58,the Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code and NFPA-54,the National Fuel Gas Code. We have discussed this program with the California Region 1 (Los Angeles County)Local Emergency Planning Committee and the Los Angeles Fire Department.A representative of the California Occupational Safety &Health Administration (CalOSH)visited and inspected this facility on March 15, 1995. 3-98 PLANNED CHANGES TO IMPROVE SAFETY This facility was constructed in 1974 and is in compliance with NFPA-58 Standard.AmeriGas acquired this facility from CalGas Propane Company in 1983. A major plant modification was completed by AmeriGas in 1983,in which a second bulk storage tank was added,a new compressor was installed,a transport unloading bulkhead was added,and the hydrostatic relief valves were changed on all bulk storage tanks.At this time,there are no p~ans for any future modifications to this faci~ity. 3-99 E-mail from Diana Nave with attached article about rail tank car safety (dated 9/13/12) 3-100 Page 1 of 1 Kit Fox From:diana nave [diananave@gmail.com] Sent:Thursday,September 13,2012 11 :28 AM To:John Greenwood;katie marrie;pete burmeister;bob bryant;CYNTHIA Gonyea;Anise Goldfarb; Carolyn Grayson;Kristina Smith;John Greenwood;Scott Allman;Barbara schach;craig goldfarb;dan dixon;Ray Regalado;Laurie Jacobs;laureen vivian;george thompson;Gary Buss; joe@joebuscaino.com;jacob haik;gordon teuber;Kevin Bingham; Assemblymember.Lowenthal@assembly.ca.gov;Linda alexander;june smith;Pat Nave;Kit Fox; Michael Aguilera;Elise Swanson SUbject:Tanker rail car has dangerous design flaw Begin forwarded message: From:diananave@earthlink.net Date:'September 13,2012 11 :17:00 AM PDT To:diananave@gmail.com Subject:E-mail-A-Friend:Tanker rail car has dangerous design flaw Comment: Story: Tanker rail car has dangerous design flaw CHICAGO -For two decades,one of the most commonly used type of rail tanker has been allowed to haul hazardous liquids from coast to coast even though transportation officials were aware of a dangerous design flaw that almost guarantees the car will tear open in an accident,potentially spilling cargo that could catch fire,explode or contaminate the environment. For more of this story,click on or type the URL below: http://www.daily- chronicle.comlartic1esI20 12/09/l2/968442be8 1dc4ae898d967l5a 1f23ebb/index.xml 10/812012 3-101 By JASON KEYSER - The Associated Press Tanker rail car has dangerous design flaw CHICAGO – For two decades, one of the most commonly used type of rail tanker has been allowed to haul hazardous liquids from coast to coast even though transportation officials were aware of a dangerous design flaw that almost guarantees the car will tear open in an accident, potentially spilling cargo that could catch fire, explode or contaminate the environment. The rail and chemical industries have committed to a safer design for new tankers but are pressing regulators not to require modifications to tens of thousands of existing cars, despite a spike in the number of accidents as more tankers are put into service to accommodate soaring demand for ethanol, the highly flammable corn-based fuel usually transported by rail. Derailments have triggered chemical spills and massive blasts like one in July in Columbus, Ohio, that blew up with such intensity that one witness said it “looked like the sun exploded.” Some communities with busy railways are beginning to regard the tankers as a serious threat to public safety. Barrington’s mayor is trying to build a national coalition to push for safety reforms. The wealthy Chicago suburb sees many ethanol tankers snake through a bustling downtown. The tanker, known as the DOT-111, is a workhorse of the American rail fleet, with a soda-can shape that makes it one of the most easily recognizable cars on freight routes. The tanker itself is not suspected of causing derailments, but its steel shell is too thin to resist puncture in accidents. The ends are especially vulnerable to tears from couplers that can rip off between cars. Unloading valves and other exposed fittings on the tops of tankers also can break during rollovers. The flaws were noted as far back as a 1991 safety study. An Associated Press analysis of 20 years’ worth of federal rail accident data found that ethanol tankers have been breached in at least 40 serious accidents since 2000. In the previous decade, there were just two breaches. The number of severe crashes is small considering the total mileage covered by the many tankers in service. But the accident reports show at least two people have been killed by balls of flame, with dozens more hurt. And the risk of greater losses looms large. The rail and chemical industries and tanker manufacturers have acknowledged the design flaws and voluntarily committed to safety changes for cars built after October 2011 to transport ethanol and crude oil. The improvements include thicker tank shells and shields on the ends of tanks to prevent punctures. But under their proposal to regulators, the 30,000 to 45,000 existing ethanol tankers would remain unchanged, including many cars that have only recently begun their decades-long service lives. The National Transportation Safety Board asked in March for the higher standards to be applied to all tankers, meaning existing cars would have to be retrofitted or phased out. The industry’s proposal “ignores the safety risks posed by the current fleet,” the NTSB said, adding that those cars “can almost always be expected to breach in derailments that involve pileups or multiple car-to-car impacts.” The federal Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, part of the U.S. Department of Transportation, is considering both arguments, but the regulatory process is slow and could take several years, experts said. Industry representatives say a retrofit isn’t feasible because of engineering challenges and costs. They insist the threat of serious accidents is overstated. “How many millions of miles have the 111 cars run without problems?” said Lawrence Bierlein, an attorney for the Association of Hazmat Shippers Inc. “It’s more likely you’re going to be hit by lightning.” But worries about the tankers’ weaknesses persist, especially since the volume of dangerous cargo on American rails is only expected to grow. Ethanol production has soared from 900 million gallons in 1990 to nearly 14 billion gallons last year. Seeking to lessen America’s dependence on foreign oil, federal mandates will quadruple the amount of ethanol and other renewable fuel that’s blended into the nation’s gasoline and diesel by 2022. Nearly all of it moves by rail. In 2010, that meant 325,000 carloads of ethanol, according to the Association of American Railroads. Ethanol is now the highest-volume hazardous material shipped by rail. In 2000, it wasn’t even in the top 10. “That may account for the increasing frequency of accidents involving the DOT-111s and the current attention that’s being drawn to them,” said Paul Stancil, a senior hazardous materials accident investigator with the NTSB. Page 1 of 2Print Version: Tanker rail car has dangerous design flaw 9/13/2012http://www.daily-chronicle.com/2012/09/12/tanker-rail-car-has-dangerous-design-flaw/am... 3-102 Since 2005, ethanol has increasingly been shipped in higher densities using “virtual pipelines” — trains in which every car carries the same product. The NTSB says that practice increases the potential severity of accidents like one in 2009 in the northern Illinois city of Rockford. On the way home from her nursing job, Chris Carter stopped at a rail crossing near Rockford as a Canadian National freight train barreled past carrying more than 2 million gallons of ethanol to Chicago. Unknown to the train’s two crew members and the small number of waiting motorists, a section of track had washed out in a rainstorm earlier that evening. “I notice to my right side there’s sparks like fireworks, like a sparkler,” Carter said. “So that catches my eye. In my head I’m going, ‘Oh my God, this is going to derail.’ I could feel it, I could tell.” The train began to come apart, its cars bouncing and colliding like toys thrown by a child. One exploded as it tumbled through the air. “I stood there just frozen, watching these unbelievable explosions,” Carter recalled. “The concussion from the energy just blew your hair back.” More than 20 miles away, Carter’s husband and son saw the fire from their farmhouse. It looked to them like a sunrise. As Carter and the others ran, an older woman who injured her knee couldn’t move. She cast a tiny silhouette against an enormous wall of flame. A man ran back and rescued her. On the other side of the tracks, one of the explosions washed over the van of Jose Tellez and his family. His wife, Zoila, was killed. Witness Matthew Koch told a local newspaper he saw Zoila Tellez run from the vehicle in flames and fall to her knees with her arms outstretched as if she were reaching out for help. Jose Tellez suffered burns, and his adult daughter, Addriana, who was five months’ pregnant, lost her baby. In addition to the fatality, 11 people were injured, making it the nation’s single worst ethanol tanker accident. Nineteen of the 114 cars derailed. Thirteen released ethanol and caught fire. In its final report in February, the NTSB cited the “inadequate design” of the tanker cars as a factor contributing to the severity of the accident. The other accident in which a release of ethanol claimed a life was a 1996 derailment at Cajon Junction in southern California. The train’s brakeman, who was thrown or jumped from the locomotive, burned to death after apparently trying to crawl to safety in a creek bed. The Ohio derailment forced a mile-wide evacuation just north of downtown Columbus. Three tankers, each carrying 30,000 gallons of ethanol, caught fire and filled the night sky with flames. “The heat was so excruciating that I had to ball up and cover my body,” said Nicholas Goodrich, a grocery store employee who happened to be nearby and ran to the scene. The cost of retrofitting existing tankers is estimated conservatively at $1 billion and would be shouldered mostly by the ethanol-makers who own and lease the cars. The rail industry points to its improving safety record, but that’s little comfort to communities like Barrington, said Village President Karen Darch. “There’s a risk every day of affecting lots of people in one incident,” Darch said, “lots of property, but obviously most importantly, lots of people’s lives.” Copyright © 2012 Daily Chronicle. All rights reserved. Page 2 of 2Print Version: Tanker rail car has dangerous design flaw 9/13/2012http://www.daily-chronicle.com/2012/09/12/tanker-rail-car-has-dangerous-design-flaw/am... 3-103 Staff E-mail to interested parties regarding tonight’s meeting (dated 10/4/12) 3-104 Page 1 of1 Kit Fox From:Kit Fox Sent:Thursday,October 04,2012 2:38 PM To:'Kit Fox' Cc:Carolynn Petru;Carolyn Lehr SUbject:Rancho Palos Verdes City Council Discussion of Rancho LPG Facility in San Pedro on October 16, 2012 Dear Interested Party: As you are probably aware,City Staff has been briefing the Rancho Palos Verdes City Council on issues related to the Rancho LPG facility in San Pedro for the past two (2)years as a part of the regular,bi- monthly Border Issues Status Reports.On August 21,2012,Councilwoman Susan Brooks asked the City Council to consider agendizing a discussion of this facility as a separate agenda item at a future City Council meeting.You may review the video of the City Council's August 21 st discussion and Councilwoman Brooks'memorandum at the following links: http://www.palosverdes.com/rpv/citycouncil/agenda videos/display/index.cfm?id=242 http://www.palosverdes.com/rpv/citycou nci l/agendas/20 12 Agendas/Meeting Date-2012-08- 21/RPVCCA CC SS 2012 08 21 02b Rancho LPG Butane Storage Facility.pdf This matter has been scheduled for the City Council meeting of October 16,2012,which begins at 7:00 PM at Hesse Park Community Building,29301 Hawthorne Blvd.,Rancho Palos Verdes,CA 90275.Staff intends to prepare a report asking the City Council to:1)consider a range of options for responding to community concerns about this facility;and 2)provide direction to Staff as deemed appropriate.The Staff report for this item should be posted on the City's website (http://www.palosverdes.com/rpv)by Thursday or Friday of next week. Thank you very much for your interest in this matter. Sincerely, Kit Pox,AICP Senior Administrative Analyst City Manaaer's Office City o£Rancho Palos Verdes 30940 Iiawthorne Blvd. Rancho Palos Verdes,CA 90275 T:(31O)544-5226 F:(310)544-5291 E:kit£@rpv.com 10/8/2012 3-105 E-mail from Janet Gunter to LA Councilman Buscaino (dated 10/4/12) 3-106 Page 1 of2 Kit Fox From:Janet Gunter [arriane5@aol.com] Sent:Thursday,October 04,20122:47 PM To:Kit Fox Subject:Fwd:MOST RECENT MOTION ON RANCHO/LIQUID BULK FACILITIES Hi Kit- Just received your notice for the RPV Council agenda.I have sent this email to both Councilmembers Brooks and Campbell ....but.would like for you to distribute to all other members and whomever you feel appropriate since it is directly related to Rancho. -----Original Message----- From:Janet Gunter <arriane5@aol.com> To:Joebuscaino <Joebuscaino@cox.net>;jacob.haik <jacob.haik@lacity.org>;kevin.bingham <kevin.bingham@lacity.org> Cc:det31 0 <det31 O@juno.com>;jody.james <jody.james@sbcglobal.net>;IVIrEnvirlaw <MrEnvirlaw@sbcglobal.net>;connie <connie@rutter.us>;dakotahpat <dakotahpaf@sbcglobal.net>; chateau4us <chateau4us@att.net>;diananave <diananave@earthlnk.net>;qve.rbid2002 <overbid2002@yahoo.com>;burling1 02 <burling1 02@aol.com>;pmwarren <pmwarren@cox.net>; marciesmiller <marciesmiller@sbcglobal.net>;igornla <igornla@cox.net>;dwgkaw <dwgkaw@hotmail.com>;greenwood.coro <greenwood.coro@gmail.com>;dgdavidgreene <dgdavidgreene@yahoo.com>;marisol.espinoza <marisol.espinoza@lacity.org>;jcynthiaperry <jcynth iaperry@aol.com>;mand m8602 <mandm8602@att.net>;d Irivera <d lrivera@prodigy.net>; jnmarquez <jnmarquez@prodigy.net>;brian.campbell <brian.campbell@rpv.com>;susan.brooks <susan.brooks@rpv.com>;carriescoville <carriescoville@yahoo.com>;fbmjet <fbmjet@aol.com> Sent:Tue,Oct 2.2012 11 :51 am Subject:MOST RECENT MOTION ON RANCHO/LIQUID BULK FACILITIES Dear Councilman Buscaino &Staff: So,we now have two study motions from you.Joe ....and one from Jan Perry.We also appear to have one study in progress as per a JUly 31 st letter from the Public Safety Committee to Gerry Miller (Chief Legislative Analyst). Miller needs some encouragement from your office ...(assuming that you are sincere about getting action on this issue)that it would be a good idea to recommend to the Council that the Rancho property be put into the geographical boundaries of the Harbor (Pat Nave's idea)so that the Harbor Department can undertake the necessary evaluation and leverage the eminent domain possibilities as part of the Pier 400 negotiations ...Then once that is done,the property can be removed from the Harbor Dept.jurisdiction by again amending the boundaries. I,and several others,can't help but wonder why it takes three motions to do the same thing that was originally requested.It appears to be a bit contrived,no?We would love for our Councilman to prove himself and his interest in taking serious action by having this item promptly calendared in Reyes'PLUM (Planning and Land Use Management Committee),then passed through (or waived through)for a vote by the entire City Council.That should be entirely doable.While.everyone is being assured that our Councilman is really trying to "do"something on Rancho ....what really appears to be happening is simply a repetition of that which is already in the pipeline. What would hearten us all would be if our councilman would: 1.Push Gerry Millier (CLA)for a report back ASAP on this ...and then to meet with us (the Harbor folks) to discuss what is happening with Rancho (Plains)on the Pier 400 Negotiations. 2.Use the City Council subpoena power to get Rancho's insurance policies. 3.Introduce a motion to get the property transferred into the Harbor Dept.. 10/8/2012 3-107 Page 2 of2 4.Direct that the City Attorney's conflict of interest in representing the Harbor requires that outside counsel advise the City on the full nature and extent of its liability in the event of an accident; 5.Direct the City Controller to come up with a cost estimate of what it would take to fight a butane fire at the facility; 6.Direct the CLA and the Harbor Dept.to consider the Contra Costa County Risk Management Ordinance,and pass a resolution stating that the City of LA should have a similar ordinance;and that the City lobbyist before the County Board of Supervisors should lobby for the passage of such an ordinance; 7.Advise the City Council to specifically inquire as to the degree of protection the City has from Rancho to cover its exposure in the event of an accident; 8.Limit its focus to just Rancho,instead of purposely trying to confuse and complicate the discussion by including other facilities ...This latter will only delay,deflect,and obfuscate the real problem issue,Rancho. Motions such as the one presented are common and the typical bureaucratic game where the Motion is introduced never to be heard again.Since this is a simple directive,this can and should be scheduled post- haste ....Otheiwise it appears to be mere pander and pretense.. This motion needs to have a deadline on it.....and it needs to be coordinafed with the pending motion which is being held up in Englander's committee -while the old Perry Motion (council File No.11-1813 )-awaits Gerry Miller's report on the outcome of his 'meetings'on the safety of Rancho's facility (and other bulk storage facilities). Having grouped all of these liquid bulk facilities together has unduly expanded the scope of the work required, when really a more focused effort is needed.It becomes difficult to try and understand why the Council office would purposely make it harder on yourselves and drag things out while you are professing to want to take serious action on the issue of Rancho. In order to prove your office's concern about Rancho,it would be tremendously meaningful to introduce a motion that makes reference to the specific alternatives noted above ...and gets the matter quickly before Council to be heard by all the Counc[lmembers.This would really get the ball rolling. The clock is ticking louder everyday at the Rancho facility.There has been a unforgivable 40 year delay in justice that has knowingly allowed public safety to be ignored.Your pledge in your election campaign was to provide a "different"and "better"community through your leadership.All we are asking is that you live up to your pledge. You are right....Public Safety SHOULD be FIRST.We urge you to put it there and in front of the Plains All American business plan. Thank you, Janet Gunter 10/8/2012 3-108